Confiscation by the ruler: a study of the Ottoman practice

of Müsadere, 1700s-1839 by Arslantaş, Yasin
1 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
Confiscation by the Ruler: A Study of the Ottoman Practice 
of Müsadere, 1700s-1839 
 
 
 
 
Yasin Arslantaş 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economic History 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, September 2017 
 
 
2 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the 
MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated 
that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work car-
ried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis 
may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.  
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, 
infringe the rights of any third party.  
I declare that my thesis consists of 74,452 words.  
Statement of use of third party for editorial help 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of lan-
guage, spelling and grammar by Maxine Montaigne and Jared Kent 
Newman.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
To Hilal and Erdem with love 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Writing this thesis has been the most challenging task of my life. 
I want to thank all the below mentioned people who made it easier. My 
primary supervisor, Tirthankar Roy kindly agreed to take me as his 
student at the halfway mark and brought extra-Ottoman perspective 
to my attention ever since. My secondary supervisor, Ali Coşkun 
Tunçer has played a crucial role over the course of four years by giving 
me constant support whenever I needed his help. I thank all my friends 
in the department of economic history at the LSE, especially but not 
exclusively Thilo Albers, Mattia Bertazzini, Enrique Jorge-Sotelo, 
Kazuo Kobayashi, Leonard Kukic, Maxine Montaigne, Sumiyo Nishi-
zaki, Andrea Papadia, Esther Sahle, Greta Seibel, Gerardo Serra and 
Franz Zobl. Joan Roses and Eric Schneider of the LSE gave me quite 
useful feedback. I made a good friend, Daniel Gallardo Albarran during 
his visit to the LSE. Long chats with Selçuk Aydın have always been 
eye-opening. Back in Turkey, Bilgin Bari and Sevilay Küçüksakarya 
Atlama were kind and helpful during the early stage of my doctoral 
studies. Without Uğur Aytun’s friendship, I would not even be able to 
come to the UK. My dear cousins Fırat and Serhat Oğuz opened their 
houses to me during my archival visit in Istanbul.  
I am grateful to many institutions too. First and foremost, the 
Turkish Council of Higher Education and Anadolu University funded 
my doctoral studies at the LSE. The staffs of the Prime Ministry Otto-
man Archives in Istanbul and the archives of Directorate General of 
Foundations in Ankara have been very helpful during my archival vis-
its. I have also received funding for conference attendance and archival 
research from the LSE and the Economic History Society. I have bene-
fited much from working at the libraries of London among which are 
SOAS library, Institute of Historical Research Library and Senate 
House Library. Finally, we thank the founders and staff of Nansen Vil-
lage who created such a lovely and affordable place to live, and our 
fellow Nanseners who shared the last four years of our lives.  
5 
I know that my education life was unusually long for my family. 
I would not have written these words without the importance my father 
attributed to our education. His tiny home library full of encyclopae-
dias, absent from many houses in his extended family, was where I 
developed an interest in history and geography, which I consider my 
first step to social sciences. To express my gratitude to my mother, I 
cannot say anything more than what Azeri poet Vahapzade wrote: 
‘Through this language I have created/My every poem/My every 
tune/No, I am nothing/I am a lie/It is my mother who is the writer/Of 
my words book by book.’ My sisters, Derya and Hülya always stood 
together with me through this difficult path. Finally, it is my wife, Hilal, 
who endured all the hardships of my studies and she was the one who 
made the biggest sacrifice by leaving her job back in Turkey. If we are 
seeing this day, it is a joint work of both of us. And, towards the end 
of our journey, our son Erdem was born. If you are reading this from 
sometime in future, I hope that you will find it good enough to forgive 
me for stealing from the time I should have spent with you. This thesis 
is dedicated to my wife and son with love.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the practice of confiscation in the Ottoman 
Empire during the long-eighteenth century. It investigates what ena-
bled, guided and motivated the sovereign to confiscate the property of 
elites, and how and to what extent this occurred. The contribution of 
this thesis is twofold. First, it provides the first systematic analysis of 
the practice of confiscation in the Ottoman Empire, highlighting the 
basis of selectivity in its application. Second, it contributes to a broader 
line of literature by analysing the drivers, informal constraints and per-
sistence of historical state predation. One of the strengths of the thesis 
is its combination of theory and a rich variety of archival evidence, us-
ing both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The thesis finds that 
müsadere was a selective institution targeting mainly office-holders 
and private tax contractors. However, some were less likely to face or 
more capable of avoiding confiscation than others mainly due to factors 
related to time and location of confiscation, the bargaining position of 
the wealth-holder and the attributes of their wealth. Although confis-
cation was costly and time-consuming to enforce, the sultans were 
continuously interested in it because of its political and redistributive 
functions such as monitoring the behaviour of their agents and pro-
tecting their share in the fiscal revenue from fiscal intermediaries. They 
had power to do so primarily because of many disincentives of collec-
tive action among the targets of confiscation. Through the study of this 
practice, this thesis shows how an early modern monarch, who was 
not formally constrained, could and did confiscate the elite property in 
a time of crisis.  
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1 LITERATURE	REVIEW	AND	INTRODUCTION	TO	THE	
STUDY	
In 1794, the Ottoman central government was informed that 
Hacı Hasan, a tax farmer from Bursa, had died. Following this news, 
the government sent an official tasked with the confiscation of Hasan’s 
estates for the public treasury. According to the inventory prepared by 
this official, the total value of Hasan’s wealth was some 723,846.5 ku-
ruş. Though these inventories were kept with the intention of full con-
fiscation, a process of negotiation with Hasan’s heirs resulted in a deal 
requiring them to pay 300,000 kuruş in cash to the treasury in three 
annuities.1 This type of deal is called bedel-i muhallefat (literally: inher-
itance value) and the above procedure was not uncommon in the eight-
eenth century. The practice of confiscation of personal estates by the 
sultan, known as müsadere in Ottoman historiography, had been a 
common practice since the fifteenth century.2 In general terms, 
müsadere can be defined as the transfer of property from the hands of 
a select group of people to the treasury, either after death or as a way 
of punishment.3 Though generally overlooked by the existing literature, 
it was a selective institution, which excluded some potential targets. 
This thesis is an analysis of the determinants of this selectivity from 
1700s to 1839 during which confiscations were increasingly arbitrary 
in nature and sophisticated in methods of enforcement. 
                                         
1	Nilüfer	Günay	Alkan,	 "Müsaderenin	 Sosyal	 Ve	 Ekonomik	Bir	 Analizi:	 18.	 Yüzyılda	 Bursada	 Yapılan	
Müsadereler,"	Belleten	LXXVI,	no.	277	(2012).	
2	This	study	uses	the	English-language	words	‘confiscate’	and	‘confiscation’	when	referring	to	the	prac-
tice	of	müsadere.	Although	other	words	such	as	expropriation	and	seizure	have	been	used	in	the	cur-
rent	 literature,	confiscation	has	so	 far	been	the	most	preferred	word	 in	English-language	Ottoman	
historiography.	In	this	study,	the	word	müsadere	is	used	interchangeably	with	the	word	confiscation	
and	exclusively	in	discussions	of	Ottoman	historiography	and	when	referring	specifically	to	the	practice	
of	the	Ottomans.		
3	Later	in	this	chapter,	it	will	be	discussed	how	personal	or	private	the	often-confiscated	property	was.	
It	suffices	to	say	here	that	confiscations	covered	any	property	owned	by	the	wealth	holder.	It	is	true	
that	there	was	a	sovereign	ownership	of	land;	yet	even	this	was	changing	in	the	eighteenth	century	in	
favour	of	recognition	of	private	property.		
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Figure 1.1: Presentation of the Severed Head of Ali Paşa of Ya-
nina to Sultan Mahmud II 
 
Source: Accessed through https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/ on 28 August 
2017.4 
Although this is a context-specific study, it sheds some light on 
the interaction between power and prosperity, a relationship which has 
long puzzled economists, political scientists and economic historians. 
In historical settings, state predation has been presented as the main 
                                         
4	In	this	picture,	Ali	Paşa’s	severed	head	is	being	presented	to	the	sultan.	The	practice	of	müsadere	
was	often	a	supplementary	punishment	to	political	execution	(siyaseten	katl).	Previously	the	governor	
of	the	Western	Balkans,	he	rebelled	against	the	central	authority.	He	was	deposed	and	assassinated.	
His	wealth	was	immediately	confiscated.		
19 
obstacle for early modern growth mainly by proponents of New Institu-
tional Economics (NIE) since the 1970s.5 Their main argument is that 
the precocious establishment of the rule of law, mostly linked with con-
straints on government, was the most important determinant of his-
torical economic growth. Although some scholars were more cautious, 
this literature created a dichotomy between absolute and formally lim-
ited regimes. Putting this view in consideration, recent research in 
comparative economic history and historical political economy now 
places more emphasis on state capacity to enforce rules and collect 
taxes as the main drivers of modern economic growth. Thus, it is now 
less credible that the central problem facing early modern economies 
was state predation. This shift of attention, however, does not change 
the fact that confiscation by the ruler was a common phenomenon in 
the pre-modern and early modern times and was exercised with little 
or no formal constraint to their power during much of state history. 
Although several studies rightly claimed that property rights protection 
was a private good and predation was inherently selective before the 
nineteenth century in most parts of the world, this claim has not been 
put into sufficient empirical analysis in a way explaining the determi-
nants of this selectivity. Most importantly, the following questions are 
yet to be answered in the Ottoman context. This study contributes to 
a more balanced understanding of historical state predation and its 
limits, and potentially explain why state predation was not the most 
important culprit for economic stagnation.  
Motivated by the above literature, this thesis analyses the func-
tions, driving forces, actors, informal constraints, survival and aboli-
tion of the müsadere practice with a focus on its latest period, from the 
1700s to 1839. This period was extraordinary considering the rise of 
                                         
5	There	is	a	problem	with	the	use	of	the	terms	pre-modern,	early	modern	and	modern	especially	in	
non-European	contexts.	 It	 is	open	to	debate	whether	and	to	what	extent	there	were	any	pre-nine-
teenth	century	origins	of	Ottoman	modernisation.	While	this	debate	is	beyond	the	aims	of	this	study,	
it	should	be	noted	that	the	year	1839	is	an	important	year	in	Ottoman	history	as	being	a	threshold	of	
modernity.	 See:	 Jack	 A.	 Goldstone,	 "The	 Problem	 of	 the	 "Early	 Modern"	 World,"	 Journal	 of	 the	
Economic	and	Social	History	of	the	Orient	41,	no.	3	(1998).				
20 
the local elites and ever-deteriorating state finances. I find that the sul-
tans confiscated consistent with maximisation of their rule rather than 
acting simply as revenue maximisers during the period under consid-
eration.  The tool of confiscation, despite being costly and lengthy, was 
useful for the sovereign to maintain its control of fiscal and political 
resources. When the crisis threatening the very existence of the empire 
was turned down in favour of the centre in the 1820s, the need for 
such a tool decreased, leading to its abolition in 1839.   
This chapter is constructed as follows. Section 1.1 provides a 
brief historical background to help trace and elucidate the topic in the 
relevant historical context. The first sub-section deals with the origins 
of müsadere as an Islamic state practice and its evolution throughout 
Ottoman history. The second sub-section gives an overview of fiscal 
and political transformation in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Em-
pire. The final sub-section places the thesis in the context of the period 
from which the data was collected. Section 1.2 reviews the literature in 
two sub-sections, dealing with the broader economic historical litera-
ture on state confiscations, and modern Ottoman historiography on 
the müsadere, respectively. Following this review, section 1.3 intro-
duces the research questions, methods and content of the chapters. 
Section 1.4 gives a general overview of the sources. Section 1.5 con-
cludes.  
1.1 Historical	Background	
1.1.1 The	Origins	of	the	Practice	of	Müsadere	
Confiscation by the ruler was a common practice not only in the 
Ottoman Empire but in many parts of the world. The focus here is 
rather directed at Islamic history. The word müsadere is originally Ar-
abic, meaning literally ‘to wrest’.6 The reason the Ottomans used an 
                                         
6	Cengiz	Tomar,	"Müsâdere,"	in	TDV	İslâm	Ansiklopedisi	(İstanbul:	TDV	Yayınları,	2007).	
21 
Arabic word to denote state confiscation goes well beyond the close 
interaction between the Ottoman Turkish and the Arabic language. 
That is, the Arabs have arguably inserted this practice into Islamic 
statecraft based on their use of it from the very early period of Islamic 
history. Early evidence shows that confiscations were used as a puni-
tive measure to prevent undesirable behaviour of office holders such 
as bribery, embezzlement and overexploitation of tax payers, and often 
supplemented capital punishment. It was arguably during the rule of 
the Umayyads (661-750) that it became more arbitrary as it turned 
into a tool of revenge and threat.7 From the Abbasids (750-1258) in 
medieval Iraq to the Mughals of India (1520-1857) in the early modern 
period, many Islamic states resorted to confiscations in a similar fash-
ion. Mughals called property confiscation zabt (seizure), which is a 
term frequently used by the Ottoman sources as well (i.e. miriden zabt, 
miriye zabt –seizure by the state). In Mughal India, ‘confiscation of 
property was a conditionality of tax farming arrangements common in 
the Islamic empires of Asia.’ However, ‘confiscation did not mean tak-
ing over ownership rights but the withdrawal of an entitlement.’ 8 The 
right to use the property was not the same as owning it. The overarch-
ing feature of these practices, however, is that the social group under 
constant risk of confiscation was office-holders.9  
Although knowledge of these earlier exercises of confiscation in 
Islamic history is not as detailed as that of Ottoman müsadere, it is 
possible to draw some insights on how they were enforced from the 
case of the Abbasid Empire.10 Confiscations were undertaken by this 
                                         
7	Ibid.	
8	Zafarul	Islam,	"The	Mughal	System	of	Escheat:	An	Analytical	Study"	(paper	presented	at	the	Indian	
History	Congress,	1985).	Bishnupriya	Gupta,	Debin	Ma,	and	Tirthankar	Roy,	"States	and	Development:	
Early	Modern	 India,	 China,	 and	 the	 Great	 Divergence,"	 in	 Economic	 History	 of	Warfare	 and	 State	
Formation,	ed.	Jari	Eloranta,	et	al.	(Singapore:	Springer,	2016),	53.	
9	 Eliyahu	Ashtor,	A	Social	and	Economic	History	of	 the	near	East	 in	 the	Middle	Ages	 (Berkeley,	 Los	
Angeles	and	London:	University	of	California	Press,	1976),	141.	
10	Abbasid	records	mention	at	least	30	confiscations	in	the	period	908-946	and	10	in	the	years	946-
991.	Tomar,	"Müsâdere."	
22 
medieval Arab state through a bureau in the central bureaucracy (di-
vanü’l-müsadere) that specialised in the enforcement of confiscation. 
When an office-holder was accused of a major crime or failure to meet 
the ruler’s demands, he was immediately dismissed and imprisoned. 
He was then offered the chance to sign a bond of considerable reim-
bursement. If he did not accept the offer, he was beaten and tortured.11 
As it will be seen, these methods show substantial similarities with 
methods used in the Ottoman Empire. 
The müsadere practice must have entered the Ottoman political 
system in the 1400s. It should be noted that the precise timing is dif-
ficult to determine and beyond the scope of this study, and the conti-
nuity of the practice is of more interest here than its origins. Necessary 
to this discussion, however, is the year 1453, the year most widely ac-
cepted as the beginning of confiscation according to the current litera-
ture. In 1453, the Ottomans conquered the Byzantine capital Constan-
tinople (now Istanbul). Although the Byzantine Empire was already 
quite weak, it was not easy to capture the city and the siege took longer 
than expected. The day following the conquest, Mehmed II (r. 1444-
1446, 1451-1481) executed his grand vizier, Çandarlı Halil Paşa, and 
confiscated his wealth. The vizier was accused of treason by his actions 
of making a secret deal with Byzantium on termination of the siege to 
allow time for the arrival of the Papal support.12  
Whether this was the first case of müsadere is dubious. It may 
well be, and rejecting this claim is difficult since there are scarce 
sources for this early era of Ottoman history. An account, however, 
does describe Musa Çelebi, one of the princes who fought in the civil 
war of 1402-1413 for the throne, as a “confiscation-lover”. According 
to this chronicler, called Neşri, the prince had said that “this Paşa 
                                         
11	Maaike	Van	Berkel,	"Embezzlement	and	Reimbursement.	Disciplining	Officials	in	‘Abbāsid	Baghdad	
(8th-10th	 Centuries	 A.D.),"	 International	 Journal	 of	 Public	 Administration	 34,	 no.	 11	 (2011):	 712.	
Ashtor,	Social	and	Economic	History.	
12	Halil	İnalcık,	Fatih	Devri	Üzerinde	Tetkikler	Ve	Vesikalar	I	(Ankara:	Türk	Tarih	Kurumu,	1987),	133.	
23 
smells florin [an Italian coin].”13 The other pre-1453 evidence of 
müsadere is also from the first half of the fifteenth century. The above 
civil war ended in 1413 when Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421) finally acceded 
to the throne. Following his accession, he received the consent of the 
legal community (ulema) to execute a cleric, Şeyh Bedreddin, who had 
organised a rebellion against the central authority after his dismissal. 
When he asked them if it was also permissible to confiscate the rebel’s 
fortunes, however, they replied, “to execute him is lawful but a Muslim 
is forbidden from confiscating his wealth.” These anecdotes indicate 
that müsadere was arguably not unknown to those in power before 
1453, though not institutionalised like it was after then.14 
There is more certainty that during the reign of Mehmed II, con-
fiscations became more frequent and extended to include all officials, 
irrespective of crime or failure to meet the demands of the sultan. This 
process coincided with an ongoing bureaucratic transformation. The 
members of influential Turcoman dynasties, who had been filling bu-
reaucratic positions until that time, were gradually replaced by a new 
group of people who were loyal to the sultan. This new regime, which 
abolished the status quo, is called the kul (literally: slave) system; this 
refers to the terminology in which the sultan was the master and the 
members of the military-administrative class were his so-called 
slaves.15 Besides their life and property being at the will of the sultan, 
being a slave was only symbolic, implying expected devotion and loy-
alty. In practice, they possessed many privileges related to their offices 
in the Ottoman administrative system.16 As previously stated, however, 
these privileges were confined to their lifetime as they were typically 
not allowed to bequeath their riches. This was due to the belief that 
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since they accumulated wealth through their offices, it had to be con-
fiscated once they died or were dismissed from office. 
In the classical imperial ideology, Ottoman society was divided 
into two classes: (1) the military-administrative class (the askeri) and 
(2) tax-paying subjects (the reaya). The askeri class was further divided 
into three groups: men of the sword (the military), men of the pen (ad-
ministrators) and men of religion and law (the legal-religious commu-
nity).17 Mobility between classes was hardly tolerated until the eight-
eenth century. There were essentially three ways of becoming a mem-
ber of the askeri class: (1) through the devşirme system, requiring non-
Muslim birth, (2) birth into an askeri family or (3) following the usual 
educational path to become ulema.18 The askeri class was exempted 
from paying taxes but were subject to property confiscation excepting 
the legal community, which was generally immune from it unless they 
were ‘politically executed.’ In fact, these class boundaries shifted and 
became blurred in the eighteenth century. For the moment, however, 
focus shall remain within the pre-eighteenth century context.  
The term ‘political execution’ is closely related to the müsadere 
practice. It refers to the execution of those who committed major 
crimes against the state such as bribery, treason and rebellion. Like 
confiscation, it was also at the sultan’s discretion, which often lacked 
judicial process but occasionally was given the approval of the grand 
mufti.19 The development of political execution and müsadere went 
hand in hand, since müsadere often accompanied political execution.20 
Not all müsaderes, however, were of this nature. It was not uncommon, 
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for example, that the property of an individual who died naturally to 
be confiscated even in times before the eighteenth century. 
A concurrent development regarding land property rights is also 
key in the evolution of the state and the practice of confiscation. Start-
ing in 1475, Mehmed II appropriated immense areas of arable land 
owned by provincial aristocracy and religious endowments (waqfs) to 
finance his military campaigns.21 It is a matter of debate in modern 
Ottoman historiography whether this was an act of confiscation of pri-
vately owned lands or redistribution of lands that were already owned 
by the central state.22 For some, these were state lands farmed out to 
the dynasties.23 Regardless of this debate is the importance that most 
lands were now being endowed to the military-administrative class. To 
clarify, the land rights regime institutionalised in the sixteenth century 
identified three types of land ownership: state land (miri), ‘private’ land 
(mülk –only vineyards, plantations and orchards) and waqf land (those 
under the ownership of religious endowments).24 
The source of wealth of the military-administrative class was 
their offices that were, by various means, linked with fiscal hierarchy 
or the right to collect taxes from state lands for a temporary period. 
Two methods of tax collection coexisted from very early Ottoman his-
tory: while urban taxes were collected predominantly through tax farm-
ing, agricultural taxes, forming the majority of state revenues, were 
collected locally under the tımar (military-administrative) system, 
mostly in kind due to low levels of monetisation.25 In this system, each 
officeholder was assigned a revenue unit of varying size by the sultan 
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in exchange for certain military and administrative services such as 
training cavalries for wartime, the number correlating with the size of 
entitled land, and maintaining social order in their region.26 It is highly 
significant that, unlike fief-holders in feudal Europe, they neither 
owned land as private property nor held hereditary rights to it. Instead, 
their rights on land were restricted to revenue collection from their as-
signed land for a given period. It was the right to use land and not a 
property right in the modern sense. Until the 1858 Land Code, and per 
some historians consistently after that time, there was no private own-
ership on land except for vineyards, plantations and orchards.27 
The institution of müsadere was born into this environment. It 
remains vital to understand the difference between those confiscations 
before and after the eighteenth century. Rising to power primarily due 
to privatisation of tax farming, provincial elites became a new target of 
müsadere in this century. Moreover, considering new methods of en-
forcement, the practice arguably became more sophisticated as well. 
However, the basic definition of the müsadere remained the same in 
the eighteenth-century context: it was a seizing of property, typically 
including not only land but the entirety of assets, from a select group 
of wealth-holders for the public treasury, usually but not necessarily 
after death. This is a general definition that fails to consider the sul-
tan’s motive. El-Hajj draws attention to factional politics:  
An even more significant aspect of the müsadere policy is the 
question of who could initiate and prevent confiscations. From 
the available evidence, it appears that the option was exercised 
at the discretion of whichever faction among the ruling class had 
the upper hand at the time. This was especially true when new 
factions had just succeeded to a position of power and when a 
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victorious faction exercised the right of müsadere against those 
who had lost out.28 
One of the aims of this study is to understand what motivated the sov-
ereign. It suffices for now to say that these motives were time-specific, 
which dictates that this study be placed in its relevant historical con-
text as it concerns these motives. This section has summarised a long 
history of the practice of müsadere and its evolution towards the period 
under study. No economic history study dealing with the long-eight-
eenth century of the Ottoman Empire, however, would be complete 
without a mention of the breakdown of the classical regime in political 
and fiscal terms. This is the topic of the next section.  
1.1.2 Fiscal	and	Political	Transformation	in	the	Eighteenth-Century	Otto-
man	Empire	
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe passed 
through a process of transformation in the methods of warfare and 
military organisation called the ‘military revolution.’29 Apparently, the 
Ottoman Empire was less successful in its responses to this transfor-
mation. Larger and regular armies that had to be kept ready for war 
and necessary investments in military technology required the injec-
tion of more revenue into the treasury. Military failures created by the 
widening gap put an end to the Ottoman expansion in Europe, result-
ing in additional fiscal pressure on the Ottomans. These factors led to 
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a reorganisation of fiscal and political institutions in the Ottoman Em-
pire in the late seventeenth century. The present section provides an 
account of these developments.  
The fiscal system was reorganised in such a way as to lead to 
greater privatisation of tax collection. The form of tax farming before 
1695 was iltizam. In iltizam, tax units were auctioned in Istanbul. The 
highest bidder supposedly obtained the right to collect taxes from a tax 
farm initially for one to three, and later to five years.30 One feature of 
iltizam was the central government’s ability to terminate the contract 
unilaterally if a higher bid appeared at any time during the course of 
the contract.31 The downside of this insecurity and brevity of contracts 
was tax farmers’ tendency to overexploit tax-payers as much as possi-
ble before their contract ended or was terminated.32 To remedy these 
problems, the government not only introduced a new form of tax farm-
ing called malikane in 1695 but extended the scope of tax farming to 
new lands.33 The main difference between malikane and iltizam was 
that contracts were ideally lifelong and secure against higher bids of-
fered during the course of the contract.34 These changes expected to 
incentivise tax farmers, who were now made long-term investors, to 
take better care of their tax base and to bear the risk of bad harvests. 
From the tax farmer’s perspective, the rationale of taking on this risk 
was the security of property rights.  
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In contrast to its related institutions, the malikane system paved 
the way for a networked society.35 Auctions initially began in Istanbul 
but soon extended to other major cities. The successful bidder was 
granted a deed (berat) explaining his responsibilities in return for a 
down payment and annuities. Even though most tax farmers were 
members of the askeri class, bidding in an auction increasingly ex-
panded to include other Muslims, which is why some historians called 
this process ‘privatisation.’36 Non-Muslims were also part of the system 
as financiers, brokers and accountants. Property rights of tax farmers 
on their farms included developing, selling and subcontracting. They 
did not possess the ownership rights as there existed state ownership 
on most lands.37 Although contracts were for one’s lifetime, adult sons 
were occasionally given priority in management of a tax farm if they 
had remained in favour with local administrators. Moreover, some con-
tractors subcontracted their farms to lesser elites while continuing to 
live in the capital or other cities where they held offices. These institu-
tions led to the foundation of many partnerships among contractors, 
subcontractors, financiers and brokers.38 
Although the malikane system remained in effect until the 
1840s, it did not prove successful in increasing fiscal capacity mainly 
due to monopolisation by large buyers who controlled large farms. To 
address this problem, the central government introduced another sys-
tem of tax farming called esham in 1774. In esham, tax farms were 
divided into lifetime revenue shares that were then sold to many small 
and middle-scale shareholders for six to seven times their face value.39 
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By implementing this system, the government expected to gain reve-
nues back from major tax farmers. This was not a successful attempt 
due to the failure to control the resale of shares among individuals and 
to prevent the heirs from continuing to benefit from the shares after 
the death of original shareholders. In brief, the lifetime principle did 
not experience success.40  
The other macro-historical development taking place in the 
eighteenth century was commercialisation. During this period, the Ot-
toman Empire began to be incorporated into the world economy as a 
peripheral zone, namely an area producing low-cost materials for 
global markets.41 The imported goods were mainly grain, livestock, to-
bacco and cotton. Although the timing of this integration is often dated 
to the nineteenth century, there were already notable advances in the 
volume of international trade by the eighteenth century.42 Coastal cit-
ies such as İzmir and Thessaloniki became new entrepôts of trade.43 
Increased levels of international trade led to higher monetisation, stim-
ulation of commercial agriculture and reorganisation of social and eco-
nomic relations.44 
One of the outcomes of fiscal reorganisation and commercialisa-
tion was the rise of provincial elites (ayans) to power. These peripheral 
figures played a key role in Ottoman political economy, especially dur-
ing the second half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth 
century. Their origins varied, including former high officials, Janissary 
leaders, religious scholars, guild leaders and merchants.45 Their rise 
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to power was, first and foremost, associated with life-term tax farming. 
Usually starting as subcontractors, some became grand tax farmers 
while many monopolised tax farms in their areas of influence. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, ayans held more than 30 per cent of all 
tax farms.46 Their economic activity was not limited to tax farming, 
however: some were involved with commercial agriculture in their plan-
tation-like estates called çiftliks, whereas those settled in coastal re-
gions traded commodities to both international and domestic mar-
kets.47 They also lent money to townsmen, peasants and merchants.48  
They were powerful not only economically, but politically and so-
cially as well. Their social position rested on their reputation acquired 
through the institution of ayanhood. Since the sixteenth century, pro-
vincial elites had served as locally elected community leaders to nego-
tiate the fiscal contribution of their region with the central government. 
This intermediary role between state and society was recognised and 
institutionalised in the eighteenth century by the establishment of an 
office called ayanship (ayanlık). Recognised ayans served many func-
tions including administration, food provisioning and maintenance of 
public buildings. Although the central government attempted to regu-
late the election of ayans from 1762 to 1792, the success of this inter-
ference remained limited so that in most cases elections had to be left 
to the local community.49 By the late eighteenth century, many provin-
cial elites reached the top of both provincial and the central bureau-
cracy by acquiring further offices and titles. Due to the immense power 
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and wealth of provincial elites, modern historians of the Ottoman Em-
pire describe the long-eighteenth century as a period of decentralisa-
tion or sometimes even as the age of the ayans.50  
Their power did have its limits. They did in fact manage to mo-
nopolise fiscal and political resources of their zones of influence from 
around the second half of the eighteenth century to the 1820s. How-
ever, although their relations with the central government were gener-
ally of a mutually beneficial nature, the size of these zones was subject 
to change in line with a change in this relationship. Their fate rested 
on the will of the sultan who often dismissed them and/or confiscated 
their property. They benefited from certain informal institutions to 
build and maintain power, using their networks and patron-client re-
lations.51 Thus, insecurity of property did not necessarily mean that 
they were entirely voiceless. Some managed to transmit their wealth 
through a few generations. This transfer of power and wealth, however, 
was not sufficient to create a stable aristocratic class similar to that in 
Europe. The central authority never entirely lost political power in the 
provinces to these local figures.52 Similarly, the Ottoman state in the 
eighteenth century was not jurisdictionally fragmented, that is, legal 
functions of the state were never outsourced.  
These historical events are what shaped the institutional envi-
ronment behind the period under study. In the eighteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire was significantly different from its classical form in 
terms of fiscal and political institutions that had been redesigned to 
respond to global changes. Before proceeding to the literature review, 
a final dimension of historical context is necessary. The period covered 
by the data used in Part I of the study, 1750-1839, was marked by 
warfare, rebellion and reform, which arguably determined the severity 
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of confiscation activity. The next sub-section describes the major po-
litical and economic developments during this period.  
1.1.3 An	Era	of	Crisis	and	Reform	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	1750-1839	
The period from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury was extraordinary in the sense it witnessed a severe political and 
fiscal crisis. The Empire fought many wars and encountered challenges 
from provincial elites as well as revolutionary movements in the Bal-
kans. In contrast to the first half of the eighteenth century, this period 
was also defined by economic stagnation.53 Reformist sultans Selim III 
(r. 1789-1807) and Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) undertook many reforms 
reflecting their efforts to adapt state institutions to the changing exter-
nal environment. This sub-section presents a concise political and eco-
nomic history of this turbulent period that shaped the nature of con-
fiscations. 
Even though there is no census data available for this period, it 
has been estimated that there were around 25 million inhabitants in 
the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century. Prior to 
territorial losses in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire com-
prised a territory of 3 million square kilometres. Eighty-five percent of 
the population lived in rural areas, while the remainder lived in towns 
and cities. Balkan provinces were more intensely populated than other 
regions. With much territory in the Balkans lost in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, this proportion gradually shrank in favour of An-
atolia and the Middle East. These losses also made the Empire more 
predominantly Muslim, as the proportion of non-Muslims in the Bal-
kans was relatively higher.54 Nevertheless, at the turn of the nineteenth 
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century, the Ottomans still ruled a vast territory including the Anato-
lian peninsula, most regions of the Balkans, North Africa and some 
regions of Arab lands (See: Map 1.1).  
Map 1.1: The Ottoman Empire in 1801 
 
Source: (Miller 1913) 
The defeat by Russia in the war of 1768-1774 turned a new page 
in the history of the Ottoman Empire due to its military and fiscal 
weaknesses becoming apparent, which was less the case during the 
relative peace of the first half of the eighteenth century. This defeat 
made some Ottoman territories a matter of contention, subject to the 
ambitions of Russia, the Habsburg Empire, England and France.55 
With the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed in 1774, the Ottomans lost 
Crimea to Russia. In 1789, Sultan Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-1789) died 
and Selim III acceded to the throne. At the time of the accession, the 
Empire was in the middle of another war with the Russians (1787-
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1792). This war ended with the signing of the treaty of Jassy in 1792. 
The treaty confirmed the terms of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, while 
additional territories were lost to Russia.56  
Immediately after the treaty of Jassy, Selim III launched a series 
of Western-style reforms called the New Order or Nizam-ı Cedid. From 
his years of princedom, he had corresponded with Louis XVI of France 
on what reforms would be appropriate for the Ottoman Empire.57 The 
New Order reforms were initially military. Beginning in 1794, a new 
army was established from the ground up to match the existing Janis-
sary Corps. Western-style educational institutions were founded to 
train the military personnel. To finance these reforms, a new treasury 
named İrad-ı Cedid (New Revenue) was founded. However, the govern-
ment failed to find new sources of revenue. Selim III often resorted to 
solutions that created additional problems such as taxation of previ-
ously untaxed commodities, confiscations and debasement.58  
The New Order produced two losers: (1) Janissaries, who lost 
their primary importance as a military corps and whose salaries were 
devalued by frequent debasements, and (2) provincial elites, whose 
wealth and tax farms were constantly confiscated. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that these two groups played key roles in the events between 
1806 and 1808. First, due to a rebellion led by the Janissaries and 
some provincial elites, Selim III was deposed and replaced by Mustafa 
IV (r. 1807-1808). Learning of this coup, one provincial notable, 
Alemdar Mustafa Paşa of Ruse in Bulgaria, marched to Istanbul to re-
throne Selim. In the meantime, however, the Janissaries killed Selim, 
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the former sultan. Upon the arrival of Alemdar Mustafa Paşa to Istan-
bul in 1808, he started a counter-coup that culminated in the en-
thronement of another reformist prince, Mahmud II.59 
In October 1808, one month after he was appointed as the grand 
vizier of Mahmud II, Alemdar Mustafa organised an assembly to which 
he invited major provincial elites and high dignitaries of the govern-
ment. At the end of the assembly, the parties signed the Deed of Agree-
ment (Sened-i İttifak). Although the sultan did not attend the assembly 
in person, he allowed his seal to be put on the document. The most 
important clause of it for the context of this study is that which reflects 
the sultan’s pledge to respect the lives and property of provincial elites 
on the condition of their declaration of loyalty to the persona of the 
sultan and promise to continue support of his reforms.60 The sultan 
still required the fiscal and military contributions of these provincial 
actors. In return, the notables wanted to maintain their privileged sta-
tus. Therefore, a facet of the Deed of Agreement was the intention to 
continue a mutually beneficial relationship. This agreement has been 
considered by some historians as the Ottoman Magna Carta and thus 
the beginning of constitutionalism. Although it has an important place 
in constitutional history, in the end it was a still-born document be-
cause its clauses never came into practice. The assassination of 
Alemdar Mustafa by a second Janissary rebellion ended this process 
two months after the signing of the Deed.61 Confiscations continued 
almost uninterrupted.  
Having lost the man who helped him to accede to the throne, 
Mahmud II started his rule from a fragile position. Despite this fragility, 
he managed to stay on the throne primarily due to his status as the 
only surviving male member of the dynasty. During his early years as 
sultan, he dealt with independence movements in Serbia and Greece 
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which broke out due to the waves of nationalism generated by the 
French Revolution of 1789. Furthermore, Napoleon had invaded Egypt 
over the period 1798-1801, after which major European states such as 
Russia, France and England became involved in the question of Egypt. 
Eventually, the Ottomans had to recognise the independence of Serbia 
and Greece with the treaty of Edirne, signed in 1829. Egypt, however, 
remained in Ottoman territory as a tribute-paying vassal state, though 
only in theory. In practice, the governor of Egypt, Muhammed Ali Paşa, 
acted more like an independent ruler than a governor. After fighting 
wars against the central authority, he finally established his own dyn-
asty in Egypt.62 
Mahmud II saw the Janissaries and the provincial elites as ob-
stacles to his military and fiscal reforms respectively. After the signing 
of the treaty of Bucharest and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia gave him 
some time away from international politics, he turned his attention to 
domestic issues, one of which was beginning to eliminate the provincial 
elites. Where necessary, he used coercion as in the case of Ali Paşa of 
Janina (See: Figure 1.1). On occasion, he simply waited until the death 
of a powerful notable and then immediately confiscated his estates and 
appointed an official to take control of the region. In doing so, he man-
aged to get most provinces back under his control between 1812 and 
1830.63 The sultan also eliminated the Janissary corps, abolishing the 
centuries-old establishment in 1826 and replacing it with a new cen-
tral army called Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (Trained Victorious 
Soldiers of Muhammad).  
Behind this eventful period was a deeply rooted economic crisis. 
Although data is scarce on total state revenues, there were large budget 
deficits throughout the period. Based on estimates by Pamuk and Ka-
raman, revenue per capita remained stagnant until the 1840s when it 
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suddenly doubled. One central reason for this stagnant fiscal capacity 
was that fiscal intermediaries were absorbing tax revenues before they 
reached the treasury. Despite gains in fiscal capacity in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, the gap between the Ottoman Empire and 
major European states continued to widen in relative terms until the 
collapse of the Empire after the First World War.64 In addition to the 
centralising efforts of the central authority to take greater control of 
resources, they often resorted to debasements during the first half of 
the century. In particular, the years between 1808 and 1834 saw a 
series of debasements in the silver content of Ottoman akçe, which is 
known as the Great Debasement. In only four years from 1828 to 1832, 
the value of akçe was reduced by 79 per cent.65 From 1788 to 1844, 
akçe lost 90 per cent of its value against major European currencies.66 
High levels of inflation accompanied the debasements; prices tripled 
during the 1820s and 1830s.67 It was under the shadow of this political 
and economic atmosphere that the sultans resorted to confiscations 
frequently in the eighteenth century and most heavily from the 1770s 
to 1839. In 1839, the practice of müsadere was abolished by the Gü-
lhane edict which started the Tanzimat period (1839-1876)—a period 
of Western-style reforms. 
In sum, the Ottoman Empire was in a political and economic 
crisis during the period of concern. It was also a period of transition to 
modern state in economic, fiscal and political respects.68 Unsurpris-
ingly, this period of crisis and transition witnessed confiscations at a 
level never experienced. Given the historical background provided in 
this section, the long-eighteenth century provides a fruitful ground for 
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the study of Ottoman state confiscations. Most importantly, it allows 
examining the relationship between confiscation and certain aspects 
of crisis. As will be highlighted throughout the thesis, I restrict my con-
clusions to the period under consideration given its extraordinary na-
ture. 
1.2 Literature	Review	
1.2.1 The	State	and	Confiscation	in	Economic	History	
The practice of müsadere can be best understood in the context 
of a broader phenomenon, i.e. the interaction between power and pros-
perity and the role of the state in economic history. There are two main 
approaches to this interaction. The rule of law approach argues that 
the early establishment of credible constraints on the sovereign was an 
advantage. The state capacity approach posits that the capacity of a 
state to extract revenue and enforce rules mattered the most. The for-
mer puts a special emphasis on the sovereign power to confiscate, 
which undermines people’s incentives to invest. However, there does 
not appear to be consensus on which kind of political regime was his-
torically most conducive to prosperity, if limited government was the 
solution, how it could be achieved and, how state predation and ca-
pacity interacted. Was the central problem in this respect due to the 
Ottoman Empire being ruled by a single dynasty for its six centuries 
with no formal limits on its members? This sub-section reviews the 
above literature with an emphasis on its interpretation of state preda-
tion and its effects on economic growth by touching on a recent histo-
riographical shift towards greater emphasis placed on state capacity 
since sovereign confiscation is important in that context too. It also 
considers the literature on institutional persistence and collective ac-
tion as they are dealt with in chapter 6.   
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It can be argued that the rise of new institutional economics 
(NIE) in the 1970s brought the state back into the field of economic 
history, a topic that had been discussed by pre-modern and early mod-
ern intellectuals for centuries.69 NIE scholars have retained a close in-
terest in the impact of politics on economic outcomes. This derives from 
the view that political decisions and institutions play a very important 
role in determining transaction costs, which lie at the centre of NIE 
research.70 An efficient state ideally minimises these costs by effectively 
enforcing its rules, including those preventing individuals from confis-
cating each other’s property. The proponents of NIE, however, have not 
taken an efficient state as given. The power of the state has been re-
garded as a double-edged sword that can be used for good or bad. This 
derives from a paradoxical situation known as the Weingast paradox 
in the literature.71 That is, a state strong enough to enforce law and 
provide security can confiscate the wealth of its own subjects, an act 
which would undermine the foundations of a market economy. Indeed, 
many rulers in history have done so under the spell of power. Some 
scholars view these abuses of economic power by the state as the main 
obstacle to early modern growth.72 From the Weingast paradox came a 
question which puzzled economic historians ever since: What histori-
cally constrained the sovereign from confiscation, and how could the 
existence or absence of these constraints help explain economic diver-
gence in the world?73 
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In the classical example from this literature, Douglass North and 
Barry Weingast draw attention to the role of constitutional con-
straints.74 They argue that the institutional reforms that emerged out 
of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 limited the ability of the English 
Crown to change terms of trade unilaterally with economic agents by 
making the sovereign accountable before Parliament and reneging on 
contracts costlier. In their view, this helped to constrain the sovereign’s 
power to repudiate on debts, which in turn strengthened their credi-
bility which had worsened under the Stuarts before the revolution. The 
unit of analysis used in this study is the sovereign interest rate that 
they observed to have declined after 1688. They conclude that this de-
cline signified the improved capacity to borrow of the Crown, which in 
turn allowed financing itself without resorting to predation.  
Much of the current literature followed the footsteps of North and 
Weingast in focusing on the case of sovereign lending in their analyses 
of constraints on government. Some studies argue that debt repudia-
tion is sustained by the rulers’ concerns about reputation.75 Others 
emphasised the role of collective action and collusion among those 
most likely to suffer from predation. In this respect, some scholars con-
centrate on the role of formal non-state organisations. These organisa-
tions such as village communities, guilds and corporations supposedly 
helped tie the ruler’s hands in European history. One example relevant 
to this study is Eliana Balla and Noel Johnson’s study comparing 
French and Ottoman fiscal institutions in the eighteenth century.76 
They argue that the Company of General Farms under which French 
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tax farmers were organised raised the costs of property rights viola-
tions, whereas such an organisation never existed for the Ottomans. 
This absence linked to the ethnic, religious and geographical diversity 
of tax farmers, as well as high transaction costs of capital pooling. Sim-
ilarly, Hilton Root compares fiscal and political development in early 
modern England and France and finds that village communities and 
guilds in France helped the King’s lenders to safeguard their property 
from state confiscation.77 In the case of Maghribi merchants who oper-
ated in the medieval Mediterranean, Greif writes, the members were 
punished for not joining in retaliation against the rulers who confis-
cated a fellow merchant. Once retaliation was instigated, the only re-
sponse of a ruler other than waiving confiscation would be to confiscate 
the wealth of all merchants, but this would have been too costly to 
implement.78 
North and Weingast’s approach has been criticised on several 
grounds. For instance, Pincus and Robinson argue that although the 
Glorious Revolution was important for political and economic develop-
ment, the mechanism was different from what North and Weingast 
suggested. Their argument is that the Glorious Revolution led to a shift 
of power from the Crown to the Parliament that resulted in a change 
in de facto institutions. They also do not agree with North and Weingast 
in that Stuart rule in the seventeenth century was a big threat to in-
vestment and innovation.79 In a similar vein, Julian Hoppit argues that 
the Glorious Revolution contributed rather to the enhanced capacity of 
property to be alienated than the security of property rights.80 More 
importantly for this study, it is sometimes not clear which kind of prop-
erty rights are referred in the state predation paradigm in economic 
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history. Property rights economists, for example, more clearly distin-
guish the rights of ownership, use and transfer.81 Although NIE schol-
ars seemingly refer to the right to own property rather than other rights 
associated to it, this important distinction generally remains vague. As 
Ogilvie rightfully noticed, property rights abuses vary depending on the 
type of property rights in question.82 Property rights definitions are also 
important in a given context. In the context of the practice of müsadere, 
for example, it was sometimes contractual rights that were abused, 
and sometimes it was the right to transfer wealth not acquired through 
state resources to heirs despite the Islamic inheritance law.  
Despite the existence of more cautious studies, absolutist states 
were characterised by predation by this line of literature, while consti-
tutionally constrained states like England were depicted as con-
strained polities prioritising prosperity over revenue extraction through 
extra-legal methods.83 This relies on a fundamental insight of North’s 
work stating that property rights are devised not to increase the effi-
ciency of the economy but to maximise the rents accruing to those in 
power.84 Epstein criticises this view based on its implicit assumption 
that pre-modern states had full sovereignty over their subjects to de-
vise property rights as they wished or to confiscate their wealth without 
any costs:  
The argument presumes, in its strongest form, that pre-modern rulers 
had the power to modify property rights at will, and in its weakest form 
that pre-modern rulers exercised full and undivided sovereignty and 
full and final authority over their subjects. Since these were indeed the 
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central claims both of absolutism and its enemies, it is not an unrea-
sonable assumption; but it is an assumption refuted by decades of 
research on pre-modern political practices that has shown how “abso-
lutism” was a largely propagandistic device devoid of much practical 
substance.85 
Behind this assumption lies the view that rulers are revenue-maximis-
ers. It is, for example, true for Mancur Olson’s model of roving and 
stationary bandits.86 This model assumes that rulers are simply reve-
nue-maximisers who confiscate without any constraints. Although Ol-
son states that he makes this assumption to simplify his model, there 
are good reasons to rethink it. Nonetheless, Epstein’s critique of the 
above assumption cannot be generalised. Douglass North, one of the 
founding fathers of NIE, acknowledges that all rulers are constrained 
in their ability to confiscate.87 Extending his previous analyses, he ar-
gues that revenue-maximising rulers are like discriminative monopo-
lists setting property rights differently for social groups while taking 
into consideration the opportunity costs of being dethroned by their 
rivals. Likewise, Weingast argues that the sovereign’s concern of legit-
imacy was an essential informal constraint on government.88 When 
framed this way, it is clear that state confiscation is necesasarily se-
lective. According to North, non-constitutional constraints on the state 
power to confiscate are (1) profitability of confiscation, (2) bargaining 
power of constituents relative to that of the ruler and (3) fiscal capacity. 
I now examine these three non-constitutional self-constraints 
raised by North. To begin, the first constraint, namely the profitability 
of confiscation, can still be considered within the context of revenue-
maximisation. The rationale behind this constraint is simply that rul-
ers do not want to incur losses from a given opportunity to confiscate. 
After all, confiscation is a sui generis type of economic exchange and 
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so is inherently costly. Depending on the type of confiscation, it may 
be subject to one or more of the following direct costs: access costs in 
the form of monetary costs of transportation, agency and information. 
Thus, the sovereign would act only after a calculation of costs and ben-
efits. In a recent study, Mehrdad Vahabi presents a very detailed ac-
count regarding profitability of confiscation.89 He urges that, for a bet-
ter understanding of the power to predate, it is necessary to look at the 
location and composition of assets because not all assets are confisca-
ble at equal levels. They differ mainly in state accessibility of assets, 
concentration or dispersal of assets, asset specificity and asset meas-
urability. This framework fits particularly well into the context of the 
müsadere practice since it has targeted people in all territories con-
trolled by the Ottomans and those with various portfolios of invest-
ment. Thus, the costs of confiscation are determined by differences in 
these characteristics of assets to be confiscated.     
Second, the issue of relative bargaining power has been further 
elaborated by other scholars. Modelling the relationship between a 
ruler and his agents, Greif argues that the probability of retaliation by 
the agents in the case of confiscation of their wealth is determined by 
the administrative structure. If administration is partially or entirely 
delegated to asset holders, the ruler tends to respect their property 
rights because he does not want to bear the costs that they could create 
by cutting off administrative services.90 The same logic is also stressed 
by Margaret Levi though in the context of taxation.91 It can be applied 
to the context of confiscation because any taking, either taxation or 
confiscation, is a function of the balance of power between the party 
who takes and the one from whom something is taken. Similarly, she 
posits that the greater the resources others possess relative to those of 
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the ruler, the greater capacity they possess to resist the ruler’s de-
mands.  
Sources of bargaining power vary. They perhaps stem from the 
possession of troops (military power) that can be used to retaliate. Alt-
hough the central authority’s military power is likely greater than an-
ybody else, he would potentially employ only a fraction of his army to 
counter resistance against confiscation. In the case of a large majority 
of economic actors, relative bargaining positions rely on their capacity 
to retaliate economically. Greif proposes that pre-modern merchant 
guilds possessed economic power of retaliation against the rulers who 
confiscated the wealth of their members by collectively ceasing to trade 
in their territories. This, for Greif, functioned as a credible commitment 
mechanism as rulers did not want to lose future tax revenues. Such 
collective organisations were more efficient in protecting property 
rights than bilateral reputation mechanisms.92 Another source of eco-
nomic power is the degree of mutual dependence or irreplaceability. 
For Veitch, English King Edward I (r. 1272-1307) would not have con-
fiscated the fortunes of his Jewish lenders if Italian merchants had not 
emerged as a new group of lenders. In other words, the availability of 
an alternative group able to serve the same function as the targeted 
group made confiscation a viable strategy.93 The outcome of these var-
ying levels of bargaining power among the constituents is selective con-
fiscation, that is, the absence of protection for all.94 
North’s third emphasis is on the link between confiscation and 
fiscal capacity. The generally accepted view is that confiscations were 
historically driven by fiscal distress, especially during wartime. This is, 
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for example, evident in DeLong and Shleifer (1993) who find that con-
fiscation was commonplace in pre-modern Europe due to the short 
time horizon of the rulers.95 Barzel (2000) argues that the sovereign 
has a problem of information when it comes to extract revenues from 
the population, that is, because of the impossibility of perfectly moni-
toring the subject behaviour it is not possible to know how much to 
extract.96 The rulers were aware that confiscation would harm their 
legitimacy, which would have eventually lowered tax compliance and 
incentives to invest. Under the fiscal constraints created especially by 
wars, however, they were left with no choice but confiscation. There is, 
however, a paradox when one considers how fiscal needs affect confis-
cation. It could be supposed that a state with a higher capacity to tax 
would be less prone to confiscate, say, during wartime.  
These issues are now even more relevant because of the rise of a 
new line of literature concerning the concept of state capacity.97 State 
capacity is typically defined as the capacity to enforce rules (legal ca-
pacity) and to extract revenue from the populace (fiscal capacity). This 
literature stresses the insufficiency of focusing on legal capacity in ex-
plaining divergent historical growth trajectories and posits that more 
focus should be placed on the capacity to tax.98 Tax revenues were in 
fact more important than borrowing for states. Both in contemporary 
and historical settings, high state capacity, that is, high capacity to tax 
accompanied by effective constraints on the executive, was found to be 
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positively correlated with economic growth.99 Social scientists have 
proposed a number of mechanisms to explain this relationship: better 
provision of public goods, more efficient bureaucracy, protection from 
external threats, eliminating the vested interests of the elites, estab-
lishing the rule of law among others.100 State capacity demands a cer-
tain degree of political and legal centralisation but is not identical to 
concentration of power in the centre.101  
Rulers, however, do not invest in state capacity if they do not 
have incentives to do so. In one of the earliest studies in this line of 
literature, Charles Tilly argues that interstate wars incentivised states 
to invest in state capacity.102 Besley and Persson finds that this cannot 
be applied to civil wars.103 In explaining the early development of state 
capacity in England, economic historians put emphasis on its initial 
homogeneity which eased the elimination of the elites’ vested inter-
ests.104  
According to the literature on state capacity, state predation was 
not the only and the most important obstacle for historical economic 
growth. Indeed, historians of Spain, China and the Ottoman Empire 
show that absolutism did not equate to greater levels of fiscal extrac-
tion; these states were characterised by persistently low fiscal effi-
ciency. Irigoin and Grafe argue that early modern Spain suffered from 
coordination problems and the lack of fiscal centralisation rather than 
state predation. In their model, the interaction between the power to 
coerce and fiscal capacity takes a U-shape because of the diminishing 
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returns of coercion.105 The situation in China was not much different 
in terms of tax capacity. Rubin and Ma explain the paradox of low fiscal 
capacity in the face of absolutism with a principal-agent model.106 The 
model suggests that Chinese rulers chose to offer low wages to their 
tax-collecting agents in return for low taxes while allowing the agents 
to collect extra-legal taxes from the populace to a limited extent due to 
low levels of administrative power. By doing this, they also aimed to 
prevent themselves from confiscating the wealth of the agents, which 
would have caused overexploitation of tax payers that could lower tax 
compliance in the long run.107 The case of China, where confiscation 
seems to have remained limited, reveals that low levels of extraction 
did not necessarily stimulate confiscations. The Ottoman case was 
similar in terms of fiscal extraction. As Kıvanç Karaman has argued, 
the Ottoman Empire, as a polity that relied extensively on tax collection 
on provincial delegates with access to means of coercion, preferred to 
obtain a larger share of low revenue over a smaller share of higher rev-
enue.108 
The state predation paradigm has been criticised on the grounds 
of the nature of political economy of absolutist states as well. Revision-
ist narratives propose that negotiation and compromise, not predation, 
prevailed in the process of state formation. Grafe, for example, argues 
that the fiscal and military contributions of towns had to be negotiated 
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with urban power groups.109 She thus describes the political regime of 
early modern Spain as contractual rather than absolutist. French his-
toriography has a consensus on the view that French rulers were far 
from being absolutist in practice.110 Historians of early modern empires 
such as the Ottoman Empire, China and the Mughal Empire, which 
were once labelled as Oriental despots, have also taken a revisionist 
stance against a view of their governance as arbitrary, autocratic and 
predatory. These studies occasionally fail to make it clear, however, 
why the states had to negotiate their power. After all, negotiation is 
merely a pragmatic solution to, and an outcome of, constrained power. 
Moreover, negotiation was not always preferred to coercion. Historical 
episodes existed for these states during which they resorted to violence 
in maintaining domestic affairs. Therefore, studying both the scope 
and limits of the state in a balanced manner is necessary.   
Marxist critiques of the neo-classical perception of the state are 
worth consideration for their understanding of the state not as a single 
entity but as a set of institutions and power struggles.111 What this 
implies for the study of property rights abuses is the importance of 
perceiving them as reciprocal and interactive rather than top-down 
processes. It is true that the rulers behaved like discriminating monop-
olists as expressed by North.112 Similarly, in Epstein’s view, property 
rights protection was a privilege or private good and not a right or pub-
lic good before modernity.113 Little is known about why property rights 
were allocated discriminatively among the constituents. Answering this 
question can explain why constrained and negotiated power, rather 
than absolutism, if that was the case, governed allegedly absolutist 
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states. Similarly, what implications can be drawn from state confisca-
tions regarding the legal and fiscal capacity of early modern states? 
Another important aspect of the practice of müsadere is its long 
survival and abolition in 1839. Various views exist regarding how in-
stitutions persist over time. Per Acemoglu and Robinson, change can 
be blocked by the interest groups who continually benefit from the sta-
tus quo.114 Although institutional change can be beneficial for all in 
the long run, there is a commitment problem that prevents the power-
ful from doing things that are not in their benefit in the short run, 
according to the Acemoglu and Robinson model. Change can also orig-
inate from below, or the collective action of the constituents. That is, if 
the targets of confiscation had acted collectively, the sultan would be 
deterred from confiscating the wealth of all as it would not be rational 
to do so. The term ‘collective action’ was coined by Mancur Olson in 
his renowned book, The Logic of Collective Action, exploring the limits 
of collective action formation.115 Even if there is a public good that 
would benefit enough people, collective action is unlikely to occur with-
out incentives to do so as each individual would freeride on the contri-
butions of others.116 Also important in Olson’s theory is that group size 
is relevant, since the members of a small group would be more likely 
to join collective action as they are familiar with each other.  
Although these insights are indeed useful in understanding how 
property rights were secured in the West, little is known about an 
equally important question of how practices such as müsadere could 
survive for such a long time in the non-Western context. In the face of 
müsadere, property security was a public good that its prime targets 
would have liked to buy; yet neither forms of collective action, namely 
collective rebellion and non-state formal organisation, existed in the 
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Ottoman Empire. The absence of collective action is as important as 
its presence, which is why studying forces of survival and abolition is 
relevant for the analysis of state predation in early modern history.  
Where does the practice of müsadere stand in this general his-
tory of state confiscations? What were its distinguishing features? 
First, it was not collectively but individually enforced typically after 
one’s death. Second, it targeted a group of people with a different kind 
of relationship with the sovereign than, for example, the lenders to the 
sovereign. Targets were seemingly more dependent on state resources. 
Extra caution is therefore required when studying this practice from 
the viewpoint of property rights. As noted above, the definition of prop-
erty rights in the Ottoman Empire and possibly anywhere else during 
that period was not the same as in the modern world. Therefore, it 
cannot be presupposed that the existence of müsadere undermined 
capitalist development. During much of its history, müsadere was a 
matter of politics and power struggles. This does not necessarily make 
it an issue exogenous to the economy. However, as will be seen in the 
study, the above channel does not always work. 
This section reviewed a subset of studies on the role of the state 
in economics and economic history. Most scholars agree that con-
straints on the sovereign as well as the capacity to tax and enforce 
rules are positively associated with economic growth. When it comes 
to the former, there seems to be a consensus on the view that repre-
sentative institutions were not the only means of constraining the 
ruler’s power to confiscate. Non-state formal organisations as well as 
reputation and conjectural factors could be influential. Despite its 
unique character, the case of the practice of müsadere exercised by a 
so-called absolute monarchy provides a workable ground for this anal-
ysis. My contribution to this literature is not only to show the drivers 
and informal constraints of state confiscation in the case of the Otto-
man Empire but also place the practice of müsadere into a broader 
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framework of state formation and capacity. Before proceeding any fur-
ther, the following sub-section of the literature review addresses the 
Ottoman historiography on the müsadere practice and what is missing 
from that literature. 
1.2.2 Historiography	of	Ottoman	Political	Economy	and	Müsadere	
This sub-section examines how the practice of müsadere is de-
picted in the modern historiography of the Ottoman Empire. It also 
looks at the debate in imperial political economy as it cannot be strictly 
distinguished from the debate on müsadere. I make it clear here that 
the existing literature on the müsadere needs a more inclusive method 
and a more analytical approach for a better understanding of its func-
tions, surrounding institutions and constraints.   
Until a few decades ago, the Ottoman Empire had long been por-
trayed as despotic, arbitrary and autocratic. With the origins of this 
portrayal in the works of Machiavelli, this pejorative image has been 
part of the Oriental Despotism thesis, encompassing the polities of Asia 
and the Middle East.117 In the views of European enlightenment schol-
ars, these were authoritarian regimes, usually governed by a despotic 
sultan who showed no respect for the life and property of his sub-
jects.118 Max Weber goes so far as to name this political regime ‘sul-
tanism,’ which he describes as an extreme form of ‘patrimonialism’ in 
which administrative and military organisation is the ‘purely personal 
instrument of the master [sultan] to broaden his arbitrary power.’119 
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The sultan was thus perceived as an extreme predator. These views 
continued to appear in the generic histories of the twentieth century. 
Eric Jones, for example, defines the economic system of the Ottoman 
Empire as having rested on ‘…confiscation, despoilment, and a total, 
calculated insecurity of life and property.’120 Similarly, Samuel A. Finer 
reduces the functions of the Ottoman government as simply ‘to make 
war, acquire plunder, slaves and revenues, raise taxes and keep order,’ 
concluding that ‘it was, in short, predatory, revenue-pump and police-
man.’121 
These depictions lead to the question of whether there were any 
checks and balances limiting the power of the sultans. Answering this 
question requires an examination of the legal system. In principle, the 
sultans were accountable before Islamic law for their actions. It is a 
matter of debate, however, whether this was ever practiced. From the 
late fifteenth century when the sultan’s authority was consolidated, a 
secular parallel legal system known as örf (sultanic law) coexisted with 
Islamic law. The relevant group of people in this respect was the legal 
community (ulema). By rejecting Weber’s model of sultanism, the 
ulema could indeed oppose the sultan’s arbitrary actions, according to 
Halil İnalcık.122 Indeed, they occasionally managed even to depose the 
sultans if their interests were harmed.123 Colin Imber, on the other 
hand, claims that the ulema were mostly prepared to give the opinion 
most expected by the sultan once they were consulted, or the sultan 
could simply act against their advice.124 The fact that, unlike in other 
pre-modern Islamic states, the Ottoman ulema were incorporated into 
the bureaucratic hierarchy makes their independence dubious. This 
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issue should perhaps be considered with the dynamic approach taken 
by Metin Coşgel. That is, the ulema’s capacity to constrain the ruler 
varied according to historical conditions. Analysing state power in Is-
lamic history from the perspective of the relationship between the ruler 
and the ulema, he finds that the power of the rulers to tax and spend 
was not much constrained by the ulema, as its members were con-
trolled by the ruler.125 
The recent historiography of the Empire has taken a revisionist 
view against the above depictions of Ottoman political economy. De-
spite their emphases on different historical contexts and periods, their 
objections revolved around the view that imperial economic policies 
were pragmatic, negotiable and flexible. One of the proponents of this 
view is Şevket Pamuk who attributed the longevity of the empire to its 
ability and innovativeness in finding pragmatic solutions to promote 
growth, manage different ethnic and religious groups in harmony and 
to cope with economic, political and social crises.126 However, for 
Pamuk, these instruments were directed at the maintenance of tradi-
tional order with the caveat that its boundaries shifted over time rather 
than facilitating capitalistic development.127 In the context of the early 
period, Kate Fleet claims that it was the flexibility of early Ottoman 
rulers that made them extend their rule.128 They were flexible based on 
knowledge acquisition from states they interacted with, such as in the 
way that they learnt the use of money, tax farming and principles of 
trade from the Venetians and the Genoese in the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries.129 Additionally, Coşgel emphasises the flexibility of 
the rulers in determining tax rates in accordance with the realities of 
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each region.130 State-society relations are arguably best described by 
Karen Barkey as such: 
…A negotiated enterprise where the basic configuration of rela-
tionships between imperial authorities and peripheries is con-
structed piece meal in a different fashion for each periphery, cre-
ating a patchwork pattern of relations with structural holes be-
tween peripheries. In that construction, we see the architecture 
of empire emerge: a hub-and-spoke structure of state-periphery 
relations, where the direct and indirect vertical relations of im-
perial integration coexist with horizontal relations of segmenta-
tion.131 
Barkey recognises that the government was sometimes violent due to 
certain political, religious and economic factors but she sees these as 
moments of crisis of state formation rather than as a continuous atti-
tude.132 Overall, her portrayal of Ottoman political economy is similar 
to that of Regina Grafe for early modern Spain: a negotiated empire.   
Criticising the use of these concepts, Murat Dağlı argues that 
they have been employed carelessly and lack a theoretical-philosophi-
cal point of view—an argument that can be best expressed by the fol-
lowing quotation: 
By blurring the distinction between the actions and decisions of 
actors in specific contexts and the structural features that or-
ganise a society as a legitimate entity, and institutions that rep-
resent an arrangement of power and authority, Ottoman prag-
matism reduces a whole range of institutional practices, ideolog-
ical conventions, and relations of power to the actions of power 
holders whose aim is to retain the power. However, it is crucial 
not only for political theorists but also for historians to differen-
tiate politics from the political and to explain how the two are 
related in times of crisis and change as well as in times of stabil-
ity.133 
As he noticed, there is a need for a more interactive approach to the 
issue of political economy, in a way that encompasses the incentives 
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of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the pragmatism paradigm better 
captures survival strategies of an empire that lasted for six centuries.  
Now that the literature on Ottoman political economy has been 
reviewed, the practice of müsadere must be clarified within this con-
text. The practice of müsadere remains one of the least studied topics 
of Ottoman history. One reason for this lack of interest could be the 
nature of archival resources. They are quite dispersed, and therefore 
require tremendous work to locate. Moreover, without a careful read-
ing, these documents and the müsadere practice as a whole seem re-
petitive and thus unworthy of examining. Notwithstanding, though not 
necessarily dedicated wholly to the müsadere, there exist several stud-
ies dealing with the practice. The rest of this sub-section reviews these 
works.  
Ottomanists of the early twentieth century did not make a clear 
distinction between confiscations before and after the eighteenth cen-
tury. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, for example, sees it as a rule that applied to 
the wealth of all members of the military-administrative class who died, 
either naturally or because of execution.134 As Barkan himself informs 
us, the central government was employing its best effort to distinguish 
those properties that should return to the treasury and personal prop-
erty. However, there is no evidence of such a distinction in the eight-
eenth century, likely because it became increasingly difficult to distin-
guish what was acquired by imperial grant and what was not because 
of the increasing intensity of confiscations. The general approach to-
wards analysing the practice of müsadere in the Ottoman historiog-
raphy remained unchanged until recently.  
In parallel with a growing interest in historical roots of economic 
underdevelopment in the Middle East, property rights insecurity and 
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the practice of müsadere have attracted a special interest from eco-
nomic historians. Such remarks can be found in the works of Timur 
Kuran. For Kuran, the main culprit of underdevelopment was institu-
tional rigidity of the Islamic law and inheritance system.135 One of the 
rigid and inefficient institutions he refers is religious foundations 
(waqfs).136 These organisations, as other scholars also show, were al-
legedly used as a shelter for their wealth since the assets endowed in 
them were generally immune from confiscation.137 The logic behind 
this immunity is that the ruler’s confiscation of waqf assets would have 
damaged his reputation, as they were considered sacred. One of the 
inefficiencies of religious institutions was the accumulated wealth be-
coming lost in waqfs because of the threat of confiscation. The role of 
confiscation, in Kuran’s view, was thus indirect by causing transfer of 
capital to rigid and inefficient organisations. Another economic histo-
rian, Murat Çizakça, attributes a more direct role to the practice of 
müsadere. To him, it was the economic policies of the Ottoman Empire, 
including ‘widespread confiscation and [its] crowding-out effect,’ that 
impeded Middle Eastern economic development rather than legal insti-
tutions.138 Both scholars refer to the secondary literature in their men-
tion of the müsadere. This is inevitable in such works answering big 
questions like the historical origins of underdevelopment. However, 
what they both overlook is that the prime targets of confiscation were 
hardly productive classes such as merchants and manufacturers.   
Those studies that employ primary sources have been interested 
in three questions regarding the practice of müsadere. The first of these 
questions is the legality of confiscations. An early example is Ahmet 
                                         
135	 Timur	 Kuran,	 The	 Long	 Divergence:	 How	 Islamic	 Law	 Held	 Back	 the	 Middle	 East	 (Princeton:	
Princeton	University	Press,	2010).	
136	Timur	Kuran,	"The	Provision	of	Public	Goods	under	Islamic	Law:	Origins,	Impact	and	Limitations	of	
the	Waqf	System,"	Law	and	Society	Review	35,	no.	4	(2001).	
137	 Hasan	 Yüksel,	 "Vakıf-Müsadere	 Ilişkisi	 (Şam	 Valisi	 Vezir	 Süleyman	 Paşa	 Olayı),"	 Osmanlı	
Araştırmaları	XII	(1992).	
138	Murat	Çizakça,	"The	Economic	Role	of	the	State	in	Islam,"	in	Handbook	on	Islam	and	Economic	Life,	
ed.	M.	Kabir	Hassan	and	Mervyn	K.	Lewis	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Limited,	2014).	
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Mumcu’s study on the institution of political execution (siyaseten katl). 
He dedicates one chapter of his book to the practice of confiscation, 
which he considers a method of punishment accompanying execution. 
To him, müsadere cannot be regarded as a legitimate practice, not only 
because it was against Islamic inheritance law but because it took an 
increasingly arbitrary form over time.139 Another legal historian argues 
that it can be best understood within the context of the tazir penalty in 
Islamic law. Tazir can be defined as a discretionary right of the sultan 
or a judge appointed by him to adjudicate in crimes not specified in 
two main sources of Islamic law: the Quran and hadith (prophetic say-
ings).140 In fact, it is said that the müsadere practice could have origi-
nated from the following hadith: ‘it is theft and betrayal if the one to 
whom we granted office conceals even a tiny needle he collected as 
tax.’141 However, as Abou El-Hajj observes, müsadere was a selective 
practice.142 That is, many wealth-holders, including those who held an 
office, managed to transfer their wealth down through generations 
without facing confiscation. Having financial accounts with the Treas-
ury, therefore, did not necessarily result in confiscation even before the 
eighteenth century when it was arguably the most arbitrary. Moreover, 
müsadere went far beyond punishment during its long history. So, this 
was a practice rather at the sultan’s discretion that was open to abuse 
and arbitrariness.  
Related to this, the second question that appears in the works of 
historians concerns the functions of the müsadere practice. In addition 
to being a discretionary form of punishment, it was thought to be a 
political tool. The groups most likely to accumulate power and wealth 
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140	 Hüseyin	 Esen,	 "İslam	 Hukuku	 Açısından	 Müsadere,"	 Dokuz	 Eylül	 Üniversitesi	 İlahiyat	 Fakültesi	
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were office-holders and tax farmers. The argument is that by redistrib-
uting wealth through confiscations they were prevented from creating 
factions threatening the central authority. Indeed, no proper aristo-
cratic class emerged during the history of the Ottoman Empire.143 The 
group that most closely approached this position was the provincial 
elites in the eighteenth century. Confiscation seemed to be used exten-
sively to prevent this emergence from happening. Second, some histo-
rians link confiscations with fiscal distress, referring especially to the 
period after the second half of the eighteenth century. Although he 
does not provide any ratio as evidence, Yavuz Cezar argues that mon-
etary gains from confiscation were marginal and accidental rather than 
significant and perpetual.144  
The third question is how the process of müsadere was con-
ducted. The last decade has witnessed an increasing scholarly interest 
in the methods of enforcement.145 Most of these studies, predominantly 
in the form of case studies, focus on the eighteenth century, as the 
methods of müsadere were arguably more sophisticated at that time. 
Cezar’s article is of vital importance since he approaches the topic from 
an economic history perspective and it is one of the oldest yet most 
detailed works of its kind.146 In his study of a certain provincial elite 
from central Anatolia who died in the late eighteenth century, Cezar 
details the process of confiscation from the beginning while drawing 
certain conclusions for the practice of müsadere. Most importantly, he 
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(Müsadere	Olayı	Ve	Terekenin	İncelenmesi),"	Belleten	XLI,	no.	161	(1977).	
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does not accept the actions reflected in the sources as given by high-
lighting self-interested actions of non-ruler actors of the process of con-
fiscation. He suggests, for example, that the confiscator could deliber-
ately overestimate the value of wealth to get higher service duties, 
could accept bribes from the family in return for underreporting or 
could rather choose to be honest by not taking the risk of getting 
caught.147 In doing so, Cezar observes that the process of müsadere 
was not a straightforward one. His narrative does not extend the same 
logic to other players of the game. Fatma Müge Göçek states that the 
family could hoard the property and wealth-holders could prefer to 
keep their wealth in less liquid forms of property during their life-
time.148 Both actions would make müsadere costlier, if not impossible 
at times. The opposite of the latter strategy was mentioned by French 
traveller Olivier who wrote that the best way of circumventing confis-
cation was to invest in more liquid assets such as cash, golden and 
silver to easily hoard or transport them.149 
Ali Yaycıoğlu is the first scholar who emphasises that the process 
of müsadere did not necessarily end with full confiscation. By employ-
ing certain game theoretical insights though without strictly using the 
concept of game theory, he identifies three outcomes, which he called 
scenarios, of the confiscation process. These are full confiscation, leav-
ing to the family and subcontracting to a third party. He is also the 
first historian who attempted to answer why the müsadere practice 
had survived through the long-eighteenth century. In his reasoning, it 
was because of its redistributive function used by the powerful faction 
to eliminate others, which prevented the emergence of collective action. 
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Despite these initial thoughts stated in a working paper, it must be 
noted that Yaycıoğlu has not yet finalised his project.150  
Implying that müsadere was a non-codified sultanic convention, 
these functionalist interpretations have overshadowed the temporal di-
mensions of confiscation. As Rifa’at Abu El Haj has noticed, ‘…Twenti-
eth century researchers … take an ahistorical approach to the 
müsadere practice claiming that it was retained unchanged over 
time.’151 The only exception is the often-repeated claim that confisca-
tions became more frequent and arbitrary after the 1770s because of 
fiscal distress, political turmoil and centralising attempts following the 
first two. Although this claim adds a fiscal dimension with a certain 
degree of dynamism, the study of müsadere remains mostly static.152 
This work brings about a greater level of complexity, completeness and 
representativeness to such claims in the existing literature.  
My contribution to this literature is as follows. In modern Otto-
man historiography, the concept of müsadere is a topic that is mostly 
squeezed into footnotes and paragraphs. A systematic analysis of it 
does not exist, to the best of my knowledge, and the current literature 
is generally limited to case studies. It is true that a case study, when 
accurately done, can illuminate the hidden details behind an institu-
tion. I too use them frequently in the study; yet bringing the pieces 
together is also necessary. To do so, this study employs the broader 
economic history and political economy literature as well as the tools 
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of econometrics, game theory and microhistory to shed light on the 
regularities and exceptions embedded in the practice of müsadere. In 
doing so, it also sheds light on certain assumptions regarding the na-
ture of Ottoman political economy. One note of importance, however, 
is that this study is specific to the long-18th century which was extraor-
dinary due to the ongoing crisis and civil war between the central gov-
ernment and the provincial elites.  
1.3 Research	Questions,	Methods	and	Chapter	Outline	
The main research question of this study is as follows: What en-
abled, guided and motivated Ottoman state confiscations of elite prop-
erty, and how and to what extent? Out of this question, many sub-
questions, such as what the determinants of selectivity of confiscation 
were and how the central government confiscated in times of crisis, 
can be generated. Answering these questions within the Ottoman con-
text can produce important lessons for historical state predation. De-
spite studies linking state abuses of property rights with underdevel-
opment, little is known about what made rulers confiscate and what 
limited them in doing so. There is also a missing link between state 
predation and capacity in the sense that it is not clear how they inter-
act with each other. When it comes to modern Ottoman historiography, 
there is the need for a more analytical approach to unravel the prefer-
ence and priorities of the Ottoman rulers. By answering the above 
question, this thesis contributes to the existing historical literature on 
the practice of müsadere and the more general histories of early mod-
ern confiscations.  
This thesis proceeds in three parts. The first part provides a 
quantitative analysis of state confiscations in the Ottoman Empire. The 
second part deals with the role of human agency in determining the 
nature of confiscations. The third part presents an institutional anal-
ysis explaining the survival and abolition of the practice of müsadere 
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in the context of state formation and capacity. As is seen, this thesis 
employs a multi-methods approach. This is necessary since the above 
question cannot be addressed solely with quantitative or qualitative 
techniques per se. Indeed, most archival evidence is in non-numeric 
form, some of which can be incorporated into regressions while some 
cannot. Nevertheless, each chapter’s findings are not independent of 
one another. For example, the game theoretic analysis is not detached 
from the findings of the econometric analysis. The opposite is true: the 
findings of the quantitative analysis are used in chapter 4. The rest of 
this section provides a chapter-by-chapter organisation of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 introduces the dataset employed in the regression 
analysis and describes the basic patterns of the müsadere. This chap-
ter contributes primarily to the historical literature that, as mentioned 
above, lacks quantitative evidence. The dataset was constructed pri-
marily from state records known as muhallefat records (confiscation 
inventories). The first part of this chapter thus discusses the sources 
of the data used in chapter 3 and their limitations. The second part 
presents some descriptive statistics to reveal the patterns of the 
müsadere practice. More specifically, it gives a rough idea about the 
identity, temporal and spatial distribution of the targeted population. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in chapter 2 pose crucial ques-
tions to be answered in the following chapters.   
Chapter 3 goes into the analysis of what drove the preferences 
and priorities of confiscation by the sultans. The chapter is motivated 
by the view that confiscation is inherently selective. What determined 
this selectivity is thus the central question of the chapter. It employs 
the above-mentioned dataset using multinomial logistic regression 
analysis. The chapter models the process of müsadere as a two-step 
game, arguing that the decision made in the first step, meaning before 
a confiscator was sent, was driven by external factors such as wars, 
while the second step was driven by the qualities of the wealth to be 
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confiscated and relative bargaining power of the family. The quantita-
tive analysis assumes that there were no unobservable costs of en-
forcement and families did not use their coercive resources to resist 
confiscation. These assumptions are necessary due to the non-quanti-
fiable nature of this evidence.  
Chapter 4 relaxes these assumptions by investigating the pro-
cess of enforcement using qualitative evidence drawn from state rec-
ords such as imperial edicts, notes and complaint letters. This chapter 
explains in what ways states did not have full power to confiscate. In-
deed, pre-modern states often contained multiple sources of coercion 
that counterbalanced state power. This was particularly true within 
the context of the period in question. Therefore, the chapter takes con-
fiscation as a strategic action in which a player’s actions are subject to 
the actions of other players. In this regard, for example, it takes the 
agents who were employed in the enforcement of confiscation as indi-
viduals not necessarily motivated to act in the best interest of the ruler. 
This chapter argues that the actions of non-state players increased the 
costs of confiscation in a way that reduced the gains of the ruler. The 
whole process, however, was designed to minimise these costs. The use 
of game theory helps to better grasp the meaning of actions observed 
in the enforcement of confiscation. It is important to note that this 
chapter generally assumes that the players were revenue-maximisers 
and not concerned about political costs and benefits. It also deals 
solely with the process of enforcement and therefore excludes the pre-
confiscation stage of the game.  
The long-term interactions between the sultan and the families 
are examined in chapter 5. This chapter looks at the nature of patri-
monial management of the families, which gave them relative protec-
tion from the müsadere.  Behind this analysis lies the hypothesis that 
loyalty and establishing a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
central government made them better off. This chapter is designed as 
a micro-history of an Ottoman family called Çapanoğlus that was based 
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in central Anatolia and primarily engaged with tax farming. Tax farm-
ing activities normally made one’s wealth subject to confiscation. The 
family in question, however, seemingly succeeded in accumulating im-
mense wealth and transferring it through three generations. A first 
glance at the archives pointed to many sources regarding the relations 
between the government and this family. Using these qualitative 
sources, this chapter constructs a micro-history with the goal of deter-
mining which patrimonial strategies could have helped wealth-holders 
to circumvent confiscation and when they would have failed to do so. 
Chapter 6 addresses the institutional survival and abolition of 
the practice of confiscation in the Ottoman Empire in the broader con-
text of state formation and capacity. It provides an analytical narrative 
explaining why the practice survived during the eighteenth century 
and why it was abolished in 1839. It is argued that confiscations were 
bound to survive due to institutional factors that made collective action 
infeasible and confiscation was the best available policy in the absence 
of sufficient capacity to tax, fight and administer. The method used is 
called analytic narratives, which was introduced by a book bringing 
stories, accounts and context together with formal lines of reason-
ing.153 Its overarching purpose is to explain the interplay between mi-
cro-structures, which are shaped by choices and decisions, and macro-
historical changes. In a way, then, this chapter links the micro-struc-
tures examined in the previous chapters with macro-historical phe-
nomena. It deals with how we can think of the practice of müsadere 
within a broader state formation framework. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by offering a summary of the 
main arguments as well as their implications for the study of pre-mod-
ern confiscations in the field of economic history. Finally, it introduces 
potential areas of future research.  
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1.4 Sources	
Some chapters in the study present a discussion of their sources 
separately. One half of the next chapter is dedicated to the discussion 
of the sources of data and their limitations. The aim of the present 
section is to give a concise overview of the sources of this study from a 
general perspective. The study makes use of a wide range of primary 
sources collected from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istan-
bul. The data for quantitative analysis comes from probate inventories. 
Probate inventories are the inventories of all the assets, as well as debts 
and receivables, of the deceased. Spanning the mid-fifteenth to early 
twentieth centuries, these sources have been used by historians of ma-
terial culture, wealth distribution, credit relations, etc. It must be 
noted that those used in this study constitute a sub-category of the 
above, called muhallefat records. While a more detailed discussion of 
sources is done in the next chapter, it suffices to say here that confis-
cation inventories differ from other probate records essentially in the 
reason for their preparation, that is, for confiscation rather than divi-
sion of inheritance. Confiscation inventories include a summary of the 
confiscation, its actors and a list of assets owned by the deceased or 
the punished. The dataset, containing 1,017 cases of confiscation 
which I use in the next two chapters, was constructed primarily from 
these documents.  
Qualitative data employed in the study comes from a variety of 
sources such as correspondence, decrees, petitions and contemporary 
chronicles. These sources clearly show in what ways the actors of con-
fiscation behaved and interacted with each other. Without these 
sources, it would not be possible to detail, for example, property hoard-
ing by families or the cheating of confiscators who made deals with 
families. The fact that there is documentary evidence for hoarding or 
cheating reveals that it happened or at least was claimed to have hap-
pened. One can hypothesise that more such cases went unreported 
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due to the clandestine quality of such behaviour. The main shortcom-
ing of the sources employed in this study is that they can be biased 
towards official discourse, as they have been produced by the agents 
of the state. In other words, they rarely provide first-hand information 
on the views of the victims. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
existing personal accounts detailing an individual’s stance against the 
confiscation of their wealth.  
1.5 Conclusion	
This chapter has placed state confiscation in the Ottoman Em-
pire into its historical context and then introduced the aims, method-
ology and sources of the present study. The historical background for 
this thesis has encompassed a period of crisis and transition to the 
modern state, a period in which the practice of confiscation was at its 
most intense. Therefore, it is the most appropriate period to answer the 
research questions of this study. But this makes the conclusions 
reached in the study time-specific, that is, not applicable to earlier pe-
riods. The second part of the chapter reviewed the relevant literature. 
It has revealed that this is one of the least studied topics of Ottoman 
history and has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the 
interaction of power and prosperity in economic history. This study can 
therefore lead to a better understanding of historical state predation 
and its limits as well as how it can be thought in the context of state 
capacity and formation. The thesis proceeds with a quantitative anal-
ysis. 
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PART	I:	CHANCE	OR	DESIGN:	A	QUANTITATIVE	ANALY-
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2 SOURCES	OF	DATA	AND	PATTERNS	OF	MÜSADERE,	
1750-1839	
The central questions of the two chapters of this part are who 
the most affected from confiscation were and why, as well as under 
what constraints their wealth could be confiscated. Because of the lack 
of quantitative data due to the technical difficulties of data construc-
tion on this subject, the literature usually relies on case studies and 
contemporary Ottoman chronicles to generalise on the above-men-
tioned aspects of müsadere. This limitation has been recognised by at 
least one historian who employed a case study approach.154 The quan-
titative analysis conducted in this part also adds to the broader under-
standing of state predation in the early modern period by determining 
the kind of self-constraints to the sovereign.155 The logic adopted from 
new institutional economics is that confiscations are inherently selec-
tive and/or unevenly distributed. Part I thus examines why and how it 
was so. It is necessary to emphasise that the findings of this part are 
subject to the limitations of the data, which are discussed in the cur-
rent chapter, and restricted to the extraordinary period under analysis, 
i.e. 1750-1839. 
This chapter introduces the sources of the data used in Part I of 
the thesis and their limitations, while presenting general patterns of 
the müsadere with the help of descriptive statistics. The constructed 
data set includes 1,017 cases of müsadere exercised by seven succes-
sive sultans of the Ottoman Empire during the period 1750-1839. The 
data has been built mainly out of muhallefat records preserved in the 
Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. Despite their historical 
value, employing these sources has certain limitations. The chapter 
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starts by addressing these limitations from both general and study-
specific perspectives. 
The second purpose of the chapter is to explain the profile of the 
prime targets of the müsadere, which has special importance in setting 
the groundwork for the rest of the thesis. The existing literature often 
argued that the müsadere targeted primarily high government officials, 
joined by local elites in the eighteenth century.156 It has also been ar-
gued that the legal community (ulema), the merchants (especially non-
Muslims), ordinary subjects (reaya) and women were generally im-
mune from müsadere.157 However, little is known about the actual oc-
cupational distribution of the targets of confiscation. In addition to 
testing these hypotheses, this chapter answers a largely neglected 
question of what kind of spatial and temporal patterns the application 
of müsadere followed during this period.158  
Also provided in this chapter is statistical evidence on how the 
central government justified confiscations. This question is linked to 
another often repeated claim in the literature that the müsadere was 
often directed at wealth accumulated through imperial grants which 
were considered bound to return to the public treasury once wealth-
holders died or were dismissed from office. As will be shown, different 
forms of justification are observed in the long-eighteenth century. One 
of these justifications, i.e. major crime committed against the state, 
was recognised by the historians.159 Nevertheless, overall this subject 
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has not received enough attention and needs to be examined with 
quantitative evidence. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 addresses the 
scope and limitations of muhallefat records as main sources of the 
data, while touching upon how these limitations are mitigated in the 
study. The rest of the chapter aims to set the ground for the economet-
ric analysis in chapter 3. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the temporal 
and spatial patterns of confiscation respectively. Section 2.4 deals with 
the justification of müsadere and the profile of the prime targets in 
terms of religion, gender and occupation. The final section concludes.  
2.1 Muhallefat	Records	and	Data	Construction	
2.1.1 Scope	and	General	Limitations	
In recent decades, probate records have increasingly been used 
in many areas of Ottoman studies from cultural to economic history.160 
In Part I of this study, which quantifies the patterns and driving forces 
of müsadere, I use a sub-category of probate records called ‘muhallefat’ 
records (confiscation records). It is thus necessary to make a distinc-
tion between the two types of probate inventories. Most inventories 
were produced for division of inheritance purposes when the heirs of 
the deceased have taken their disagreement over inheritance to the 
court. These are called ‘tereke’ records.161 Both the concepts of mu-
hallefat and tereke have similar lexical meanings: possessions left be-
hind by the deceased. However, the term muhallefat has traditionally 
been used in official records and by modern historians of the Ottoman 
Empire to denote inventories recorded for property confiscation. Also, 
                                         
160	Halil	 İnalcık	was	 the	 first	 historian	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 probate	 inventories	 in	 the	 1940s.	Halil	
İnalcık,	"Osmanlı	Tarihi	Hakkında	Mühim	Bir	Kaynak,"	Ankara	Üniversitesi	Dil,	Tarih-Coğrafya	Fakültesi	
Dergisi	 1,	 no.	 2	 (1942).	 For	 a	 review	 of	 studies	 using	 probate	 inventories,	 see:	 Hülya	 Canbakal,	
"Barkan’dan	Günümüze	 Tereke	 Çalışmaları,"	 in	Ömer	 Lütfi	 Barkan	 Türkiye	 Tarihçiliğine	 Katkıları	 ve	
Etkileri	Sempozyumu	(İstanbul:	2009).	
161	Tahsin	Özcan,	"Muhallefat,"	in	Türkiye	Diyanet	Vakfı	Ansiklopedisi	(2005).	
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these two types of probate records differed in the person who prepared 
them. While terekes were prepared by court experts called kassam, 
muhallefats were prepared by an agent called muhallefat mübaşiri 
(hereafter: confiscator), often a low or mid-ranking official from the cen-
tral bureaucracy commissioned by the central government for the sole 
purpose of confiscation. 
It must be noted, however, that they are similar in form. Alt-
hough the content might vary, they typically contain three parts. The 
introductory protocol of a muhallefat register, as well as that of a tereke 
register, consists of a summary of the case including the name, occu-
pation and location of the individual and the names of the third parties 
involved in the process of müsadere or lawsuit. The second part of mu-
hallefat records provides a list of assets owned by the confiscated indi-
vidual. Ranging from a single page to tens of pages, these lists come 
either with or without property categories. As will be detailed below, 
the third section, which is lacking from some inventories, contains a 
brief calculation of net value, which is a deduction of debits from 
claims. In fact, one possible outcome of the müsadere process was par-
tial confiscation, meaning confiscation of a fraction of assets.162 Typi-
cally, though, müsadere covered any moveable and immoveable prop-
erty owned by the targeted individual without leaving even a tiny piece 
unregistered with the inevitable exception of hoarded property. Thus, 
confiscated property could be anything from housewares, jewellery and 
cash to big farms, livestock and gardens.  
In some cases, there exists more than one inventory. This is often 
the case if the confiscator was ordered to make a further search in case 
the central authority was not satisfied with the total value. Moreover, 
in some cases, the confiscator might have wanted or might have been 
ordered to send inventory in parts rather than all together, for example, 
                                         
162	In	case	of	partial	confiscation,	those	assets	to	be	confiscated	were	marked	with	the	Arabic	letter	
‘mim,’	referring	to	the	word	‘miri’	(state).		
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if an initial list of possessions was sent followed by a list of debtors and 
creditors. Depending on how complex the case was, these procedures 
could be more detailed than those simplified here.163 
Although the study of müsadere has so far been the primary area 
where muhallefat records were used, they include valuable information 
for the fields of price history, consumer culture, living standards and 
credit relations. Like tereke records, muhallefats are subject to certain 
limitations when used in these areas. One of them is the wealth bias, 
which reflects the inherent underrepresentation of the relatively less 
wealthy social strata, as the likelihood of a case being taken to the 
court increased with size of inheritance.164 This problem is even more 
serious when it comes to muhallefat records, as the size of inheritance 
tends to be higher in those considered for the müsadere. This problem, 
however, is barely an issue for the present study since its main objec-
tive is to analyse confiscations facing the wealthiest, thereby intention-
ally leaving those poorer parts of society out of analysis.  
Another limitation to the use of muhallefats is the potential in-
accuracy of valuations found in them.165 The accuracy of these valua-
tions depends on the nature of the müsadere. If the confiscated assets 
were auctioned, they often reflected actual market prices. Such inven-
tories with auction prices even included the names of purchasers writ-
ten next to the item they purchased. For assets transported to the cap-
ital in kind, these values indicate the estimates of the confiscators. To 
what extent these estimates represent the actual prices is a question 
requiring further attention. There are convincing historical reasons to 
believe that they were not too different from market prices. First, either 
confiscators or local administrators might have had experience in price 
estimation. Second, confiscators sometimes worked with a local expert 
                                         
163	A	detailed	examination	of	these	complexities	is	provided	in	chapter	4.		
164	Hülya	Canbakal	and	Alpay	Filiztekin,	"Wealth	and	Inequality	in	Ottoman	Lands	in	the	Early	Modern	
Period,"	in	AALIMS	Political	Economy	of	the	Muslim	World	(Houston:	2013),	3.	
165	 For	 a	 methodological	 article	 detailing	 the	 problem	 of	 valuation,	 see:	 Pınar	 Ceylan,	 "Ottoman	
Inheritance	Inventories	as	a	Source	of	Price	History,"	Historical	Methods:	A	Journal	of	Quantitative	and	
Interdisciplinary	History	49,	no.	3	(2016).	
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to help them with estimation. Nevertheless, any estimated price can 
and would often be different, though slightly, from the actual price. 
Though this might be the case, I am mainly interested in a different 
aspect of the valuations, which are the government’s gains from con-
fiscation and not the prices themselves. For this reason, while this kind 
of inaccuracy can distort the value of revenue acquired through con-
fiscation, this distortion would not be as great as that in a price histo-
rian’s findings. In addition to these general limitations to the use of 
probate records and those specific to muhallefat records, there are also 
limitations specific to the current study. These are addressed in the 
next section within the context of the data construction process.  
2.1.2 Data	 Construction:	 Study-specific	 Limitations	 and	 Representative-
ness	
How representative is the constructed dataset and what are the 
limitations of the sampling? It must be stated at the outset that inevi-
table barriers make a ‘perfectly’ random sampling difficult. It is nearly 
impossible to know the entire population of muhallefats (N) and its 
characteristics primarily because we do not know if a muhallefat was 
prepared or survived for all confiscations. Therefore, we do not know 
the crucial ratio of n/N where n=1,017. Any estimation of the value of 
N would be subject to a critique of survival bias, that is, if all relevant 
archival documents have survived up to today. Another important is-
sue is that it could well be that one’s wealth has been confiscated with-
out precreation of a muhallefat. Since these problems restrict the find-
ings of the analysis of selectivity, I try to be as cautious as possible in 
their interpretation. Nevertheless, the discussion below detailing how 
the sample used in the quantitative analysis was filtered out of the 
existing sources shows that there are good reasons to believe that n 
has certain characteristics that resembles that of N.    
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I started my archival research by determining the location of mu-
hallefats in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (Prime Ministry Ottoman Ar-
chives—hereafter BOA) in Istanbul where a high majority of them are 
preserved. Most muhallefats in the BOA are located in a collection 
called Başmuhasebe Muhallefat Halifeliği Defterleri (Books of the Bu-
reau of Confiscation—hereafter BMHD).166 This collection consists of 
some 1,381 documents dated to the period 1601-1839, the majority of 
which belong to the post-1750 period.167 This first step has shown that 
BMHD was not the only catalogue housing muhallefats, but that, 
though in much smaller numbers, several collections in the BOA, un-
catalogued folios in the BOA, as well as the Topkapı Palace Archives 
also had some.  
For reasons detailed below, I have decided to limit the quantita-
tive analysis to catalogued muhallefats either in the BMHD or other 
collections. The first reason for the decision to focus on the catalogued 
muhallefats is rather practical. Since uncatalogued ones are not 
searchable neither in digital nor in printed catalogues, they must be 
searched for one by one in certain uncatalogued folios. This would be 
an indispensable task for a historian working on a single case of 
müsadere or researching the life of an individual whose wealth was 
confiscated. However, it would possibly require several years of ar-
chival work for one attempting to build a large dataset out of muhalle-
fat records. In addition, I have excluded those muhallefats in the 
Topkapı Palace archives for they are biased towards Istanbul muhalle-
fats and they mostly constitute a fraction of inventories of the assets 
sent to the public treasury located in the palace and thus usually have 
a copy in the BOA. Those with a copy in the BOA were used if they 
passed other elimination tests below.  
                                         
166	This	bureau	functioned	as	a	branch	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	oversaw	carrying	out	confisca-
tions	on	behalf	of	the	sultan.		
167	Yusuf	Sarınay,	Başbakanlık	Osmanlı	Arşivi	Rehberi	(İstanbul:	Başbakanlık	Basımevi,	2010),	147.	
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The dataset contains 1,017 cases of confiscation. The reason 
why this number is even lower than the number of documents pre-
served in the BMHD is as follows. First, the analysis employed in Part 
I is restricted to the period 1750-1839, so cases from the previous 149 
years for which there are existing muhallefats, though much lower in 
quantity, are excluded. The practical reason for this choice is that the 
number of existing muhallefats is much higher during this period. Fur-
thermore, as the Introduction has demonstrated, most of this period 
was marked by fiscal and political crisis. The fact that the first 20 years 
of it were relatively peaceful allows for an exploration of the relation-
ship between the crisis and confiscation. Second, I have immediately 
noticed that some documents under the BMHD were miscataloged 
sources such as confiscator reports seeking a decision what to do next. 
These were also ruled out. Third, I have not included misplaced terekes 
produced for division of inheritance rather than confiscation purposes. 
Fourth, some muhallefats were left out since they missed an introduc-
tory protocol without which it would become almost impossible to 
know anything but some numbers. Fifth, I have eliminated some be-
cause items were recorded only in quantities rather than with their 
value. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, information on how the pro-
cess of each müsadere concluded is crucial as it is used as the depend-
ent variable in my regression analysis. Muhallefat records, however, 
are not always informative on whether it was ‘full confiscation,’ ‘no 
confiscation’ or ‘inheritance tax’ reflecting a deal between the central 
government and the family.168 Where possible, I have resorted to a large 
pool of supplementary documents (over 7,000) to complete this missing 
information. These documents include reports, notes and decrees. A 
few cases for which I could not identify the confiscation outcome were 
removed from the dataset. But this elimination did not apply to data 
                                         
168	The	outcome	of	inheritance	tax	was	first	identified	by	Ali	Yaycıoğlu:	Yaycıoğlu,	"Wealth,	Power	and	
Death."		
78 
items with a missing value of a relatively less important variable. For 
example, an item in which occupation was missing was still included 
in the dataset in which case this value was simply treated as missing 
in the analysis.  
In addition to the eliminated cases, there were some additions. 
It turned out, for example, that some documents catalogued in the 
BMHD included multiple inventories. Where I could identify to whom 
these inventories belonged, I added them to the dataset as separate 
items. If it was a collective confiscation of a family or a group of rebels 
that was meaningless to separate, it was treated as a single item. Fur-
thermore, I have included those inventories catalogued under collec-
tions other than the BMHD accessed through a digital search. 
This summary of the process of data construction makes it clear 
how the dataset of 1,017 cases of müsadere was constructed.169 As 
emphasised in the beginning, constructing a ‘perfectly’ random dataset 
was not possible due to the limitations listed above. At times, the ob-
stacle to this was simply an overly faded document, in which case I 
had to leave that case out. Perhaps, two positive points about the rep-
resentativeness of the data are as follows. First, while filtering out the 
subset, I have not consciously eliminated a specific group, geography, 
gender etc. Second, the BMHD, where most muhallefats used in the 
data come from, shows a reasonable degree of diversity in terms of 
location, social groups, and period, and met my expectations on where 
and when confiscations were known to be most prevalent. For example, 
as expected, the share in Istanbul is relatively higher than other loca-
tions.  
What information was gathered in muhallefat records? The in-
troductory protocol provided the identity and location of wealth-hold-
ers. Titles present in official sources are quite telling, especially when 
                                         
169	A	full	list	of	sources	used	in	the	data	construction	is	provided	in	the	primary	sources	section	of	the	
bibliography.			
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it comes to the elites that constitute the focus of this study. From one’s 
title, the historian can tell his or her gender, religion, secular title, so-
cial group as defined in Ottoman political thinking, family affiliation 
and whether he completed pilgrimage.170 For example, the full title 
‘Karaosmanoğlu el-Hac Mehmed Ağa’ informs us about all these char-
acteristics of this person:  
Karaosmanoğlu: He was a member of a prominent family lo-
cated in Manisa on the Aegean coast of Anatolia. 
El-hac: A religious marker for a pilgrim male. 
Mehmed: A Muslim male name. 
Ağa: A secular title given to most provincial elites in the eight-
eenth century. 
A wealth-holder’s occupation was mostly affixed to the title as well. For 
women, however, occupation was invariably missing. The protocol oc-
casionally gives the justification for müsadere as well (for 390 cases).  
In addition to the identity of the wealth-holder, the protocol al-
most invariably specifies their location. Normally, the location is de-
tailed down to village level. But a high majority of the individuals tar-
geted were urban dwellers. Two difficulties in the collection of spatial 
information were as follows. First, identifying the present-day equiva-
lent of historical settlements whose name changed in the last two cen-
turies was cumbersome. This was notably the case for those in the 
Balkans where Ottoman names of towns and cities are not used by 
post-Ottoman nation states in the region. Second, it was difficult to 
identify the province they were part of, which was necessary for prov-
ince-level analysis, because province borders were frequently redrawn 
                                         
170	Working	with	Ottoman	titles	is	tricky.	For	example,	it	could	well	be	that	someone	was	mentioned	
with	more	than	one	title	in	different	sources.	When	it	comes	to	social	class,	I	mean	the	one	identified	
in	Ottoman	political	terminology,	primarily	the	dichotomy	between	askeri	and	reaya	(military-admin-
istrative	and	ordinary	subjects).	For	more	on	the	interpretation	of	Ottoman	titles,	see:	Metin	Coşgel	
and	Boğaç	Ergene,	"Dispute	Resolution	 in	Ottoman	Courts:	A	Quantitative	Analysis	of	Ligitations	 in	
Eighteenth-Century	Kastamonu,"	Social	Science	History	38,	no.	1-2	(2015):	182.	
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because of territorial changes or administrative arrangements. Fortu-
nately, these changes were not significant during the period of concern. 
These difficulties regarding spatiality were overcome largely with the 
help of Osmanlı Yer Adları Sözlüğü (The Dictionary of Ottoman Place 
Names).171 
The date of müsadere is another important element of the da-
taset. Muhallefat records typically include the data in ‘day, month, 
year’ format. The date included in the dataset is the end date of the 
process of müsadere evident in the date of final inventory. Some rec-
ords, however, would not specify the first two components of the date, 
namely day and month. This study is inherently interested in the years 
and months only. Years are indispensable because time-specific varia-
bles of the statistical analysis are annual. Months are used to examine 
the effect of seasonality. Thus, although the absence of day of 
müsadere did not influence my analysis, the lack of month did. In case 
month was missing, it was coded as missing in the data.  
One of the determinants of who was subjected to confiscation 
was the size and distribution of wealth. Accordingly, I have collected 
information on certain features of confiscated wealth. As mentioned 
above, muhallefat records often give the value of each asset included 
in confiscation and calculation of the net value of wealth. The net value 
was calculated by subtracting the total value and debts owed to wealth-
holder from debts owed by him and direct costs of confiscation such 
as commission paid to the agents in charge and the costs of auction 
and transportation where available. Not all inventories were that de-
tailed though. They were then coded as missing values. The most time-
consuming process of data construction was to calculate the share of 
                                         
171	 Tahir	 Sezen,	Osmanlı	 Yer	Adları	 Sözlüğü	 (Alfabetik	 Sırayla)	 (Ankara:	 Başbakanlık	Devlet	Arşivleri	
Genel	Müdürlüğü,	2006).	
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liquid assets, namely cash, jewellery, watches and slaves for calculat-
ing a liquidity ratio, i.e. the proportion of liquid assets to the total 
value. This ratio could be calculated only in 357 cases.172  
Now that potential biases have been discussed, a mention of how 
they could affect the conclusions is necessary. These problems matter 
more in the analysis of patterns that will follow because in the present 
chapter I try to give a broader picture of the practice of confiscation 
and no matter how they seem consistent with what we would expect 
they are subject to biases mentioned above. Therefore, these conclu-
sions are made with caution. By contrast, the econometric analysis in 
the next chapter employs a micro approach by directly looking at deci-
sions made by the sovereign rather than the amount confiscated each 
year. Such decisions are less affected by the problem of representative-
ness in the sense that the use of logistic regression makes the amount 
of confiscation per annum or in a region matter less. The focus of this 
section was on the most important details and problems of data con-
struction, leaving issues of econometric methodology to the next chap-
ter. I shall now proceed to the patterns of müsadere.      
2.2 Time	
This section looks at the temporal patterns of müsadere. Despite 
the generally static approach to the müsadere practice taken in the 
existing literature, historians claim that its frequency mounted during 
crises and wars, especially from the 1770s until its abolition in 1839. 
This period was also a period of many costly reforms undertaken by 
Selim III and Mahmud II. Before subjecting the data to econometric 
analysis, the present section shows how the frequency of müsadere 
                                         
172	Therefore,	econometric	analysis	conducted	in	chapter	3	considers	the	impact	of	liquidity	in	a	sepa-
rate	model	with	fewer	observations.		
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fluctuated in the period 1750-1839 and what can be learnt from these 
temporal patterns. 
Figure 2.1: Frequencies of Müsadere Attempts and Full Confiscation, 
1750-1839173 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Figure 2.1 gives a broad sense of the timing of müsadere. The 
left-y axis of the figure shows the annual number of müsadere while 
the right-axis represents the average value of müsadere revenues ex-
pressed in tons of silver. To help to read the graph, table 2.1 provides 
exact values included in this figure. Apart from the years with dramatic 
falls, the green line representing the number of müsadere follows a 
generally increasing trend after the 1770s, coinciding with the deteri-
oration of state finances during and after the Russo-Ottoman war of 
1768-1774. A decreasing trend begins after 1820, continuing until the 
abolition in 1839. This is overall in line with the view that the crisis 
triggered confiscation activity. The red line represents how much aver-
age revenue was extracted through müsadere annually. However, as 
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this is a sample representing a fraction of müsadere undertaken during 
the period, I am more interested in fluctuations of the red line than its 
actual values. Due to the outliers in the dataset, these fluctuations do 
not seem as interesting as the number of confiscations. For example, 
in 1755, the inheritance of Yahya Paşa, who was the governor of Tırh-
ala (modern day Larissa, Greece) district, was confiscated.174 His 
wealth was so large that it distorts the results. Therefore, the green line 
probably provides more robust results. However, even the average an-
nual revenues are greater during the periods 1770-1790 and 1810-
1825 if we leave out those years before 1770 that had an outlier case. 
This means that relatively larger wealth-holders were preferred in this 
period.   
Figure 2.2: Frequencies of Müsadere Attempts and Full Confis-
cation, 1750-1839175 
 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
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175	Values	are	given	in	3-year	moving	averages	to	normalise	the	data.	
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Figure 2.2 shows total number of confiscation attempts in com-
parison with the number of cases that resulted in full confiscation. The 
blue area shows the total number of attempts while the red area rep-
resents the number of full confiscations. It is clearly seen that the pro-
portion of full confiscation outcome falls when the crisis was at peak. 
This is a question, however, that can be best explained by an econo-
metric approach.  
Table 2.1: Table of Temporal Patterns of Müsadere, 1750-1839 
Year Total 
        
Full    Partial 
         
No 
Inheritance 
Tax 
Confiscated 
(Tons of Silver) 
Left to 
family 
(Tons of 
Silver) 
1750 5 4 1 0 0 17.00618 0.020531 
1751 9 8 1 0 0 11.15139 0.667615 
1752 3 2 1 0 0 0.390439 0.02904 
1753 4 3 1 0 0 0.626428 0.015222 
1754 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1755 8 6 2 0 0 80.58043 0.072638 
1756 5 3 0 0 2 137.4482 39.86663 
1757 6 6 0 0 0 1.385735 0 
1758 3 2 1 0 0 0.288454 -0.01674 
1759 2 2 0 0 0 1.213781 0 
1760 2 2 0 0 0 0.931008 0 
1761 1 1 0 0 0 0.388603 0 
1762 1 1 0 0 0 0.113943 0 
1763 4 0 2 1 1 0.324472 -7.33807 
1764 7 6 0 0 1 4.099526 2.725461 
1765 9 8 1 0 0 78.21852 2.051367 
1766 6 6 0 0 0 32.77696 0 
1767 8 6 1 0 1 46.2318 1.462118 
1768 2 2 0 0 0 0.579489 0 
1769 5 4 0 0 1 2.403764 2.142432 
1770 9 8 1 0 0 1.393128 -0.03567 
1771 6 5 0 0 1 0.988609 0 
1772 10 8 2 0 0 0.628236 0.13422 
1773 2 1 0 0 1 0.38137 0.911307 
1774 7 5 0 1 1 5.144494 2.482091 
1775 17 13 0 1 3 30.28567 1.68502 
1776 4 3 0 1 0 4.419581 0 
1777 6 4 0 0 2 11.46844 4.115202 
1778 17 10 1 2 4 12.58096 1.64055 
1779 19 13 1 1 4 20.08487 3.352757 
1780 12 9 0 2 1 8.843704 0.398774 
85 
1781 7 1 1 3 2 24.08549 3.025375 
1782 1 1 0 0 0 0.073814 0 
1783 8 4 1 2 1 3.595057 1.861703 
1784 10 5 0 0 5 10.15681 5.262954 
1785 19 6 3 3 7 9.987424 5.753235 
1786 9 3 1 1 4 3.456459 2.950998 
1787 8 4 0 4 0 0.311689 0.003988 
1788 18 8 1 3 6 4.73587 3.606254 
1789 18 7 0 4 7 7.889238 2.671008 
1790 25 13 0 6 6 6.89769 1.472641 
1791 14 6 1 4 3 8.240205 4.34556 
1792 19 7 2 7 3 2.510428 2.46602 
1793 24 16 1 2 5 19.99914 3.666774 
1794 12 7 1 1 3 1.682244 0.526263 
1795 14 6 0 5 3 3.277756 0.995122 
1796 24 7 1 7 9 19.05546 6.338613 
1797 25 5 1 5 14 10.64869 15.24268 
1798 5 1 2 2 0 1.727926 0.126939 
1799 15 10 2 2 1 9.891556 2.181745 
1800 21 11 2 4 5 3.433291 1.993038 
1801 25 7 0 6 12 31.7826 1.770865 
1802 16 4 0 5 7 2.096764 4.035564 
1803 20 10 2 3 5 31.09262 14.19794 
1804 12 3 0 8 1 2.808914 2.310246 
1805 15 6 0 6 3 3.749038 0.247489 
1806 13 1 0 7 5 5.714599 7.014206 
1807 13 3 1 4 5 18.67846 1.675494 
1808 18 11 0 6 1 20.55151 3.646855 
1809 16 13 0 0 2 4.75932 3.200241 
1810 18 5 0 10 3 1.304457 0.274175 
1811 13 4 0 6 2 1.060406 0.625793 
1812 19 10 0 6 3 2.426257 0.087015 
1813 27 11 1 7 8 24.5076 5.670986 
1814 22 8 4 2 8 4.796588 1.928832 
1815 24 14 0 6 4 5.910112 0.34695 
1816 19 7 1 8 3 16.0514 16.60718 
1817 19 12 0 5 1 11.08368 0.30674 
1818 17 14 0 3 0 11.23685 0.01439 
1819 11 7 1 1 2 41.35319 0.733717 
1820 14 6 0 3 4 2.375957 0.954914 
1821 19 11 0 5 3 3.476262 2.42982 
1822 12 8 0 4 0 39.62966 0.448853 
1823 22 18 1 2 1 5.275497 1.780838 
1824 7 3 1 1 2 7.483911 1.092378 
1825 11 9 1 0 1 3.239621 0.636402 
1826 6 5 0 1 0 0.865205 0.429553 
86 
1827 6 5 0 1 0 1.441594 0 
1828 7 6 0 1 0 2.068623 0.095232 
1829 16 10 1 4 1 0.488946 0.076291 
1830 8 6 0 1 1 0.946505 0.017209 
1831 3 3 0 0 0 0.118707 0 
1832 8 7 0 0 1 0.764076 0.357973 
1833 10 9 0 1 0 1.398784 -0.00029 
1834 6 3 0 2 1 1.124021 0.179353 
1835 11 3 1 6 0 0.514286 0.028636 
1836 4 3 0 0 1 1.544366 0.356127 
1837 5 1 1 3 0 0.258229 0.015877 
1838 7 2 0 3 2 0.661712 1.247604 
1839 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Total 1017 547 52 213 200 978,6478 195,7148 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: The number of confiscation attempts is given in four categories in terms of 
their outcomes, namely full confiscation, partial confiscation, inheritance tax, and no 
confiscation. Negative values seen in the amount left to family are because inher-
itance tax asked to be paid by the family was higher than the total value of inher-
itance.   
Another question of temporality is the contribution of monetary 
gains from müsadere to total state revenues. This is a question that 
needs to be approached with extra caution partly because the data on 
state revenues is quite scarce during this period. The data prepared by 
Pamuk and Karaman (2010) include only the three years covered by 
the present study: 1761, 1784 and 1785.176 With respect to these three 
years, figure 2.3 illustrates the contribution of müsadere revenues to 
the total revenues of the central government. Starting from a tiny share 
of 0.28 per cent in 1761, it goes up to 6.85 and 6.83 per cents in 1784 
and 1785 respectively. As far as this graph is concerned, one would 
say that the contribution was marginal in these years. However, we 
can confidently argue that this ratio was higher than what is shown 
here though we do not know by how much, and particularly so in the 
years with an outlier case that was of significantly large value. This is 
not to say that if it rises to, say 20 per cent in such a year, it would 
mean that the central government extracted much less tax compared 
                                         
176	Pamuk	and	Karaman,	"State	Finances,"	603-609.	
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to the previous year. This is primarily because the Ottoman budgets 
typically do not reflect müsadere revenues since they were extraordi-
nary and irregular sources of income.177 The reason, apart from the 
lack of state revenue data, why I do not speculate much on the issue 
of contribution is that we do not know the value of N, being the entire 
population, which would allow us to calculate the ratio of n/N where 
n is 1,017. But let’s assume for a moment N=1,017. Even so, it would 
not mean that these revenues were unimportant. Although they could 
be negligibly small, serving as an immediate and irregular source of 
revenue was the exact fiscal function of the practice of müsadere. Con-
versely, even if it was much higher than the ratio in this graph, we 
could not argue that it was a purely fiscal weapon. As will be seen in 
the following chapters, müsadere had important political functions too. 
Figure 2.3: Contributions of Müsadere Revenues to Total State Reve-
nues, 1750-1839 
	
Source: Pamuk and Karaman (2010) and see bibliography for data sources.178 
                                         
177	Mehmet	Genç	and	Erol	Özvar,	Osmanlı	Maliyesi	Kurumlar	Ve	Bütçeler	(Istanbul:	Osmanlı	Bankası	
Arşiv	ve	Araştırma	Merkezi,	2006).	
178	Pamuk	and	Karaman,	"State	Finances."	
88 
Notes: Ottoman budgets typically do not reflect müsadere revenues as they were ac-
cidental. 
2.3 Space	
This section examines the spatial patterns of müsadere. The in-
tuition behind this spatial investigation is that the power and willing-
ness to confiscate of the central authority was spatially uneven. This 
unevenness is linked with distance from Istanbul and administrative 
status of the physical location of assets. Proximity to Istanbul matters 
since it increased the direct costs of müsadere, namely agency and 
transportation costs, while administrative status affects the degree of 
state presence in the location.179 Due to the fewness of observations 
belonging to autonomous regions, I chose not to report a map of spatial 
distribution by administrative status. 
This section addresses these aspects of spatiality with the help 
of two maps, using the number of, and revenues from, müsadere re-
spectively.180 Map 2.1 displays spatial frequency of müsadere at both 
location and province levels. The map illustrates that the largest num-
ber of confiscations took place in Istanbul, followed by such cities as 
Bursa, Antalya and Manisa. The common feature of most cities with a 
higher number of confiscations is that they are either coastal or very 
close to the coast. This finding leads to two potential hypotheses. First, 
coastal regions were more appealing since they were relatively devel-
oped due to greater commercial exchange stemming from port presence 
and favourable climate. Second, undertaking confiscations on the 
coast was less expensive because sea transport was historically 
                                         
179	For	more	on	spatiality	of	müsadere,	see	the	section	on	theoretical	background	in	chapter	3.		
180	When	entering	the	spatial	data	into	Geographic	Information	Systems	(GIS)	each	case	of	müsadere	
had	to	be	assigned	to	a	dot	on	the	map.	Since	it	is	not	possible	to	know	each	coordinate	of	the	location	
of	assets,	which	would	be	numerous	anyway,	I	had	to	decide	where	to	assign	confiscations	conducted	
in	a	settlement.	While	doing	so,	I	have	chosen	the	best	possible	solution	by	assigning	all	confiscations	
in	a	certain	settlement	to	a	coordinate	chosen	from	its	present-day	centre.	This	does	no	harm	to	the	
general	purpose	of	mapping	in	this	study	which	is	simply	to	visualise	spatial	distribution.		
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cheaper than inland transport. In addition to these hypotheses, an al-
ternative reasoning could be that the wealthy people living in the coasts 
were less dependent on the central governments because of the greater 
likelihood of engagement with commercial activity from which acquisi-
tions had relative immunity from müsadere.181 This reasoning, how-
ever, is not supported by the spatial data presented here as one would 
then see the opposite trend, namely less confiscation on the coasts. 
What drove this trend is left as an open question to be answered in the 
next chapter. 
Table 2.2: Table of Frequency of Müsadere at Provincial Level, 1750-
1839 
Province Frequency Percentage 
Adana 13 1.28 
Anadolu (Anatolia) 208 20.49 
Bağdad (Baghdad) 2 0.2 
Boğdan (Moldovia) 4 0.39 
Bosna (Bosnia) 14 1.38 
Cezayir (Algeria) 1 0.1 
Cidde (Jeddah) 6 0.59 
Diyarbakır 14 1.38 
Eflak (Wallachia) 8 0.79 
Erzurum 12 1.18 
Frontier Castles 2 0.2 
Girit (Crete) 12 1.18 
Halep (Aleppo) 10 0.99 
İstanbul 289 28.47 
Kaptanpaşa 63 6.21 
Karaman 35 3.45 
Kıbrıs (Cyprus) 7 0.69 
Maraş 6 0.59 
Mısır (Egypt) 6 0.59 
Mora (Pelaponnese) 8 0.79 
Musul (Mosul) 2 0.2 
Rakka (Raqqa) 1 0.1 
Rum  37 3.65 
Rumeli (Rumelia) 131 12.91 
Şam (Damascus) 18 1.77 
                                         
181	This	is	in	line	with	Albert	Hirschman’s	well-known	terminology	of	‘exit,	voice	and	loyalty.’	Albert	O.	
Hirschman,	 Exit,	 Voice	 and	 Loyalty:	 Responses	 to	 Decline	 in	 in	 Firms,	 Organizations	 and	 States	
(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	1970).	
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Sayda (Sidon) 4 0.39 
Silistre (Silistria) 85 8.37 
Trablus (Tripoli/Leba-
non) 5 0.49 
Trablusgarp (Trip-
oli/Libya) 1 0.1 
Trabzon (Trebizond) 5 0.49 
Van 6 0.59 
Total 1,015 100  
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
It is also evident that areas proximate to Istanbul have a higher 
number of müsadere, possibly caused by lower transportation costs 
and greater influence of the central authority.182 Map 2.1 illustrates 
the provincial distribution of müsadere as well. It reveals that the high-
est number of confiscations was conducted in Istanbul, which was 
treated as a separate province in the data. Istanbul was followed by its 
three neighbours, i.e. the province of Anadolu (Anatolia) in western An-
atolia, the province of Rumeli (Rumelia or eastern Balkans) lying on 
the western side of Aegean Sea and the province of Silistre (Silistra) 
lying on the north of Istanbul along the Black Sea. This also empha-
sises the importance of distance from the capital. Last but not the 
least, province-level statistics show low intensity in indirectly ruled re-
gions (marked with red-yellow circles). For example, Tunisia in North 
Africa, which was autonomously ruled by Husaynid Dynasty and the 
vassal states of Wallachia and Moldavia in the Balkans were not the 
prime spatial targets of confiscation. Table 2.2 gives the exact number 
of müsadere attempts in each province.  
The other striking finding is the high density in the islands of 
Crete and Cyprus together with the province of Kaptanpaşa (covering 
the rest of Aegean islands).183 As this is not included in the regression 
                                         
182	One	point	that	can	potentially	matter	is	that	elites	closer	to	the	capital	can	be	wealthier.	While	the	
focus	here	is	to	give	a	descriptive	picture,	the	next	chapter	will	control	for	the	size	of	wealth	when	
examining	the	proposition	that	transportation	costs	were	important.		
183	The	Kaptanpaşa	province	shown	in	the	maps	in	the	middle	of	Aegean	Sea	was	a	fragmented	prov-
ince	including	most	Aegean	islands	and	some	coastal	settlements	on	both	Anatolia	and	Greek	coasts	
of	the	Sea.	The	province	was	under	the	administration	of	the	Kapudan	Paşa	(the	commander-in-chief	
of	the	Ottoman	navy).	Its	capital	was	Gallipoli.	
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analysis, it is worth giving further details on potential reasons why is-
lands had a higher density of confiscations. It could well be the result 
of abovementioned low transportation costs in the coastal regions that 
would apply to the islands too. But it is important to note that the 
islands were traditional places of exile where many officials had been 
deported to live until they died or were pardoned. So, what increases 
the number of confiscations in the islands could be that their inher-
itance was confiscated in their places of exile when they died.184 
Map 2.1: Frequencies of Müsadere Attempts in Ottoman Locations 
and Provinces, 1750-1839 
 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: Provincial borders shown here are approximately drawn based on a geocoded 
map created by Harvard Geospatial Library accessed at http://hgl.har-
vard.edu:8080/opengeoportal/ on 18 January 2017. This map displays provincial 
borders of the Ottoman Empire, circa 1790. The Kaptanpaşa province is shown in 
                                         
184	The	Grand	Vizier	Memiş	Paşa	was	one	such	official.	After	staying	in	the	office	for	one	month	and	
nine	days,	he	was	dismissed	as	a	result	of	a	Janissary	revolt	in	January	1809.	He	was	then	deported	to	
Chios	(Sakız)	island	where	he	died	in	July	of	the	same	year.	His	wealth	was	immediately	confiscated.	
HAT	518/25292.	
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the middle of Aegean Sea as it did not have clear-cut territories. Similarly, those 
confiscations conducted in frontier castles are shown at the top of the Black Sea 
under the name of ‘Frontier Castles.’ 
Map 2.2 shows how this picture changes when we use müsadere 
revenues instead of frequency. It demonstrates that certain provinces 
such as Baghdad and Tripoli that were previously coloured with lighter 
tones of blue are found to have provided higher average amounts of 
revenue to the central government. This finding, however, does not tell 
us much as it stems from four outliers that can be seen in figure 2.1.  
Map 2.2: Provincial Densities of Müsadere by Revenues (per sq. km), 
1750-1839 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: Provincial borders shown here are approximately drawn based on a geocoded 
map created by Harvard Geospatial Library accessed at http://hgl.har-
vard.edu:8080/opengeoportal/ on 18 January 2017. This map displays provincial 
borders of the Ottoman Empire, circa 1790. The Kaptanpaşa province is shown in 
the middle of Aegean Sea as it did not have clear-cut territories. Similarly, those 
confiscations conducted in frontier castles are shown at the top of the Black Sea 
under the name of ‘Frontier Castles.’ 
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With few exceptions, proximity to Istanbul and administrative status 
seem to matter in the map 2.2 as well. But the descriptive spatial anal-
ysis used in this section does not fully explain to what extent spatial 
forces shaped the decision to confiscate. Before the role of spatiality is 
considered in more detail via econometric analysis and by controlling 
for the size of wealth and other variables, it is necessary to understand 
the identity of the victims of müsadere and why their property was 
confiscated according to the official jargon of the sources. 
2.4 Justification	and	Identity	
This section investigates the justification of müsadere by the 
central government and then the occupational, gender and religious 
patterns, where needed, by time and justification. As I noted above, the 
existing literature has often claimed that enrichment by royal grant 
was the main reason for the existence of the practice of müsadere, that 
the prime targets were office-holders, except for the legal community, 
and private fiscal contractors, and that certain groups such as mer-
chants, artisans, peasants and women were relatively immune from 
it.185 The aim of this section is to explore whether the data lends sup-
port to these claims.  
Surviving sources of müsadere occasionally state a justification 
explaining why confiscations were carried out. Table 2.3 shows these 
justifications based on 390 cases for which I could identify justifica-
tion. There are five categories of justification, namely, death with no 
heirs, indebtedness, crime, enrichment by royal grant and affluence. 
The crime category is a pooled category, including five sub-categories 
of crime. It is pooled because, even though I was confidently able to 
identify that a crime was committed, I could not always identify the 
                                         
185	İnalcık,	"Capital	Formation,"	107.	
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type of crime.186 Therefore, I instead examine these issues with quali-
tative evidence provided later in this section. One word of caution is 
necessary before proceeding. Official justifications of müsadere admit-
tedly cannot be taken for granted, as they are not fully reliable due to 
their bias towards the official view.187 Even where reliable, they would 
not help to explain why only a select group of people faced confiscation 
of their wealth and not others who could easily have fallen under one 
of these categories of justification. It is the same bias, however, which 
makes them worth-examining. That is, they are valuable in under-
standing the official mind-set behind müsadere. 
Table 2.3: Frequencies of Justifications of Müsadere, 1750-1839 
Justification188 Frequency Percent 
Death Without Heirs 43 11.03 
Enrichment by Royal Grant 56 14.36 
Affluence 39 10.00 
Indebtedness 46 11.79 
Crime 206 52.82 
Total 390 100.00 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Arguably the least disputable of all categories of justification was 
one’s dying without any heirs.189 Death with no heirs constitutes 11 
                                         
186	Most	frequent	types	of	crime	are:	(1)	corruption,	(2)	oppression	of	subjects,	(3)	fake	claim	of	ayan-
hood,	(ayan,	in	this	context,	refers	to	elected	local	representatives)	and	(4)	rebellion.			
187	Therefore,	regression	analysis	in	the	next	chapter	does	not	use	justification	as	a	variable.		
188	Corresponding	words	in	official	sources	are	as	follows.	Death	without	heirs:	‘Bilavaris	fevt	olmak,’	
Enrichment	by	Royal	Grant:	‘Serveti	miriden	olmak,’	Affluence:	‘Servet	ve	yesar	sahibi	olmak,’	Indebt-
edness:	‘Miriye	ve	saireye	borcu	olmak,’	Crime:	Vary	depending	on	the	type	of	crime.		
189	Even	in	the	case	of	merchants	who	were	not	the	prime	targets	of	confiscation,	heirless	death	was	
a	reason	for	confiscation.	A	letter	sent	by	the	tax	farmer	of	Aleppo,	for	example,	complains	about	his	
unpaid	debt	owed	by	a	merchant	based	in	Istanbul	and	who	died	on	his	way	to	Mecca	to	do	the	pil-
grimage.	It	explicitly	says,	‘the	wealth	of	those	who	died	without	heirs	belongs	to	the	public	treasury	
of	the	Muslims.’	C.ML	563/23076	(25	November	1178	(5	Zilkade	1192)).		
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per cent of the sample. These cases should be distinguished from oth-
ers in the sense that the motives of the state behind confiscating the 
wealth of an individual without heirs were hardly political but to pre-
vent plundering of inheritance by others.190 Out of 43 cases falling into 
this category, 20 are situated in Istanbul, which is higher than the 
capital’s share of the total number of confiscations (28 per cent). This 
is arguably because the wealth of some people who died without heirs 
were confiscated by local authorities without documents having 
reached the imperial archives. One of the striking features of confisca-
tions carried out with this justification is that once one’s inheritance 
was sealed, if some persons came forward with claims on the inher-
itance their claims were then examined before witnesses.191 If these 
claims were proven legitimate, the inheritance could be returned to the 
claimants if other justifications shown in table 2.1 were not also appli-
cable. 
The second least questionable category of justification is indebt-
edness that also forms 11 per cent of the sample population.192 This 
means that the failure to pay debts could be a justification for confis-
cation. Many prime targets of müsadere were tax farmers who had to 
pay annuities to the treasury. It appears that some defaulted on their 
debts. In other cases, the creditor was a third party and not the central 
government. At times, müsadere was used as a tool to threaten the 
                                         
190	One	document,	for	instance,	makes	it	clear	that	confiscating	the	wealth	of	those	who	died	without	
heirs	was	a	norm.	It	writes	that	“because	confiscating	the	wealth	of	those	who	died	without	heirs	and	
children	from	the	subjects	of	the	Kehlivanlı	tribe	and	those	subject	to	them,	it	was	ordered	to	confis-
cate	the	belongings,	cereals	etc.	of	Cameleer	Emir	Ömer	who	died	in	Thessaloniki.”	CML	355/14558.	
191	C.ML	539/22158	(11	September	1832	(15	Rebiülahir	1248)).	
192	In	an	order	sent	by	the	sultan	to	the	local	administrators	of	the	city	of	Tokat	in	the	province	of	Rum,	
the	sultan	orders	the	confiscation	of	the	wealth	of	former	governor	of	Aleppo,	İbrahim	Paşa	residing	
in	Tokat,	and	his	son	Hamud	Paşa,	resident	of	Dimetoka	(Didymoteicho).	The	reason	is	that	the	former	
owes	some	648,781	kuruş,	and	the	latter	508,233	kuruş	to	the	public	treasury.	These	are	their	debts	
from	tax	farms.	The	sultan	says,	although	the	full	amount	was	divided	into	annuities	of	25,000	kuruş	
before,	they	still	tried	to	avoid	payment.	The	confiscation,	the	sultan	wrote,	should	have	included	all	
their	property	in	Tokat	and	Aleppo	as	well	as	tax	farms.	We	understand,	however,	that	this	order	was	
also	in	the	form	of	warning	and	threat	that	would	not	have	been	carried	out	if	they	paid	their	debts.	
Some	words	in	the	document	are	addressed	to	the	confiscator	sent	to	the	location,	ordering	him	to	
unearth	all	property	with	finicalness	and	send	the	inventory	as	soon	as	possible.	CML	205/8456.	22	
May	1812	(10	Cemaziyülevvel	1227).		
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debtor to expedite payment. This could indeed be an effective strategy 
from the central government’s perspective unless the reason for non-
payment was bankruptcy. When threatened this way, it could also be 
rational for the debtor to make the payment if his debts did not exceed 
his credits to prevent the confiscation of their entire wealth.193  
Figure 2.4: Proportional Frequency of Justifications of 
Müsadere across Time, 1750-1839 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Another way of justifying müsadere was broadly defined crime, 
constituting more than 50 per cent of the sample. In this case, the 
practice of müsadere takes the form of punishment though typically-
without any judicial process. As mentioned above, crime as a justifica-
tion was pooled in the above statistics. So, I shall examine five sub-
                                         
193	In	one	of	such	cases,	for	instance,	the	wealth	of	a	certain	Ahmed	Zero,	who	was	a	merchant	from	
Egypt,	was	confiscated	probably	on	a	temporary	basis	by	the	government	due	to	his	debts	to	the	treas-
ury.	After	he	discharged	the	debts,	the	confiscated	properties	were	returned	to	him.	C.DH	60/2958.		
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categories of crime here. The first one is corruption including both brib-
ery and embezzlement.194 This inherently applied to office-holders as 
they were those with access to government funds. Müsadere following 
alleged corruption was often accompanied by another form of punish-
ment, namely execution, dismissal and exile. One might argue that 
from a political economy perspective, it is not arbitrary to confiscate 
the wealth of a corrupt official. Perhaps, what makes it arbitrary is the 
fact that there was no judicial process involved, meaning that the de-
cision was at the sultan’s whim.195  
The second type of crime that typically resulted in müsadere was 
oppression of the subjects.196 This is easy to understand within the 
context of the political economy of tax farming. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, Ottoman provinces came increasingly under the control of pro-
vincial elites who were mostly tax farmers and collectors (on behalf of 
grand tax farmers). As fiscal entrepreneurs, they signed a contract in 
either primary or secondary markets of tax farming, making them lia-
ble to make prefixed payments to be followed by annuities. The revenue 
they collected above that amount was their profit. The natural outcome 
of this process was that many entrepreneurs did their best to squeeze 
                                         
194	One	example	is	quite	telling.	Vassaf	Efendi,	who	was	one	of	the	clerks	at	the	office	of	the	private	
secretary	 in	 Istanbul,	was	accused	of	embezzlement.	The	document,	dated	20	November	1837	 (21	
Şaban	1253)	tells	us	first	of	the	rumours	surrounding	his	corruption	and	presents	evidence	that	it	was	
known	to	everybody	that	fiscal	clerks	employed	by	him	were	travelling	with	cash	and	jewellery	and	
possibly	hiding	embezzled	money	in	their	houses	or	at	various	locations.	It	says	that	his	entire	wealth,	
without	 leaving	even	a	 tiny	piece	behind,	had	 to	be	confiscated	 for	 justice	 to	be	 realised,	and	 the	
confiscation	to	be	an	example	for	others	who	would	attempt	to	steal	public	money.	Then	his	assets	
are	mentioned,	while	some	of	them	such	as	his	waterfront	residences	were	auctioned.	And,	we	un-
derstand	that	the	confiscation	included	also	his	tax	farms	and	bonds.	The	document	ends	with	a	men-
tion	of	the	fact	that	although	his	men	were	interrogated	and	threatened,	they	did	not	say	a	word	about	
hoarded	property.	C.ML	151/6354.							
195	Yaycıoğlu,	"Wealth,	Power	and	Death."	
196	A	good	example	of	this	is	as	follows.	The	wealth	of	a	local	notable	of	Menteşe	and	his	sons	was	
confiscated	because	of	their	oppression	of	the	subjects.	Çavuşzade	Ebubekir,	it	is	mentioned,	was	fa-
mous	for	the	size	of	his	wealth.	But	this	wealth,	according	to	the	sultan,	was	gained	through	oppression	
of	 the	 subjects	 through	over-taxation.	 The	document	 continues	by	 informing	us	 that	 although	 the	
property	was	sealed	before,	one	of	the	sons	of	Ebubekir	called	Hacı	Hasan	illegally	unsealed	them	and	
wanted	to	sell	the	cereals	in	storehouses.	After	cautioning	the	governor	of	Anadolu	province	to	handle	
this	issue	with	care,	he	threatens	the	confiscator	that	if	he	does	not	pay	enough	care	to	the	completion	
of	this	confiscation,	he	will	be	punished	harshly.	C.ML	460/18682	(12	January	1793	(29	Cemaziyülevvel	
1207)).		
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tax payers. From the central government’s point of view, oppressing 
the subjects could mean permanent damage to the tax base by lower-
ing the ruler’s legitimacy among them.197 Knowing this, the subjects 
used the right to send a petition to the sultan which was a unique way 
of communication between the sultan and his subjects. These com-
plaints seem to have worked at times as they could lead to confiscation 
of the wealth of those who were supposedly overtaxing or confiscating 
the wealth of tax-payers. This too was usually accompanied by execu-
tion or exile.  
The third kind of crime is the fake claim of ayanhood (ayanlık) 
Ayans were the representatives of cities and towns elected by the local 
population though with some government intervention until 1768.198 
The centre generally respected this mutually beneficial relationship 
with the elected ayans and prevented others from claiming ayanhood. 
Therefore, people who declared themselves as the ayan were often pun-
ished with confiscation almost invariably accompanied by execution.  
Even less tolerated was open rebellion against the authority of 
the sultan, which was considered major disobedience against the ‘faith 
and government’ (din ü devlet), as the traditional coupling of the Otto-
man political thinking suggests.199 If a rebel could be caught some-
times with the help of the local state employees, he was most often 
punished with execution and confiscation. However, the doors were 
occasionally not entirely closed to rebels as some were eventually par-
doned either through request, or, if they possessed enough bargaining 
power, negotiation. Related to that, müsadere also applied to office-
holders who did not obey the government’s orders that were predomi-
nantly war-related such as sending troops or foodstuff to warzones. 
Depending on the bargaining position of the disobedient, their life and 
                                         
197	The	legitimacy	is	argued	to	be	one	of	the	determinants	of	the	capacity	to	tax	of	a	ruler:	Levi,	Of	Rule	
and	Revenue,	17.	
198	Yaycıoğlu,	Partners	of	the	Empire,	17.	
199	Halil	İnalcık,	"Islam	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,"	Cultura	Turcica	5,	no.	7	(1968-1970).	
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property could have been put under risk. As in the case of indebted-
ness, müsadere was at times a means of threatening the disobedient, 
its very existence deterring them from disobedience and oppression.  
The next type of justification was enrichment by royal grant.200 
For many historians, enrichment by royal grant was the single explan-
atory cause of the existence of confiscation. The sources use two types 
of statement to imply enrichment by royal grant: (1) being a member of 
the askeri class that often meant holding an office, and (2) having an 
account with the state that was again related to the use of state re-
sources. An imperial order to confiscate the wealth of a high bureau-
crat in charge of foreign affairs clearly explains this justification:  
Although this confiscation was waived before, it is now legitimate 
with the legal opinion that the possessions of the late Reis’ül Küt-
tab Seyyid Efendi shall be confiscated by leaving a decent 
amount to his heirs because he has no heirs but a mother, two 
wives [or sisters as the word hemşire is used for both] and two 
grown-up children and because he accumulated his wealth not 
through trade but public office.201 
It is clear from the end of this passage that the central government 
regarded the gains from an office as non-heritable. The question is 
whether his wealth would have been confiscated if he had not held an 
office. One would perhaps never be able to give a convincing answer to 
this question. But, thinking more generally, we must emphasise the 
fact that there were office-holders who never faced confiscation of their 
                                         
200	When	the	sultan	ordered	the	confiscation	of	the	wealth	of	Ebubekir	Paşa,	the	former	governor	of	
the	province	of	Egypt,	for	example,	he	justified	it	with	having	accounts	with	the	treasury.	The	order	
was	to	confiscate,	though	unusually,	even	the	precious	assets	of	his	sons,	but	excluding	those	of	his	
wife.	C.ML	577/23651	(11	July	1797	(16	Muharrem	1212)).		
201	C.ML	477/19445.	At	first	glance	it	seems	contradictory	that	the	existence	of	heirs	is	presented	as	a	
reason	 for	 re-confiscation.	 This,	 however,	 implies	 that	 the	 deceased	 has	 no	 vulnerable	 heirs	 who	
would	be	affected	so	badly	by	it.	As	will	be	seen	later	in	this	part,	many	confiscations	were	given	up	
just	because	of	the	existing	of	needy	heirs.	
100 
wealth, which was inherited rather smoothly by their heirs. Neverthe-
less, it appears that enrichment by royal grant was used to justify con-
fiscations in the imperial language.202  
The most curious type of justification is affluence. Some sources 
explicitly state that müsadere was carried out ‘because of the fame of 
being affluent.’203 A document, for example, mentions this justification 
as such: ‘while the centre should necessarily be informed on the death 
of a wealthy individual, we somehow did not know that Pasinoğlu Mus-
tafa of Crete died and it is now ordered that his real estates, farms and 
possessions shall be confiscated.’204 One clue may be that this was 
sometimes linked with suspiciously rapid accumulation of wealth, im-
plying uncertainty of the source of one’s wealth. It might be said that 
confiscating the wealth of an affluent individual was perceived as quite 
normal. One final note regarding the justification of affluence is neces-
sary. The following justifications were most likely to be mentioned in 
archival documents: death without heirs, indebtedness and crime. So, 
628 cases for which no justification was given are more likely to fall 
                                         
202	In	his	well-known	chronicle,	Mustafa	Naima	mentions	a	conflict	between	Bazerganzade	and	Hacı	
Sinan.	When	he	was	the	governor	of	Bosnia,	Bazerganzade	harassed	Hacı	Sinan	many	times.	As	Hacı	
Sinan	was	a	rich	person,	he	attempted	to	force	him	to	sacrifice	some	of	his	wealth	in	the	form	of	either	
debt	or	confiscation.	He	was	also	arrested	and	held	at	a	castle.	According	to	Naima,	Hacı	Sinan	said	
“You	may	not	take	anything	from	me,	unless	it	is	an	obligation	of	law.	If	you	kill	me,	I	am	content	with	
the	will	of	God.	I	am	not	a	tax	collector.	I	have	not	made	a	great	sum	of	money	through	state	property.	
If	I	have	some	wealth,	this	is	not	from	state	property	and	tax	revenue.	I	made	this	money	in	my	lifetime,	
through	trade	and	by	being	content	with	onion	and	cheese	and	depriving	myself	of	pleasures.	What	is	
my	fault	that	I	would	be	obliged	to	pay	a	fine?”	Naima	Mustafa	Efendi,	Tarih-I	Naima:	Ravzatu'l	Huseyn	
Fi	Hulasati	Ahbari'l	Hafikayn,	trans.	Mehmet	İpşirli	(Ankara:	Türk	Tarih	Kurumu,	2007).	
203	One	of	the	interesting	explanations	is	as	follows.	When	the	confiscator	was	commissioned	with	the	
confiscation	of	the	wealth	of	Karaosmanoğlu	Hacı	Mehmed,	he	was	told	that	‘because	he	has	been	
the	ayan	for	a	long	while	now,	it	is	expected	that	he	possesses	so	much	wealth.’	C.DH	329/16413	(28	
August	1792	(10	Muharrem	1207)).	
204	C.ML	166/6959.	The	details	of	the	document	(22	September	1805	(27	Cemaziyülahir	1200):	This	is	
a	letter	sent	by	the	sultan	to	the	chief	guardian	(muhafız)	of	Hanya	(Crete),	the	judge	of	Hanya,	Janis-
sary	commander	and	to	the	notables	of	Hanya.	After	complaining	that	the	centre	was	not	informed	
about	the	death	of	Mustafa,	the	son	of	Yasin,	he	mentions	the	ways	that	this	person	has	made	his	
wealth.	Per	the	sultan,	his	wealth	amounted	to	around	450,000-600,000	kuruş	(which	is	a	lot)	and	was	
made	by	oppression	of	the	subjects.	The	sultan	orders	the	local	governor	to	seal	the	houses	and	reveal	
the	property	before	a	confiscator	was	sent	to	prepare	an	inventory.	 It	 is	again	ordered	that	even	a	
single	piece	of	asset	shall	not	be	left	hoarded.	The	document	also	includes	a	threat	to	the	son	of	the	
deceased	that	his	tax	farm	called	the	Keramiye	would	be	confiscated	and	sold	to	someone	else.	An	
interesting	note	is	made	by	the	sultan	that	the	local	governor	shall	not	act	according	to	his	feelings	
towards	the	family	or	any	requests	made	by	them.		
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into the categories of affluence and enrichment by royal grant. This 
means that although affluence constitutes 10 per cent of all identified 
justifications, these may well be a fraction of those practised with the 
same motive. 
Table 2.4: Professional Distributions of Targets of Müsadere by Jus-
tification, 1750-1839 
Occupation/Justifi-
cation 
No 
Heirs 
Royal 
Grant 
Afflu-
ence 
Debts Crime Miss-
ing 
To-
tal 
Missing/To-
tal (%) 
Military Officials (Ask-
eriye) 
4 29 4 15 42 173 267 65 
Administrative and 
Palace Officials 
(Kalemiye-Saray) 
13 8 4 11 23 172 231 74 
Legal Officials (İlmiye) 1 0 1 0 2 7 11 65 
Provincial Tax Con-
tractors (Ayan) 
5 16 18 18 97 195 349 55 
Merchants (Tüccar) 4 3 8 0 12 20 47 42 
Artisans (Esnaf) 4 0 1 0 1 3 9 33 
Moneychangers (Sar-
raf) 
2 0 0 0 6 5 13 38 
Peasants (Köylü) 2 0 3 2 21 19 47 40 
Missing 8 0 0 0 2 33 43  
Total 43 56 39 46 206 627 1017  
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
It is finally necessary to make some remarks on the temporal 
patterns of justification shown in figure 2.4. Most strikingly, there is a 
falling proportion of enrichment by royal grant, a very high share of 
crime between 1820 and 1830, and affluence appears as a justification 
only after the 1770s. Based on these observations, we can argue that 
during this period the practice of müsadere has been justified less and 
less with enrichment by royal grant, which was once the only way of 
justifying confiscations, and more and more with accusation of crime 
against the state and with the curious justification of affluence. A very 
high proportion of crime in the period 1820-1830 can be attributed to 
two developments. First, at the time, the central government was strug-
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gling to curb the power of provincial elites for which one possible solu-
tion was confiscation. The second development is the ongoing Greek 
rebellion at that time, which led to an increase in the category of crime 
in the 1820s. 
This discussion of justifications helps us understand the cate-
gorical patterns of müsadere. Table 2.4 confirms that government offi-
cials and tax farmers were the professional groups that faced confisca-
tion by far the most. The first three rows represent government officials 
expressed in three categories, i.e. military, administrative and legal of-
ficials. The fourth row displays provincial elites who were involved in 
the business of governance as tax contractors yet were not officially 
affiliated with the centre.205 Merchants and peasants represent 4 per 
cent of the sample population.206 The shares of artisans and money-
changers are quite marginal, both around 1 per cent. Among these 
findings, the most surprising is the relatively high proportion of peas-
ants. To figure out why the wealth of ordinary peasants was being con-
fiscated, we need to look at how these were justified. It appears that 21 
of 28 confiscations of peasant wealth for which I could identify justifi-
cation, out of a total of 47, were crime-related. These were invariably 
due to their participation in rebellion as the only type of crime they 
could commit against the central state. 
These findings are more interesting when we relax an assump-
tion that had to be made at the time of data construction. That is, all 
                                         
205	I	have	detected	some	individuals	who	had	multiple	occupations.	These	few	cases	were	coded	as	
either	officials	or	private	fiscal	contractors	as	one	of	their	occupations	was	always	one	of	those	four	
categories.		
206	Property	rights	of	merchants	were	generally	well-respected.	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	a	story	
narrated	by	the	chronicler	Naima.	Here	Derviş	Mehmed	Paşa,	the	governor	of	Basra	reports	the	mis-
behaviour	of	a	certain	Murtaza	Paşa	who	was	allegedly	confiscating	the	wealth	of	merchants	of	this	
port	city:	“Our	majesty!	That	castle	at	the	shore	is	under	the	protection	of	the	sultan.	For	many	years	
the	commodities	of	the	merchants	are	kept	there	safely,	and	no	one	attacks	this	castle.	The	wellbeing	
of	Basra	and	other	port	cities	depends	on	the	merchants,	and	confiscation	of	these	commodities	will	
result	in	the	ruin	of	the	country.	Merchants	are	the	immaterial	treasure	of	the	sultans.	Persecuting	
merchants	and	confiscating	their	money	and	commodities	can	be	observed	neither	in	Islamic	counties,	
nor	in	others.	Be	generous	and	surrender	this	ambition.”	Efendi,	Tarih-I	Naima.	
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first four categories are, one way or another, beneficiaries of the tax 
revenue system as either tax collectors or farmers, though of varying 
levels. Some private tax contractors also held administrative offices as 
a new practice in the eighteenth century. To highlight their later incor-
poration into the bureaucratic hierarchy, they were treated as private 
contractors.207 Likewise, office-holding typically came as a package 
combined with revenue farms. Even retired officials were granted such 
farms as retirement pensions (arpalık).208 It can therefore be argued 
that 88 per cent of the targets of confiscation were those benefiting 
from the fiscal system. In other words, people engaged in productive 
economic activities such as commerce and manufacturing were not 
under direct threat. There is, unfortunately, no precise occupational 
data to strengthen this argument. However, according to the rough es-
timation of Ariel Salzmann, the number of people in the fiscal business 
during the eighteenth century was 1,000 to 2,000 in Istanbul, and 
5,000 to 10,000 in the provinces.209 This includes moneychangers, 
which I did not include in the first four categories of the statistics pre-
sented in table 2.2.  
A glimpse into occupational distribution by justification reveals 
further results. As displayed in the table, death without heirs could 
apply to any occupational group. As for enrichment by royal grant, it 
is no surprise that it applies to the office-holders and private tax con-
tractors because they were those who had financial connections with 
the central government. In this respect, three merchants stand out as 
exceptions. They were potentially suppliers of the state that was the 
largest purchaser in the market. In the same vein, indebtedness stands 
as a justification primarily for office-holders and contractors. Among 
all categories, merchants are the occupational group for which afflu-
ence constitutes the highest proportion, standing at 30 per cent of all 
                                         
207	Salzmann,	"An	Ancien	Regime	Revisited."	
208	Madeline	Zilfi,	"Elite	Circulation	in	the	Ottoman	Empire:	Great	Mollas	of	the	Eighteenth	Century,"	
Journal	of	the	Economic	and	Social	History	of	the	Orient	26,	no.	3	(1983):	353-354.	
209	Salzmann,	"An	Ancien	Regime	Revisited,"	402..		
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existing justifications for confiscation of merchant property. Finally, 
crime as a justification applied to 63 per cent of tax contractors, pri-
marily due to the conflict between the central government and local 
elites during this period. 
It is also reasonable to question whether missing justifications 
are evenly distributed across these professions. As the final column of 
the table shows, they are not. In general, a greater proportion of justi-
fications are missing for government officials and provincial elites than 
those for other categories. This is because confiscating the wealth of 
other occupations, namely merchants, artisans, moneychangers and 
peasants had to be justified more strongly since they were not the 
usual suspects.  
Figure 2.5: Professional Distributions of Targets of Müsadere across 
Time, 1750-1839
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the temporal changes in the frequencies 
of the professional distribution of müsadere expressed as a percentage 
of total number in the decades during the period 1750-1839. There is 
no considerable change in the percentage of artisans, moneychangers, 
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and legal community. What is most striking in this figure is that it 
shows a boom in the number of provincial elites compared to the other 
groups. The figure reveals that starting from 13 per cent in 1750-1759 
the share of provincial elites moves around 40 per cent between 1780 
and 1820. It starts to fall after 1820, continuing until the abolition of 
müsadere. In the meantime, the ratios of military and administrative 
officials fall when the ratio of provincial elites rises. Precisely the period 
1780-1820 was a time of centralising efforts. The power of major pro-
vincial power-holders was curbed by the 1820s. Nevertheless, this is-
sue is also left as an open question for the econometric analysis. 
Figure 2.6: Distributions of Targets of Müsadere by Religion and 
Gender, 1750-1839 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
The prime targets of müsadere, namely tax farmers and govern-
ment officials, were almost invariably Muslim men. Thus, the occupa-
tional distribution explains, to a large extent, the religious and gender 
distribution displayed in figure 2.6. The figure reveals that Muslim men 
constituted 919 out of the 1,017 observations, while the central gov-
ernment attempted to confiscate the wealth of only 38 women. If this 
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is again combined with the basis of justification, it turns out that 8 out 
of 9 women for whom I could identify justification were those who died 
with no heirs. Even though not specified by official sources, some were 
arguably the wives of office-holders whose wealth was previously con-
fiscated. This is probably because many people under high risk of con-
fiscation seemingly transferred a fraction of their assets to their wives 
and children. The qualitative sources inform us that the central gov-
ernment has mostly respected the individuality principle of confisca-
tions, that is, those properties owned by family members were gener-
ally not touched.210 Upon their death, however, their inheritance could 
have been confiscated too. 
The religious distribution is more interesting than that of gender. 
As shown in figure 2.6, Muslims form a large majority of the victims of 
müsadere despite the existence of many rich non-Muslims. This is 
firstly related to the occupational structure of the targeted population 
since non-Muslims were generally not allowed to serve as government 
officials except for certain offices such as translation and minting. Sim-
ilarly, they were not able to bid in tax farming auctions either, though 
they were involved in the fiscal system as moneylenders who lent to tax 
farmers who needed capital. To explain further why those non-Muslim 
financiers and merchants, who constituted the majority of people in 
these professions in the eighteenth century, have not faced confisca-
tion as much as Muslims did, it is necessary to look at the commercial 
diplomacy of the time. That is, non-Muslim merchants mostly operated 
under the protection of major European powers. Their consulates in 
the Ottoman lands were selling property rights to Greeks and Armeni-
ans, who were hired by consulates as dragoman (translators) though 
only on paper.211 There were approximately 1,700 non-Muslim mer-
                                         
210	This	raises	the	question	of	why	not	all	did	so.	First,	there	was	an	inspection	process	in	which	trans-
fers	were	detected	by	the	agents.	Second,	death	was	not	necessarily	expected.		
211	Kuran,	Long	Divergence,	199.	
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chants, who were under consulate protection in the eighteenth cen-
tury.212 Regardless of European protection of non-Muslims, the Otto-
man centre must have recognised the role of trade for prosperity and 
developed a new institutional framework, guaranteeing the security of 
property and life of merchants.213 
Non-Muslims who held a government office were less likely to 
escape. The Armenian Düzoğlu family, which oversaw the royal mint 
in the early nineteenth century, is a noteworthy case. When the family 
was blamed of causing deliberate damage to the imperial economy, the 
entire wealth of all prominent members of the family was confis-
cated.214 Another exception is the case of rebels. If the effect of the 
Greek Rebellion of 1821-1829 that resulted in Greek independence is 
removed from the data, the share of non-Muslims would have been 
smaller. 17 out of 53 confiscations of the Christian property are indeed 
from the period 1821-1823. Some of these 17 cases are collective con-
fiscations labelled, for example, as ‘the Greeks of Izmir.’215 These con-
fiscations applied to the wealth of either the executed rebels or those 
who fled to join the rebellion by leaving their property abandoned.  
This section found that the potential targets of müsadere were 
office-holders and private tax contractors who were overwhelmingly 
male Muslims. Over the course of the chosen period, the latter seem to 
have been targeted more than the former. This is in line with the in-
crease in the use of crime as a justification as opposed to enrichment 
by royal grant that we see more in the case of office-holders. There were 
                                         
212	 Cihan	Artunç,	 "The	Price	 of	 Legal	 Institutions:	 The	Beratlı	Merchants	 in	 the	 Eighteenth-Century	
Ottoman	Empire,"	The	Journal	of	Economic	History	75,	no.	3	 (2015):	727.	Cihan	Artunç	gives	 these	
numbers	as	opposed	to	the	earlier	claims	in	the	literature	that	Russians	protected	120,000,	and	Aus-
trians	200,000.		
213	Said	Salih	Kaymakcı,	"The	Sultan's	Entrepreneurs,	the	Entrepreneurs’	Sultan:	Beratlı	Avrupa	Tüccarı	
and	 Institutional	 Change	 in	 the	 Nineteenth	 Century	 Ottoman	 Empire	 (1835-1868)"	 (Boğaziçi	
University,	2013),	16-36.	
214	 Fatmanur	 Aysan,	 "Ii.	 Mahmud	 Döneminde	 Dersaadette	 Bir	 Ailenin	 Muhallefatı:	 Düzoğulları"	
(İstanbul	University,	2013).	
215	DBŞM.MHD	13371,	DBŞM.MHD	13719,	DBŞM.MHD	13336.	
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exceptions to this rule, yet it never became a norm to confiscate, say, 
the wealth of merchants.  
2.5 Conclusion	
The first part of this chapter has discussed the sources of data 
employed in the next chapter and their limitations. Muhallefat records 
constitute the backbone of the constructed data. These inventories 
were recorded usually after the death or occasionally after a non-exe-
cution punishment. They are rich in terms of information on the iden-
tity of the individual as well as certain characteristics of his wealth. Yet 
working with muhallefat records, I have recognised some limitations 
like missing information and time constraints of collecting more mate-
rial. Therefore, the conclusions reached in this part are subject to the 
limitations discussed in this chapter.  
The descriptive statistics shown in the second part set the 
ground for the regression analyses done in the following chapter. Apart 
from giving a general quantitative outline of the application of state 
confiscations in the Ottoman Empire, this chapter has posed im-
portant questions concerning the apparently complex nature of their 
driving forces. As far as the descriptive statistics is concerned, its tem-
poral patterns point to a positive relationship with fiscal distress and 
centralising attempts. Although I have reported a graph showing that 
confiscation revenues constituted a marginal part of the total state rev-
enues, this is also subject to the same limitations and should not be 
overemphasised judging on the dataset. As for its spatial patterns, the 
spatial evidence presented here emphasised the role of proximity to 
Istanbul and to the coasts. Finally, I have argued how the government 
justified müsadere and linked this with categorical patterns of 
müsadere. Beneficiaries of the fiscal system were the main targets, 
with very few attempts at confiscating from the productive classes.  
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Although this thesis is the first study using quantitative data to 
discuss these issues, the approach of this chapter remains descriptive. 
The question remaining to be answered is which tax farmers and office-
holders were most likely to be targeted or who were more likely to avoid 
confiscations. In other words, why did not all people who shared the 
above characteristics fall victim to müsadere? What were the exact 
drivers and constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman Empire? 
In addition to their reflection of official ideology, the justification pro-
vided by official sources give us little sense about these questions. 
Moreover, the basic statistical principle applies to some of the claims 
here and this is the reason some were left as open questions: correla-
tion is not causation. These hypotheses and many others need to be 
subjected to econometric analysis. This is valid because of the com-
plexity of the questions; the present chapter has deliberately not 
touched upon the outcomes of the müsadere process as it would have 
made it unnecessarily complex given its purposes. Instead, I add this 
crucial piece of information to the analysis in the next chapter to shed 
light on the driving forces of state behaviour of confiscation.   
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3 DRIVERS	AND	CONSTRAINTS	OF	MÜSADERE	
This chapter studies the driving forces and constraints of the 
practice of müsadere in the Ottoman Empire during the period 1750-
1839. So far it has been argued that müsadere was a selective practice. 
Yet its selectivity remains to be examined. To address this question, 
the chapter presents an econometric analysis. Because the period of 
concern was different from earlier periods in terms of being a period of 
fiscal crisis and civil war between the central administration and local 
elites, the analysis here is restricted to the chosen period. This chapter 
has broader implications too. It mainly contributes to two lines of lit-
erature. Theoretically speaking, the question of what drives confisca-
tion by the ruler is one for the public choice literature.216 Although 
scholars adopting the ‘predatory state’ view have generally abstracted 
predatory behaviour from its complexities, recent literature has broad-
ened the concept of rationality by relaxing it from revenue-maximisa-
tion only approaches.217 Economic historians exploring the interaction 
between politics and prosperity in historical settings have concentrated 
on constitutional limits and non-state formal organisations that tied 
the hands of rulers.218 This is not to say that they have not recognised 
the importance of the strategic constraints on the sovereign. Indeed, 
many have acknowledged that state confiscation is subject to strategic 
constraints and rulers must retain the support of at least some people 
in order not to lose their legitimacy especially in pre-modern context. 
What the present chapter does is to provide empirical evidence to ex-
plain the drivers and constraints of state confiscation in a context 
                                         
216	Olson,	"Dictatorship."	Levi,	Of	Rule	and	Revenue.	
217	For	a	detailed	overview	of	confiscatory	behaviour,	see:	Vahabi,	"Predatory	State."	
218	Cases	of	state	confiscation	of	property	studied	by	economic	historians	differ	in	type	from	debt	re-
pudiation	to	outright	confiscation.	Yet	the	overarching	theme	of	this	literature	is	the	confiscatory	be-
haviour	of	 the	state	and	the	 institutional	constraints	that	deterred	them	from	doing	so.	North	and	
Weingast,	 "Constitutions	 and	 Commitment."	 Hilton	 L.	 Root,	 The	 Fountain	 of	 Privilege:	 Political	
Foundations	of	Markets	in	Old	Regime	France	and	England	(Berkeley,	Los	Angeles,	Oxford:	University	
of	California	Press,	1994).	Greif,	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy.	
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where it is not clear what determined who were more likely to be con-
fiscated.  
The method chosen here divides the process of müsadere into 
two steps, namely the pre- and post-inventory steps. As explained be-
low, this division captures the degree of information available to the 
centre before and after the inventory was prepared. Using a novel da-
taset and choice regression models, this chapter finds that wars and 
distance from Istanbul were the main determinants of the first-step 
decision, while bargaining position of the family and composition of 
wealth drive the second-step outcome. These findings demonstrate un-
der what constraints and with what motives the Ottoman rulers con-
fiscated the elite wealth.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the light of the 
current literature, section 3.1 presents a non-mathematical model. 
Section 3.2 describes the empirical strategy employed in the regression 
analysis. Section 3.3 discusses the regression estimates. Section 3.4 
concludes.  
3.1 Theoretical	Considerations	
Drawing insights from new institutional economics and public 
choice theory, this section offers a model detailing the incentive struc-
ture of the sultan. It should be stated at the outset that the model does 
not attribute full power or motivation to confiscate to the sultan. He is 
treated as a rational individual under certain constraints. These con-
straints were created by either ‘nature’ (in a game theoretical sense) or 
humanly devised by the targets of müsadere through their counterbal-
ancing power. It is indeed these constraints that form the backbone of 
the model. Importantly, the context-specific model proposed here fo-
cuses on quantifiable behaviour, that is, it excludes two types of be-
haviour, namely agent cheating and military resistance of families. 
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These types of behaviour will be added to the analysis in the next chap-
ter. 
Under these assumptions, the sultan has two types of payoff: 
monetary and political. Like every rational individual, he tries to opti-
mise his gains and not to incur losses. To do so, he needs to calculate 
how profitable each case of confiscation is both in monetary and polit-
ical terms. This is in line with historical reality as muhallefat records 
sometimes include a part of calculation of net value, though not al-
ways. However, it was not uncommon that wealth with unworthy or 
even negative net values was confiscated, which makes it necessary to 
include the calculation of political payoff though in a more hypothetical 
sense. 
For simplicity, first consider the case where political payoff was 
zero, meaning that political costs and benefits were equal. If this is the 
case, the decision to confiscate would be governed entirely by monetary 
calculation. The monetary value, which is of interest for the central 
government, was what we can call the ‘booty value.’219 The booty value 
is the transferrable amount or net value of wealth, which equals the 
total value of wealth and receivables minus debts and direct costs of 
confiscation. Direct costs include the costs of transportation and 
agency. Agency costs are the commissions paid to confiscators and 
other agents involved in the process.220 Even though the value of these 
commissions was determined also by the duration of the process, 
which is a function of the complexity, costs of agency and transporta-
tion were, to a large extent, governed by various aspects of asset con-
fiscability.  
The components of asset confiscability are largely associated 
with spatial constraints. This stems from the intuition that the capac-
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ity and willingness to confiscate of the sovereign is unevenly distrib-
uted, which is also true from a spatial perspective.221 Here I mainly 
consider the distance from the physical location of the wealth to where 
it is transported and to the sea, although there are spatial constraints 
such as the conditions of the road to the destination and the adminis-
trative status of the location. The proximity from the destination mat-
ters as it increases direct agency and transportation costs. In the case 
of the müsadere practice, there was indeed a positive relationship be-
tween the distance and the confiscator’s commission. As for transpor-
tation costs, most assets were sent to the capital in kind, or else as 
cash acquired from auctions in which they were sold. Geography, re-
gardless of distance, should be considered particularly important since 
landlocked regions were historically less accessible, while maritime 
routes were safer, faster and cheaper than inland routes. It is crucial 
to note that the spatial aspects of asset confiscability must have been 
affected also by organisational, administrative and transport technol-
ogy. However, the impact of technological change is rather negligible 
since, to the best of my knowledge, there was no significant technolog-
ical progress in the Ottoman Empire during the period of concern. The 
non-spatial elements of asset confiscability are the concentration, 
specificity and measurability of assets. The more liquid assets are, for 
example, the more confiscable they are. 
Regional differentiation in type of administration is a striking 
feature of Ottoman political economy.222 For example, the classical mil-
itary-administrative system called tımar was not applied in every prov-
ince. Rather, the Ottomans occasionally did not change the institu-
tional structure of the former polity in a newly conquered territory. This 
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meant the degree of state presence varied regionally regardless of dis-
tance from the centre. Despite being located not too far from Istanbul, 
Wallachia was a tribute-paying vassal state which was independent in 
domestic affairs and even its commerce with other states. This implies 
that the capacity and willingness to conduct confiscations in that re-
gion was arguably lower than in, for example, the province of Damas-
cus that was more distant to the centre yet was under direct rule of 
the central authority. However, administrative status is not considered 
in the econometric analysis since there are very few numbers of obser-
vations from autonomous and semi-autonomous provinces. 
In the case where political payoff is zero, therefore, confiscation 
is expected to be implemented only if this monetary payoff is signifi-
cantly positive. But political costs and benefits were hardly equal, es-
pecially when it comes to the confiscation of those who had business 
with the central government. Before proceeding any further, it is es-
sential to look at the nature of sultanic power. Although, in theory, 
they had an unquestionably authority, there existed forces that bal-
anced their power. These limits derived from the increasing influence 
of provincial elites in the eighteenth century. It is true that their ca-
pacity to impact government policies, after all, proved insufficient to 
produce formal institutions that could effectively and permanently 
constrain the sovereign power.223 However, sultans were hardly free 
from the risk of dethronement even though they were invariably re-
placed by other members of the same dynasty. It is true for the period 
of concern too, that several sultans were indeed deposed by the Janis-
saries or by a provincial magnate in 1808.224 For these reasons, the 
sovereign capacity to confiscate was constrained by concerns of staying 
in power and indirectly of legitimacy.  
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Political costs include not only the potential retaliation by the 
targets of confiscation, but also the opportunity cost of müsadere. It 
means that sultans have often seen their rule come under threat by 
either domestic or external enemies through rebellion and war respec-
tively. From a theoretical point of view, these threats encourage the 
sovereign to confiscate more since they shorten his time horizon due 
to the need for revenue to maintain internal and external security.225 
Thus, the revenue crisis makes them seek additional sources so that 
they can protect their throne. As an extraordinary source, the ruler 
turns to confiscation regardless of whether it pays off monetarily. This 
is, of course, more so the case if he cannot extract sufficient revenue 
from ordinary sources either because of inability or time constraints. 
Studies in Ottoman fiscal history show that the ruler’s capacity to tax 
was persistently low and especially so during the period under ques-
tion.226  
Even if the ruler wants to confiscate under fiscal distress, they 
face a trade-off regarding whose wealth to confiscate. In that, they con-
sider the bargaining position of the potential victims. That is, targeting 
an individual or family with high bargaining power is costlier for three 
reasons. To explain these reasons, it is necessary to highlight the po-
tential sources of bargaining power for the targets of confiscation. New 
institutional research has usually seen taxation as a source of credible 
retaliation, meaning that the ruler avoids confiscation if a potential 
target can provide revenue through tax higher than the gains from one-
off confiscation.227 This fails to explain the Ottoman case in which the 
majority of the targets of confiscation were exempt from tax payment. 
Shirking in tax collection was not the issue either as taxes were mostly 
collected under the tax farming system, requiring fiscal contractors to 
make a lump sum payment. They did not have the ability to retaliate 
by cutting off taxes but could do so differently. In the Ottoman context, 
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some who were organised as patrimonial families had their own troops 
in which they had invested for decades. They could and did sometimes 
use their military power against the central government. Certainly, the 
centre’s military power was always superior to theirs. But the fact that 
they possessed armed troops had the effect of deterrence, especially 
when the opportunity cost of fighting a local trouble-maker was high. 
Moreover, many potential targets of confiscation had a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the imperial centre, which required them to provision 
wars abroad by manning imperial armies or sending food and munition 
to warzones.   
Credibility of these threats depended also on the nature of the 
fiscal markets in which they operated. As for provincial elites, some 
enjoyed monopolies, while some had to compete with others. A family 
particularly successful in rent-seeking, that is, capturing monopoly 
rents of its area of influence, was unlikely to be replaced when its 
wealth and power was fully confiscated. By contrast, the relative bar-
gaining power of those families that operated in competitive fiscal mar-
kets was lower since they were more irreplaceable.228 Take two fami-
lies, i.e. the Karaosmanoğlus of Manisa in western Anatolia and the 
Çapanoğlus of Yozgat in central Anatolia. These families were monop-
olies in their spheres of influence from the mid-eighteenth to early 
nineteenth century. The more they monopolised, the more they became 
irreplaceable. Out of 21 (13 and 8 respectively) confiscation attempts 
initiated for these families, only 4 ended with full confiscation. In 16 
cases (11 and 5) they managed to avoid full confiscation by paying an 
inheritance tax. 
The description of the sultan’s payoff from müsadere should not 
omit the fact that confiscation could take place simply because of the 
ruler’s conflicting interests with certain groups. Even if the ruler felt 
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relatively secure in his throne and confiscation was monetarily profit-
able, he could still confiscate if the targeted population was these 
groups. Collective confiscations of this kind are observed in history of-
ten because of religious or ethnic animosity.229 To some historians, 
these events were driven by certain economic motives such as homog-
enising the country to decrease the costs of governance. As the previ-
ous chapter has shown, the targets of müsadere were not religious or 
ethnic minorities but those who shared the ruler’s fiscal revenue. One 
of the reasons for the low fiscal capacity of the Ottoman Empire was 
that tax revenues were retained by intermediaries before reaching the 
public treasury.230 According to the estimation of one historian, the 
central state’s share from the tax revenue pie was only around 24 per 
cent.231 In its path to becoming a modern state, the sultan’s expecta-
tion from müsadere was to centralise fiscal revenues by keeping tax 
intermediaries under control. Hence, a theory of müsadere should also 
factor in the identity of wealth-holders. Who were they and how did 
their identity affect the power and willingness to confiscate?  
To conclude, I hypothesise that the ruler’s payoff from confisca-
tion was a function of its costs and benefits, be they monetary or po-
litical. Drawing insights from the theoretical and historical literature, 
we can hypothesise that müsadere was not randomly exercised within 
the context of the chosen period. To clarify these hypotheses, I identify 
two steps of the process of confiscation. These steps refer to the pre- 
and post-inventory periods of the process respectively. The first step is 
when the sultan or his agents on his behalf decide to follow one of the 
strategies below:  
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è Outcome 1 
• Send confiscator 
• No confiscation 
• Inheritance tax 
The confiscator was the main agent responsible for managing the pro-
cess from the beginning together with locally based administrators. His 
main task was to prepare an inventory of assets left by the deceased. 
Importantly, this initial decision was made without full information on 
the attributes of the wealth because there was no existing inventory 
yet. Thus, it can be said that external pressures were more influential 
in the first step. 
Figure 3.1: Steps of Müsadere Process 
 
The second step is the step after which the müsadere process 
ends. Its main difference from the first step is the revealing of more 
information. At this stage, the sultan and his agents possess more pre-
cise information on the family’s power and the attributes of their 
wealth, such as its net value and liquidity. It is hypothesised here that 
confiscability of liquid assets is higher. With this revealed information, 
the question of how worthwhile it is to confiscate becomes clearer to 
the sultan. My hypothesis is that the second-step outcome was mainly 
driven by this newly revealed information, namely liquidity and size of 
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wealth and the precise bargaining power of the family. Of course, de-
pending on the length of müsadere process, there could be changes in 
the progress of wars and rebellions. The process ends with one of the 
following outcomes: 
è Outcome 2232 
• Confiscation 
• No confiscation 
• Inheritance tax 
Taken together, this section has presented a theoretical overview 
of what could be the potential drivers of the selectivity of Ottoman con-
fiscations. This question is not only underexplored in the historiog-
raphy of müsadere but in the broader economic history literature be-
yond theoretical claims, some of which were listed above. To test the 
above hypotheses, this chapter applies an econometric approach to the 
study of müsadere and, generally speaking, confiscation by the ruler. 
The econometric analysis accounts for the impact of certain fiscal, po-
litical and spatial factors as well as cost-benefit calculations. What fol-
lows is a discussion of variables and empirical methods pursued in the 
rest of this chapter.  
3.2 Empirical	Strategy	
Empirical strategy adopted in this chapter relies on two unique 
features of the process of confiscation. The first one is that the enforce-
ment of confiscation was typically a two-step process as described 
above, though various scenarios were possible depending on whether 
it was conducted after one’s normal death or punishment. The concept 
of step here is used in the historical sense reflecting the gradual nature 
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of Ottoman confiscations and should not be confused with the econo-
metric term of two-stage models. Second, the process did not neces-
sarily end with full confiscation of assets. As consistent with this 
framework, two main models and their variables are introduced as fol-
lows.  
The main dependent variable of the analysis presented here is 
OUTCOME, referring to the outcome of the confiscation process. This 
is a categorical variable taking two different forms in the two multino-
mial logistic models. As noted above, the process of müsadere did not 
necessarily end with confiscation of all assets. Other possible outcomes 
were ‘no confiscation’ and a special kind of ‘inheritance tax’ paid by the 
family instead of ‘full confiscation.’ It is difficult to predict to what ex-
tent the outcome was a result of choice or necessity. As far as confis-
cation records are concerned, however, the outcome of the second step 
was not necessarily a choice. Therefore, I prefer to call the dependent 
variable ‘outcome’ rather than ‘decision.’ The category of ‘no confisca-
tion’ refers to the outcome that resulted in waiving confiscation. ‘In-
heritance tax’ is an arbitrary form of tax, requiring the family to pay a 
certain amount of cash to the treasury, usually with a down payment 
followed by annuities. Inheritance tax as an outcome of the process 
generally occurred following a process of negotiation between the gov-
ernment and families. Importantly, this amount was conjecturally de-
termined rather than as a conventionally set proportion of inheritance. 
After all, inheritance tax was sometimes received before an inventory 
was prepared.   
This categorical variable gives us a good sense of the driving 
forces and limits of the sultan’s power and willingness to confiscate. 
One would ideally employ the exact share of confiscated wealth to the 
total value of wealth, which would then be a limited continuous varia-
ble that could be estimated using a Tobit regression. It is unfortunate 
that I was not able to identify this proportion for all cases, though I 
was more successful in determining which of the above categories each 
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confiscation fell into. The difficulty here stems primarily from the fact 
that the cases that resulted in ‘inheritance tax’ and ‘no confiscation’ in 
the first step do not have an inventory because a confiscator was not 
sent to prepare one. Regardless of this source limitation, the added 
value of using a limited continuous variable would be dubious as it 
would have created an additional problem of unrelated variables.  
Therefore, the analysis adopted here employs multinomial lo-
gistic regression model (hereafter: MNLM) to estimate what determined 
the ‘outcome’ of the confiscation process. MNLM is a type of logistic 
model used when the number of categories is greater than two and 
there is no natural order between them.233 Ordered logistic regression, 
which is another multi-categorical model, was not optimal.234 For the 
first step, this is because the decision to send a confiscator does not 
necessarily result in ‘confiscation’ since the process could still end up 
with outcomes other than ‘confiscation.’ Likewise, in the second step, 
the category of ‘confiscation’ does not necessarily refer to a higher level 
of confiscation than ‘inheritance tax’ because ‘full confiscation’ was 
merged with ‘partial confiscation’ to form the ‘confiscation’ category.   
The formal models are presented in the two-step framework 
identified above.235 Outcome 1 is the outcome of the first step. The 
category of ‘confiscation’ is not considered at this step as it is an out-
come that occurs only after an inventory is prepared. Fortunately, the 
sources allow us to determine in which step each confiscation outcome 
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has happened. In the MNLM, the probability that alternative outcomes 𝑗 = 1… 𝐽 are realised can be formally expressed as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏	 𝑌 = 𝑗 = exp	(𝛽1𝑍3)∑6exp	(𝛽6𝑍3) 
In the equation above, 𝑖 = 1… ,𝑁 indicates the wealth-holders whose 
wealth was considered for confiscation and 𝑍 denotes the vector of ex-
planatory variables included in the MNL model. In simple terms, the 
model tested in the first step takes the following form: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒1 = 𝑎A + 𝑎C𝑤𝑎𝑟 + 𝑎E𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎H𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎K𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+ 𝑎M𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎N𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒 + 𝑎O𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 + 𝑎R𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝑎T𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑+ 𝑎CA𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑦 + 𝜀 
In this chapter, I am especially interested in explaining the role 
of conflicts, geography and bargaining power and attributes of wealth. 
The variable WAR is used to estimate how wars impacted the outcome 
of the confiscation process. Due to the lack of data on state revenues, 
it also serves the function of proxying fiscal distress as most revenues 
were spent on wars during this period. Instead of the number of wars, 
which would not capture their magnitude, I use a war pressure index 
based on the number of casualties.236 Another potential determinant 
of the decision to confiscate could be internal conflicts, since this was 
a period of rebellions and independence movements. Unlike wars, there 
is no data on casualties from domestic conflicts. Thus, I use a dummy 
reflecting the number of rebellions that took place in each year of con-
fiscation. To measure the impact of spatiality or of the direct costs of 
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confiscation, i.e. agency and transportation costs, I use an interacted 
distance variable.237 This variable is an interaction of distance from 
Istanbul and distance from major ports.238  
Map 3.1: Provincial Distribution of the Outcome of Müsadere Pro-
cesses, 1750-1839 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Several variables are included in the first-step model to control 
for the potential driving forces of confiscation. First, the variable FAM-
ILY shows if the wealth-holder was a member of a prominent family, 
controlling for the bargaining position of the family. Admittedly, this 
variable has limits because the family’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
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ruler is indeed the matter of a complex long-term relationship, reflect-
ing not only how much the sovereign values the past conduct of the 
family but also how he thinks his dependence on the family will change 
in future. It is not possible to know the entire history of these mutual 
interdependencies between the centre and all 1,017 individuals. The 
shortcoming stemming from the potential weakness of the variable 
FAMILY will be relaxed with a micro-historical study in the fifth chap-
ter. But, here too, I use another variable of bargaining power. After 
considering that wars were important for the nature of dependence be-
tween the sultan and the targets of confiscation, I created the variable 
‘WARZONE,’ which is the distance from warzones at the time of confis-
cation. It captures how the existence of a war nearby impacted the 
decision to confiscate the wealth of the family.239 Another variable of 
importance is ELAPSED. This variable refers to the number of years 
elapsed after the enthronement of the sultan. By this variable, I aim to 
explain the impact of the ruler’s time horizon identified above.  
One inevitable assumption of the models must be noted at the 
outset. They assume that there were no unobservable costs of enforce-
ment. That is, the agents who were involved in the process of confisca-
tion did abide by the law by rejecting any bribes, and that confiscations 
went smoothly, that is, with no resistance from families. Even though 
these assumptions are not necessarily realistic, it is impossible to in-
clude this information in the regression analysis because of its unob-
servable nature. I mitigate this shortcoming in the next chapter by an-
alysing the impact of these costs with qualitative evidence. 
Now I shall proceed to the second-step model. OUTCOME2 is the 
dependent variable of this model. Those cases for which the confisca-
tion process ended in the first step with ‘no confiscation’ or ‘inheritance 
tax’ outcome were excluded from the below model. The formal model of 
the second-step regression is as follow:  
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𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒2 = 𝑎A + 𝑎C𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑎E𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑎H𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 + 𝑎K𝑤𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎M𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎N𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝜀	
With new information revealed, the following additional variables are 
considered in this model: NETVALUE and LIQUIDITY. 
Table 3.1: Definitions of Explanatory Variables	
Variable name Definition 
WAR War pressure index based on 
war casualties. 
REBELLION The number of internal con-
flicts including revolutionary 
movements. 
DISTANCE Interaction of distance from 
Istanbul and distance from a 
port. 
RELIGION 1 if Muslim, 0 if non-Muslim. 
GENDER 1 if female, 0 if male.  
TITLE 1 if the wealth-holder has a ti-
tle, 0 if he does not.  
FAMILY 1 if the wealth-holder is a 
member of a prominent fam-
ily, 0 if not.  
WARZONE Distance of the wealth-
holder’s  
ELAPSED The number of years elapsed 
after enthronement of the sul-
tan. 
JUSTIFY 1 if justified, 0 if not. 
NET VALUE Net value of the wealth in tons 
of silver. 
LIQUIDITY Percentage of liquid assets, 
jewellery, slaves and watches, 
to total assets.  
Notes: Variables with a large scale used in both models were log-trans-
formed to standardise different units. This does not include, however, count varia-
bles such as REBELLION and ELAPSED.  
NETVALUE is used to assess if magnitude of wealth mattered. 
Liquidity was included in the model as it is a good indicator of whether 
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the outcome was shaped by cost-benefit calculation. FAMILY, however, 
is used in the second step model for a slightly different reason. The 
confiscator collected information not only on the qualities of wealth but 
on the power of the family, which could differ from the government’s 
initial information. Thus, the variable FAMILY here measures previ-
ously unknown features of bargaining power, while in the first step it 
captured the impact of expected mutual interdependence. Variables 
used in the first step and also included in the second step are time-
specific variables that could have changed during the confiscation pro-
cess, which could sometimes take years.  
Table 3.2: Frequency Table of the Dependent Variable, ‘Outcome’ 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Before proceeding to the results, tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide de-
scriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables respec-
Outcomes Frequency Relative frequency 
All   
Confiscation 601 59.10 
No Confiscation 214 21.04 
Inheritance Tax 202 19.86 
Total 1017 100 
Step 1   
Send confiscator 832 81.81 
No confiscation 110 10.82 
Inheritance tax 75 7.37 
Total 1017 100 
Step 2   
Confiscation 601 72.24 
No confiscation 104 12.50 
Inheritance tax 127 15.26 
Total 832 100 
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tively. Table 3.3 lists all the variables considered in the models, con-
tinuous variables with summary statistics and categorical variables 
with their frequency. A necessary word of caution is that LIQUIDITY 
could not be identified or calculated for all cases. Only 357 observa-
tions include the data on liquidity. Therefore, when LIQUIDITY was in-
cluded in the model, it was estimated based on the observations for 
which liquidity data was available. The lack of liquidity is almost ran-
domly distributed across occupations. Thus, it does not significantly 
affect the results.   
Table 3.3: Frequency Table and Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory 
Variables 
Variables Min Max Mean SD Freq. Relative Ob-
serv. 
War 0.007 0.302 0.134 0.107   1017 
Rebellion 0 4 0.74 0.90   1017 
Distance Istan. 1 2409.02 374.43 367.36   1017 
Distance Port 1.64 1454.26 269.53 173.19   1017 
Elapsed 0 31 10.16 6.82   1017 
NetValue -
33.12 
106.08 1.13 5.57   828 
Liquidity 0 100 29.00 33.12   357 
   Justify        
Yes     305 70.01 1017 
No     712 29.99  
   Gender 
Male 
Female 
     
979 
38 
 
96.26 
3.74 
 
1017 
   Religion 
Muslim 
Non-Mus. 
     
957 
60 
 
94.10 
5.90 
 
1017 
   Family 
Yes 
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86.73 
 
1017 
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Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Map 3.1 provides the provincial-level distribution of the out-
comes of the müsadere process. The black colour represents the pro-
portion of ‘full confiscation’ cases relative to the other three categories. 
Admittedly, the pie charts shown in the map are more explanatory in 
provinces with a significant number of observations coloured with 
darker tones of blue.  
3.3 Results	
The main results of the MNL models are presented in tables 3.4, 
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. The independence of irrelevant alternatives assump-
tion inherent in the MNLM was tested with a Hausman-McFadden 
test.240 The results are reported in relative risks rather than coefficients 
as the latter’s interpretation in the MNLM are inconvenient. Interpret-
ing relative risks is like that of the odds ratios in binary choice models. 
That is, relative risk reflects the change for a one-unit change in the 
independent variables. Each regression treats a category of the out-
come variable, which makes it the easiest to interpret, as reference 
category. At the same time, however, the categories chosen as reference 
category happened to be those with the greatest number of observa-
tions. The first step regression uses ‘send confiscator’ as its base cate-
gory since the decision to send a confiscator means incurring agency 
costs regardless of the outcome of the second step and is costlier than 
the other two outcomes, namely ‘no confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax.’ 
Because sending a confiscator has greater costs, it is more convenient 
                                         
240	 Jerry	 Hausman	 and	 Daniel	 McFadden,	 "Specification	 Tests	 for	 the	 Multinomial	 Logit	 Model,"	
Econometrica	52,	no.	5	(1984).	
No 882 13.27 
   Title 
Yes 
No 
     
306 
771 
 
 
 
1017 
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to interpret the results compared to the category of ‘send confiscator.’ 
The reference category for the second step regression is ‘confiscation’ 
simply because the other two outcomes represent either a lesser degree 
of confiscation (inheritance tax) or no confiscation at all, which simi-
larly makes interpretation easier. Where necessary, I also take another 
category as reference category to see the interaction between the other 
two outcomes, which is not shown by one single comparison. 
3.3.1 First-Step	Estimates	
The first-step estimates are given in Table 3.4. Before proceeding 
to the impact of wars and expected costs, it is necessary to have a brief 
look at two seemingly surprising results. At first sight, the direction of 
the relative risk of the variable TITLE seems surprising. It suggests that 
holding a title increases the odds of the outcome ‘send confiscator’ 
compared to both comparison groups of ‘inheritance tax’ and ‘no con-
fiscation.’ That is, the central government was more willing to continue 
the process of confiscation if the wealth-holder had a title. This is not 
what theory would predict because title-holders tended to be more 
powerful and thus in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the sultan 
than non-title-holders. Yet we must consider here that all who bene-
fited from the ruler’s revenue pie were title-holders one way or another. 
What this implies is that a person with no title could be tolerated more 
than one with a title.  
The variable ELAPSED represents the number of years that 
elapsed after the enthronement of the ruling sultan. As ELAPSED goes 
up by one year, ‘send confiscator’ is the least likely outcome, while ‘no 
confiscation’ is more likely than ‘inheritance tax’. In other words, the 
longer the sultan stays in power, the less likely he is to continue the 
process of confiscation. If we assume that ruling for longer makes the 
sovereign more powerful and able to confiscate, this result curiously 
refers to a negative relationship between power and confiscation. A po-
tential explanation for the first result is that sultans were arguably 
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more interested in confiscation in the early years of their rule to finance 
their projects. Or, perhaps their power just deteriorated with time.  
Table 3.4: Step 1: Relative Risks of the Outcome of Müsadere Process 
Source: See bibliography for data sources 
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. 
SC: Send Confiscator, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference cate-
gory is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference 
DV categories NC-SC IT-SC IT-NC 
Conflict Interstate Wars 8.852** 6.860* 0.774 
Rebellion 0.899 0.888 0.987 
Spatiality Distance 1.482*** 1.863*** 1.256 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity 
Gender    
   Male 1 1 1 
   Female 0.224 0.791 3.521 
Religion    
   Muslim 1 1 1 
   Non-Muslim 0.675 0.922 1.480 
Title    
   No 1 1 1 
   Yes 0.336*** 0.346*** 1.032 
 
Bargaining 
Power 
Family Affiliation    
   No 1 1 1 
   Yes 1.215 0.592 0.487 
Warzone 1.068** 0.969 0.907** 
Sultan Behav-
iour 
Elapsed 1.067*** 1.003*** 0.939** 
Rules 
 
 
Justification    
   No 1 1 1 
   Yes 0.308*** 0.581** 1.882* 
 N 1015 1015 1.015 
 Pseudo R2 0.1485 0.1485 0.1485 
 LR Chi2 180.25 180.25 180.25 
 Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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category are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the 
outcome is more likely to fall in the comparison group.  
An insignificant result needs also to be interpreted. The variable 
FAMILY is not significant in both comparisons shown in columns 1 and 
2 because it was only after certain attributes of wealth were revealed 
via an inventory that a healthier analysis of the political costs and ben-
efits of confiscation could occur. Since ‘no confiscation’ and ‘inher-
itance tax’ were outcomes that could also be realised in the second 
step, the central government possibly did not want to decide before the 
value and liquidity of wealth was revealed by the confiscator.  
Finally, the results demonstrate that those confiscation attempts 
that were justified by the government in one way or another were more 
likely to reach the second step. That the statement of justification in-
creases the relative likelihood of ‘send confiscator’ means that justified 
cases were less likely to be tolerated. Other variables of identity other 
than title, namely gender and religion, are insignificant, which means 
that there was no clear preference of the sultan when it comes to these 
categories.  
3.3.1.1 War	Pressure:	A	Driver	of	Confiscation?	
It is generally argued that under fiscal distress created by external and 
internal threats, rulers tend to confiscate more. First-step estimates 
reported here refer to an adverse relationship between war pressure 
and confiscation options of the sovereign. The relative risks of WAR 
shown in panels 1 and 2 of table 3.4 reveal that one-unit increase in 
war pressure makes the category of ‘send confiscator,’ 8.852 times less 
likely than ‘no confiscation’ and 6.860 times less likely than ‘inher-
itance tax.’ This is to say that in relative terms, an increase in war 
pressure made the Ottoman rulers choose not to confiscate or obtain 
inheritance tax over continuing the process of confiscation by sending 
a confiscator. There might be two reasons why. First, the time and re-
sources of the centre were spent on warzones during wartime. Unlike 
full confiscation which could have occurred at the end of the second 
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step, inheritance tax was a quick and low-cost alternative even though 
extracted revenue was lower. The second reason is related to the sym-
biotic relationship between the centre and some targets of confisca-
tions. Relative risks of 1.068 and 0.907 shown in the row of WARZONE 
lends further support to this mutuality. They imply that the proximity 
of the physical location of wealth to a warzone at the time of confisca-
tion attempt made ‘no confiscation’ more likely relative to both ‘send 
confiscator’ and ‘inheritance tax.’ In other words, the more proximate 
to a warzone, the more they were able to escape confiscation. Like in 
the opening anecdote, this finding shows that elite cooperation was 
more needed during wartime. It also helps to understand why ‘inher-
itance tax’ is not necessarily superior to ‘no confiscation’ as expressed 
in the insignificant relative risks of WAR. To be more precise, though 
‘inheritance tax’ pays better than ‘no confiscation’ in terms of its mon-
etary value, during wartime monetary value was not necessarily the 
most important element of the process. Elites’ military support was 
much needed and confiscating their wealth was not the priority of the 
sultan. 	
Although another variable of conflict, REBELLION is not signifi-
cant, it refers to a reverse relationship between conflict and confisca-
tion. That is, with more rebellion happening at the time of confiscation 
attempt, the sovereign was more likely to send a confiscator. The rea-
son why this result is the opposite of that of WAR is that confiscations 
were sometimes the result of rebellion. This cannot be confirmed 
though as the result is not significant. 
3.3.1.2 Expected	Costs:	A	Constraint	of	Confiscation?	
Expected costs of confiscation also had an impact on the outcome of 
the first step. The relative risk of DISTANCE is higher than 1, which 
means that an increase in expected costs made both ‘no confiscation’ 
and ‘inheritance tax’ more likely compared to ‘send confiscator’ by a 
factor of 1.482 and 1.863 respectively. With increased distance from 
Istanbul and major ports, the sultan would prefer to not continue the 
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process, by not sending a confiscator. When it comes to the decision 
between ‘no confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax’ in a distant location, he 
is rather indifferent. This decision is determined by the proximity to a 
warzone, time elapsed after enthronement of the sultan and whether 
there was a justification (See: IT-NC comparison). These findings are 
consistent with the expected transport costs hypothesis as they 
demonstrate that the sultan is more hesitant to confiscate in remote 
areas. Another reason distance matters can be that the power of the 
centre generally decreases with distance from the capital. Less power 
or legitimacy increases the expectance of resistance that would result 
in undesired costs. 
Figure 3.2: Graphs of Correlations in the First-Step Regressions	
 
Source: See bibliography for data sources.  
Notes: This figure does not show results in relative terms. Although changes 
might seem not significant, it must be considered that the likelihood of sending confis-
cator was already much higher than those of other outcomes at 0. 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
War Pressure
NC SC IT
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
0 2 4 6 8
Expected Transport Costs
NC SC IT
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
0 10 20 30
Time Elapsed After Enthronement (Years)
NC SC IT
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
0 1
Title
NC SC IT
134 
3.3.2 Second-Step	Estimates	
The second step estimates are shown in table 3.5. It reports the 
results with and without LIQUIDITY in panels 1 and 2. The second part 
of dependent variable categories are the base categories. The most 
striking result in this table is the relative risks of NETVALUE, which is 
highly significant in all columns. Those in the first two columns show 
that as the value of wealth increases, the sultan is more likely to con-
fiscate relative to ‘no confiscation.’ However, the same is not true with 
‘inheritance tax.’ It appears that the likelihood of inheritance tax was 
higher for high-value inheritances in comparison with confiscation. 
Figure 3.2 clearly shows the impact of an increase in net wealth on the 
outcome of the confiscation. Until a point, it increases the likelihood of 
confiscation relative to both ‘no confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax.’ But 
after that point, the confiscation-inheritance tax comparison changes 
in a way that inheritance tax becomes more likely. This is the explana-
tion of the reverse U-shape that can be seen in the figure.  
This finding is better read in combination with the value of rela-
tive risks of the variable FAMILY, which refers to the role of relative 
bargaining power. That is, being a member of a prominent family in-
creases the probability of the ‘inheritance tax’ outcome compared to 
‘confiscation’ by a factor of 4.906 and 4.819 with or without liquidity 
respectively. This is closely related to their power to bargain with the 
central government primarily but not exclusively for the reasons men-
tioned above. Another variable of bargaining power, the proximity to a 
warzone, still has the same effect as in the first-step model in that it 
increases the likelihood of ‘no confiscation’ relative to the other two 
categories. Chapter 5 reinforces the role of bargaining power with qual-
itative evidence. It suffices here to say that prominent families used 
their military, economic and political sources of power to negotiate the 
institution of inheritance tax and even sometimes succeeded in reduc-
ing the amount of inheritance tax. Thus, the interpretation of FAMILY 
helps to explain why inheritance tax was more likely to occur with an 
135 
increase in the amount of wealth. The reason why FAMILY is significant 
in the second step and not in the first step is that the first step outcome 
is more of a decision while that of the second step is not necessarily 
so. As an outcome, it reflects a process during which both parties test 
their power. 
Table 3.5: Step 2: Relative Risks of the Outcome of Müsadere Process 
 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. 
C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is al-
ways the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category 
are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is 
more likely to fall in the comparison group.  
Panel 2 of table 3.5 reports the results with LIQUIDITY added as 
one of explanatory variables. Unfortunately, the number of observa-
tions is inevitably reduced to 344 due to the lack of liquidity data for 
many observations. In panel 2, we see that LIQUIDITY is highly corre-
lated with the outcome of the second step. More liquid assets were not 
  1   2  
DV categories NC/C IT/C IT/NC NC/C IT/C IT/NC 
Con-
flict 
Interstate 
Wars 
1.893 4.937* 0.528 11.973 19.582** 1.635 
Rebellion 1.152 1.162 1.008 1.888** 1.119 0.593 
Wealth Net Value 0.691*** 1.293*** 1.870*** 0.595*** 1.323*** 2.220*** 
Liquidity     0.968** 0.954*** 0.985 
 
 
Bar-
gaining 
Power 
Family Affili-
ation 
      
   No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Yes 1.839 4.906*** 2.667** 1.833 4.819*** 2.628 
Warzone 0.935* 1.051 1.123** 0.993 1.028 1.035 
 N 774 774 774 344 344 344 
 Pseudo R2 0.1247 0.1247 0.1247 0.2512 0.2512 0.2512 
 LR Chi2 138.71 138.71 138.71 116.62 116.62 116.62 
 Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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only more easily convertible but also more easily transferrable. As as-
set liquidity increases, confiscation turns into a more likely outcome 
relative to both comparison outcomes. An additional regression with 
‘no confiscation’ as the base category was also estimated and presented 
in the last column of the table. The insignificant relative risks of LI-
QUIDITY in the inheritance tax-no confiscation comparison indicate 
that the sultan was somewhat indifferent between these categories as 
liquidity level changed. These two categories differed in the amount of 
wealth, being affiliated with a prominent family and proximity to 
warzones.  
Figure 3.2: Graphs of Correlations in the Second-Step Regressions 
	
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: This figure does not show results in relative terms. Although changes 
might not seem significant, it must be considered that the likelihood of sending a con-
fiscator was already much higher than those of other outcomes at 0. 
Some variables used in the first step regression were not in-
cluded in the second step because they remain constant during the 
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confiscation process. Those included are time-specific ones with po-
tential to change. These affect the outcome in a similar way they did 
the first step outcome. For example, as in the first step, war pressure 
increases the likelihood of both ‘no confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax’ 
relative to ‘confiscation.’ This reinforces the argument that wars were 
negatively correlated with the power or motivation to confiscate in both 
steps. Similarly, proximity to warzones affects it the same way as in 
the first step. Overall, the value and liquidity of wealth as well as the 
bargaining power of the family predict a good deal of the second step 
outcome. When the confiscation process reaches this step, the central 
government takes a final look at the confiscation inventory and the 
outcome is determined partly by the centre and partly by ‘nature’ de-
pending on the specifics of the case. Before proceeding any further, 
figure 3.2 displays four significant results of the second step regres-
sion. 
Table 3.6 accounts for all variables without considering steps 
and liquidity, while table 3.7 does the same with liquidity. Panel 1 of 
these tables shows the results with log transformed NETVALUE, while 
the second panel uses the actual value of wealth. The reason for this 
is that logged NETVALUE reduces the number of observations although 
log transformation is generally better for our purposes due to the very 
high standard deviation of that variable. Most results are consistent 
with the step regressions in tables 3.4 and 3.5. However, inconsistent 
ones do not weaken but strengthen my analysis since they justify the 
use of the two-step framework. If we focus on the results that are in-
consistent with step regressions, we first notice that the impact of in-
terstate wars becomes less visible when considered without steps. Nev-
ertheless, ‘inheritance tax’ still proves to be significantly more likely 
than ‘confiscation’ with an increase in war pressure. Although it is not 
significant, the sign of the relative risks of no confiscation-confiscation 
comparison remains the same. Two identity variables, namely gender 
and religion, are significant in the full-sample no-step regressions. This  
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Table 3.6: Full Sample: Relative Risks of the Outcome of Müsadere 
Process without Liquidity 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. 
C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is al-
ways the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category 
are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is 
more likely to fall in the comparison group.  
 1 2 
DV categories NC-C IT-C IT-NC NC-C IT-NC IT-NC 
Wealth Net value 0.663*** 1.319*** 1.987*** 0.737** 1.003 1.360** 
Conflict Interstate 
wars 
0.564 6.087* 10.786 1.276 4.933* 3.863 
Rebellion 1.222 1.113 0.910 1.303** 1.030 0.790 
Spatiality Distance 1.164*** 1.365*** 1.172* 1.150*** 1.377*** 1.197** 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity 
Gender       
   Male 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Female 0.267* 0.184 0.821 0.223** 0.167 0.751 
Religion       
   Muslim 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Non-Mus-
lim 
0.164** 0.287* 1.788 0.130*** 0.269** 2.069 
Title       
   No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Yes 0.217*** 0.292*** 1.347 0.209*** 0.389*** 1.853** 
 
Bargaining 
Power 
Family Affili-
ation 
      
   No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Yes 1.626 4.115*** 2.530* 1.232 4.615*** 3.745*** 
Warzone 0.925** 1.029 1.112** 0.940** 1.052 1.118*** 
Sultan Be-
haviour 
Elapsed 0.951** 1.005 1.056* 0.969* 1.001 1.032 
Rules Justification 0.347*** 0.523*** 1.507 0.516** 0.559** 1.042 
 N 775 775 775 826 826 826 
 Pseudo R2 0.2162 0.2162 0.2162 0.1819 0.1819 0.1819 
 LR Chi2 241.57 241.57 241.57 203.14 203.14 203.14 
 Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
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Table 3.7: Full Sample: Relative Risks of the Outcome of Müsadere 
Process with Liquidity 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. 
C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is al-
ways the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category 
are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is 
more likely to fall in the comparison group.  
was not observed in step regressions. Although non-Muslims consti-
tute a minority of the targets of confiscation, it is possible to state that 
‘no confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax’ were less likely to be observed in 
the case of attempts to confiscate their wealth.241 Similarly, once the 
                                         
241	Due	to	the	insufficient	number	of	observations	of	gender	and	religion	for	different	categories	when	
liquidity	was	added	in	table	3.6,	these	variables	were	excluded	from	the	regression	with	liquidity.			
 1 2 
DV categories NC-C IT-C IT-NC NC-C IT-NC NC-C 
Wealth Net value 0.553*** 1.319*** 2.385*** 0.895* 1.010 1.128* 
 Liquidity 0.968** 0.958*** 0.989 0.969*** 0.957*** 0.986 
Conflict Interstate 
wars 
3.319 23.318** 7.024 4.400 33.457** 7.603 
Rebellion 1.893** 0.909 0.480** 1.796** 0.809 0.450*** 
Spatiality Distance 1.103 1.302*** 1.180 1.062 1.357*** 1.277** 
 
Identity 
Title       
   No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Yes 0.302** 0.364** 1.201 0.254*** 0.453** 1.782 
 
Bargaining 
Power 
Family Affilia-
tion 
      
   No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Yes 1.464 4.331*** 2.957** 0.896 4.275*** 4.771** 
Warzone 0.952 1.005 1.055 0.949 1.042 1.097 
Sultan Be-
haviour 
Elapsed 0.930* 1.027 1.104** 0.957 1.030 1.076* 
Rules Justification 0.314* 0.462** 1.471 0.745 0.450** 0.603 
 N 344 344 344 360 360 360 
 Pseudo R2 0.2451 0.2451 0.2451 0.2475 0.2475 0.2475 
 LR Chi2 144.92 144.92 144.92 128.45 128.45 128.45 
 Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
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confiscation process started, it was less likely to avoid full confiscation 
for females. The final difference of the regressions without two-step 
framework is that even though the sultan was indifferent between ‘no 
confiscation’ and ‘inheritance tax’ as expected transport costs in-
creased, here he is more likely to obtain inheritance tax rather than 
waiving confiscation. 
3.3.3 An	Alternative	Test	of	Expected	Costs	Hypothesis	
Before proceeding to a discussion of implications, I finally test 
the impact of cost-benefit calculation in an alternative analysis. This 
looks specifically at the role of transportation costs. If the outcome of 
the confiscation process was confiscation, the next decision of the gov-
ernment was how to transfer confiscation gains to the public treasury. 
It must be noted at the outset that the analysis excludes those gains 
that were occasionally sent directly to warzones for military use. Apart 
from that, there were three modes of transfer: (1) transportation of all 
assets to Istanbul in kind, (2) auctioning all assets on premise and 
transferring revenues in cash and (3) a mix of these modes. Independ-
ent variables included in the model are an interaction variable of dis-
tance from Istanbul and distance from the nearest major port, the 
month of confiscation, net value of wealth and liquidity. Absent from 
previous regressions, the month of confiscation controls here for the 
effect of seasonality or whether climate or any other features of sea-
sonality had an impact on the decision. If the decision of transfer was 
governed by minimisation of transportation costs, then this test should 
provide further proof for the above argument that cost-benefit calcula-
tion played an important role even in this step which we might call the 
third step of the process.  
As displayed in table 3.8, controlling for other variables, two of 
three variables of importance lend support to the cost-benefit argu-
ment. This includes the finding that as the size of inheritance in-
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creases, it becomes more likely for it to be sent in cash. That is, auc-
tions were more often held in more distant regions. There were pre-
sumably costs of auction, but these costs can be negligibly included in 
the costs of agency that were already paid. As the liquidity increases, 
the assets are more likely to be sent in kind. This is because, in con-
trast to property such as real estate, liquid assets were easily movea-
ble. Most liquid assets in the dataset are jewelleries and cash. Yet the 
distance variables in the table do not support our hypothesis. The dis-
tance from Istanbul suggests that the more distant a location was; the 
more likely assets were to be sent in kind.  
Table 3.8: Relative Risks of the Mode of Transfer of Confiscated 
Wealth 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. 
SK: Sent in Kind, M: Mixed, SC: Sent in Cash. The reference category is always the 
one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category are higher 
compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is more likely 
to fall in the comparison group.  
This section has shown the results of several regression tests 
analysing the driving forces of the practice of confiscation in the Otto-
man Empire. It can be concluded by stating that the outcome of the 
 1 (W/O Liquidity) 2 (W Liquidity) 
DV categories SK-SC M-SC SK-SC M-SC 
Wealth Net Value 0.935** 0.992* 0.859* 1.404** 
Liquidity   1.034*** 1.019** 
Seasonal-
ity 
Month Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatiality Distance 1.553*** 1.744*** 1.738*** 1.713*** 
 N 633 633 290 290 
 Pseudo R2 0.1563 0.1563 0.3050 0.3050 
 LR Chi2 133.48 133.48 143.96 143.96 
 Prob Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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process of confiscation was governed by a mixed bag of time-specific 
and spatial factors as well as cost-benefit calculation. An important 
question is how these results contribute specifically to our understand-
ing of a seemingly ‘absolute’ monarch to confiscate. Let me answer this 
question in the next section.  
3.4 Conclusion	and	Broader	Implications	
This chapter has explored the driving forces of Ottoman confis-
cations during the period 1750-1839. The issues I dealt with above are 
new to the historiography of müsadere and to the broader literature of 
property rights abuses since they had never been framed this way. 
With the help of a novel dataset constructed out of muhallefat records, 
part I of this study shed some light on the targeted population, func-
tions, motives and limitations of the müsadere practice during the pe-
riod 1750-1839. 
Based on the findings presented in this chapter, it is safe to ar-
gue that neither the decision nor the outcome of confiscation by the 
sultan was governed by chance. Rather, it has been driven by several 
factors, which cannot be explained solely by a revenue-maximisation 
approach. The chapter has considered political, fiscal, spatial forces as 
well as attributes of wealth. It finds that the profitability of confisca-
tion, which is a function of costs and benefits shaped by spatial factors 
and certain qualities of wealth regarding its confiscability, determined 
the confiscation outcome in the first and second steps of the process 
of confiscation. The role of wars and distance was more evident during 
the pre-inventory step decision of whether to send a confiscator, dis-
appearing when MNML regressions are run without considering steps. 
As the new information concerning the attributes of wealth and the 
power of the family was revealed by the confiscator, the second step 
was governed rather by the bargaining power of the family and wealth 
attributes. It was this relative power of some families that made them 
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turn a potential full confiscation into inheritance tax, which was a kind 
of partial confiscation. The cost-benefit argument was supported also 
by an additional test analysing how confiscation gains were transferred 
to the public treasury. The added value of the econometric approach is 
embedded in the two-step framework adopted in the chapter.   
The added value of the econometric approach is as follows. First, 
although many results are in line with the existing non-quantitative 
studies, their hypotheses have been tested for the first time. The use 
of descriptive statistics was not sufficient to analyse a complex set of 
the potential determinants of the power and willingness to confiscate. 
Econometrics, however, allows us to control for the effect of other pos-
sible drivers. Second, the two-step framework adopted in the chapter 
made it possible to see how revealed information changed the outcome 
of the confiscation process, enabling us to better understand the limits 
of the practice of müsadere.    
What are the implications of these findings for economic history? 
First, they lend further support to the view that self-enforcing con-
straints on the government mattered. The sultans possessed the power 
to confiscate, though at levels varying from sultan to sultan. But this 
power was by no means unconstrained. These constraints were not 
imposed by laws but by certain historical conditions and bounds of 
rationality. The beginning of Ottoman constitutional history can be 
dated to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, even in 
the absence of constitutional constraints, a rational ruler would not 
confiscate with unchanging power and willingness. His power and will-
ingness to confiscate varied over time, space and identity of the wealth-
holder. Although self-constraints on the sovereign have been examined 
by several studies often with a focus on sovereign lending, this chapter 
shows how a different type of predation was driven and constrained in 
a different institutional context. 
Importantly, the impact of war was negative on the ruler’s power 
to confiscate. This means that even if the rulers needed revenue to 
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wage wars, they did not confiscate at exactly wartime. This is because 
(1) the müsadere process was too costly and lengthy, and (2) wars in-
creased the bargaining power of elites relative to that of the sultan. 
This mutual dependence is partly caused by the decentralised nature 
of Ottoman political economy and can be applied to any polities that 
were highly dependent on the elites to wage wars. Although wars were 
crucial for understanding the drivers of confiscation and the politics 
behind it, fiscal distress caused by wars was not the only game in town. 
Cost-benefit calculation and politics were other important determi-
nants. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think of this picture along 
the same line with debt repudiation, which was the most common form 
of confiscation in European history, during the early modern period. 
Failure to pay debts could damage the credibility of a ruler but under 
fiscal distress he had no choice but repudiation. In the Ottoman con-
text, however, confiscation was not the best option during wartime.  
The present chapter has put forward what has driven thousands 
of confiscations practised by the sultans. It has focused on their pref-
erences with little emphasis on the role of counterbalancing power of 
the victims as a constraint. In doing so, it had to exclude some crucial 
aspects of human agency due to the lack of data on unobservable or 
hidden aspects of confiscation. But these aspects should not be over-
looked for two reasons. First, after all, it was not the structures but 
individuals who made decisions, and their behaviour was shaped by 
each other’s behaviour. Second, it is necessary to make use of more 
actual examples to clarify some points raised in the present chapter. 
So, Part II of this work proceeds to an analysis of the actors of confis-
cation, their interactions and implications of these interactions.  
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4 ENFORCEMENT	OF	MÜSADERE	
Part II of this work examines the actors of müsadere and their 
interactions. It includes two chapters. The present chapter investigates 
how confiscations were enforced and how strategic interactions among 
their actors contributed to the transpiring of various outcomes of the 
confiscation process. To answer these questions, I study the process of 
enforcement of the practice of müsadere from the beginning to its end. 
This analysis contributes to all three components of the main research 
question of the study: what guided, enabled and motivated the 
müsadere practice, and how and to what extent? To highlight its im-
portance, the present chapter fixes the role of politics while analysing 
the enforcement process under the assumption that individuals are 
concerned only about monetary payoff, whereas much of the political 
economy story behind this process is endogenised in the next chapter.  
This part interacts with Part I by using its findings as well as 
filling in some of its gaps. For example, it helps to explain how the 
actions of potential targets of müsadere and enforcement agents could 
impose costs to the ruler. In contrast to the previous chapters, the ap-
proach adopted here is interactive rather than a primarily single-actor 
one. It relaxes the ruler-centric approach by embracing the behaviour 
of economic agents whose property was confiscated, and when availa-
ble, that of any other agents who were involved in the process. And, it 
is sensitive to institutions of the society under study that shaped the 
behaviour of all actors including that of the ruler.242  
The chapter makes use of game theoretical insights supported 
by qualitative evidence where necessary. Theory and historical evi-
dence are used complementary in the way that they inform each other. 
Employing games facilitates understanding of the observed behaviour 
                                         
242	Greif,	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy,	350-377.	
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and the effects of some important yet non-quantifiable variables that 
could not be included in the previous chapter.243 To draw qualitative 
evidence to the theoretical claims of the chapter, I have done a selective 
reading from a pool of thousands of correspondence documents that I 
thought could change our understanding of confiscations, while also 
relying on secondary literature mostly for what is already known. In 
addition, I have chosen a specific case since it possesses sufficient ev-
idence and subjected it to a case-study analysis. These sources also 
put emphasis on the importance of decisions that were made in the 
pre-confiscation stage by the actors of müsadere. Pre-confiscation de-
cisions refer to the prior interactions between the central government 
and the families. I leave presentation of historical evidence for these 
decisions to the next chapter where they are examined with a micro-
historical method, even though inevitable references are occasionally 
made in the present chapter.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 presents a nar-
rative detailing how a typical case of confiscation was enforced by the 
central authority, where I specify the observed preferences of the actors 
of confiscation. In addition to this generalised narrative, I focus on a 
specific case of enforcement process, i.e. that of Fethullah Ağa, the 
ayan of Antakya. Section 4.2 builds a simple model out of this narrative 
to make sense of the observed behaviour in the enforcement and pre-
enforcement stages under the revenue-maximisation assumption. In 
section 4.3, I shift the focus to understanding two principal-agent 
problems, namely between the sultan and the local administrator, and 
between the sultan and the confiscator, who was the main agent of 
enforcement. Section 4.4 investigates a special kind of enforcement, 
the outsourcing of confiscation. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
                                         
243	What	I	summarise	here	is	a	method	introduced	by	Avner	Greif	called	interactive,	context-specific	
analysis.	Ibid.,	350-376.	
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4.1 The	Process	of	Enforcement	of	Müsadere	
4.1.1 A	General	Narrative	
The processes through which confiscations were conducted were 
complicated during the period under study; numerous forms of behav-
iour were possible and indeed observed. Despite this complexity and 
the fact that each case of müsadere had a unique nature, i.e. different 
actors, location, and timing, it is still possible to track some consisten-
cies and recurrences. Before proceeding, it is necessary to recall the 
distinction between the two categories of confiscation: (1) post-mortem 
müsadere meaning those confiscations after the natural death of gov-
erning and landed elite, and (2) müsadere as punishment, meaning 
confiscations conducted as a form of punishment. Here I focus on 
those fitting the former category since they were inherently more arbi-
trary and predatory while they reflect the consistencies of the practice 
well. The processes for the latter category could differ from those for 
the former by means of a chasing and catching process. The remainder 
of the enforcement process was similar for both categories.  
A typical enforcement process began when one of the local ad-
ministrators (usually the local judge) of a town or city wrote to the cen-
tre, informing it that a wealthy individual had died in his area of ser-
vice. It is crucial to note that this information was solely a recommen-
dation of confiscation, while the ultimate decision was made by the 
ruler or his agents on his behalf later in the process. There is evidence 
showing that those who conveyed this information to the centre were, 
at least occasionally, remunerated for their loyal service.244 In the 
meantime, and without waiting for the centre’s decision, provincial ad-
ministrators sometimes sealed the houses owned by the deceased to 
prevent property hoarding by family members of the deceased or from 
                                         
244	Cezar,	"Bir	Âyanın	Muhallefâtı,"	52.	
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plundering by the local population. If properties were sealed, adminis-
trators paid for the services of watchmen as well.245  
When Istanbul received this information, it had to decide 
whether to send a confiscator, not to confiscate or to negotiate with the 
family on payment of a specific amount of inheritance tax. The confis-
cator was typically chosen among low or mid-rank officials from the 
central administration. He was the person responsible for managing 
the entire process of enforcement. His role was of special importance 
because, at this stage, the only information available to the central 
government was the location of the wealth and possibly the bargaining 
position of the family if the deceased was from a prominent family or 
was known to have had patrons in the capital. The government did not 
have any precise information regarding the qualities of the wealth, es-
pecially its net value or liquidity which determined transportation 
costs. As it can be seen from table 4.1, at times, the families’ networks 
influenced the outcome of the confiscation process.  
While the decision not to confiscate resulted in no further re-
quired action, the decision to obtain inheritance tax was passed to local 
administrators who then informed the family that they were to pay the 
amount of cash set by the central administration. The family, in return, 
did not necessarily pay this amount straight away. Instead, they could 
attempt to negotiate with the centre either through the same adminis-
trators or occasionally by travelling to the capital to negotiate in per-
son. It was not uncommon that the family itself made such an offer 
                                         
245	One	document	is	quite	telling	in	this	respect.	Here	I	provide	a	full	transliteration	of	it:	‘My	great	and	
wealthy	lord!	May	God	give	our	great	and	merciful	lord	a	long	life	and	protect	him	from	the	impurity	
of	this	world	and	the	world	to	come!	When	the	son-in-law	of	Emin	Toygarzade	Seyyid	Efendi	informed	
me	that	his	 father-in-law	died	on	Tuesday	mid-afternoon,	your	humble	servant	together	with	Şeyh	
efendi,	Nakib	efendi	and	the	chamberlain	of	Hakim	efendi	arrived	in	his	home	after	the	meal.	A	few	
cupboards	as	well	as	the	rooms	were	sealed.	A	trunk	in	the	inner	room	has	been	found	and	brought	
into	the	open.	His	son-in-law	said	that	he	had	no	wealth	but	bills	of	debt.	But,	because	his	death	was	
expected,	it	is	likely	that	the	son-in-law	has	hidden	the	cash.	Three	to	five	days	before	his	death,	he	is	
said	to	have	made	a	will	to	transfer	his	wealth	to	his	religious	endowment	but	the	will	has	not	been	
officially	registered.	They	informed	us	that	he	has	still	much	crop	and	receivables	from	the	craftsmen.	
Thus,	either	a	confiscator	shall	be	sent	or	there	could	be	another	way	through	negotiating	with	his	
son-in-law	[inheritance	tax].’	C.ML	361/14781.	
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which could or could not be accepted by the centre. If they reached an 
agreement, the heirs paid the inheritance tax usually in annuities. The 
archives are also full of documents which show how the central admin-
istration tracked unpaid annuities. In case payments were not made 
on time, the family was warned; if repetitive warnings yielded no result, 
further confiscation or other forms of punishment, such as disposses-
sion of offices or honours, could have applied. The same applies to in-
heritance tax realised in the second stage.  
If the central government decided to send a confiscator to collect 
further data regarding the case of confiscation, the next step was to 
choose one. Although the sources do not provide much information 
about this choice, it is clear that it was made with care.246 Per one 
document, it was based on ‘[earlier] service, merit, reliability and right 
direction.’247 Documentation also emphasised that the confiscator was 
chosen among his peers for his above qualities.248 This special atten-
tion paid to the selection of confiscators was because they had the abil-
ity to underreport the total sum of wealth either because they pocketed 
some property from it or because they accepted a bribe from the family.  
A confiscator’s responsibilities from beginning to end were (1) 
sealing the assets if not done previously, (2) resolving conflicts over 
ownership and possession of property, (3) preparing a detailed inven-
tory of the wealth, (4) selling some or all assets in a locally held auction 
if so ordered, and (5) transporting some or all assets to Istanbul in kind 
or cash, if so ordered. This inventory process occasionally took place 
under the testimony of the local judge (or his surrogate) and/or a local 
pricing expert. If the confiscator suspected that the family had hidden 
                                         
246	In	the	confiscation	of	the	wealth	of	a	notable	of	Ankara,	Abdülhadi,	the	sultan	addresses	the	con-
fiscator	 (Halil	Akifzade)	by	encouraging	him	with	the	following	words:	 ‘You	are	the	confiscator	and	
were	selected	among	your	peers	due	to	your	service	and	loyalty…’	C.ML	657/26892	(17	July	1814	(29	
Recep	1229)).		
247	MAD	9718.		
248	When	Karaosmanoğlu	Hacı	Mehmed	died,	the	centre	sent	a	letter	to	the	commissioned	confiscator,	
listing	his	responsibilities.	This	was	a	type	of	mission	definition.	C.DH	329/16413	(28	August	1792	(10	
Muharrem	1207)).			
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some assets of the wealth before his arrival, he could decide to do a 
further search or even bastinado the suspects with the help of local 
forces. These actions, at times, led to serious clashes between the con-
fiscator and the family. Despite a certain degree of flexibility on various 
parts of the enforcement process, he was typically not given much free-
dom in his actions and was meant to follow the instructions sent by 
the centre.249 Therefore, most archival documents regarding these con-
fiscations consist of the correspondence between the centre and the 
confiscator. 
The process of preparing an inventory was costly and lengthy. It 
took months or sometimes years. Its costliness and longevity depended 
on the complexity of the case. For instance, it could take longer in the 
instance of those who claimed ownership of some assets included in 
the confiscation or if the debt-credit relations of the deceased were 
complex to manage. If a debtor could show bills of debt or bring forth 
a witness, he was often paid from the inventory. At the same time, 
those who owed the deceased were tracked through bills of debt found 
in the inheritance and were asked to pay. After having resolved such 
issues and prepared the inventory, it was ready to be sent to Istanbul 
for a final decision.  
Once receiving the inventory and after it was studied by the offi-
cials at the confiscation bureau, the centre made a second decision 
which acted as the outcome of the process. This decision was made 
with more information than the first. The extent to which this decision 
was like the one in the first stage of enforcement is dubious because it 
                                         
249	An	illustration	of	this	is	when	the	sultan	tells	the	confiscator	that	he	was	supposed	to	do	whatever	
he	was	ordered.	 It	 is	also	a	good	example	of	how	a	typical	set	of	orders	appeared:	 ‘You	know	that	
confiscation	of	the	wealth	of	this	person	(Abdülhadi	of	Ankara)	was	ordered.	Whatever	he	possesses	
in	that	neighbourhood,	any	property,	cash,	debts	and	receivables,	real	estate,	farms,	cereals,	animals,	
all	shall	be	registered	without	permitting	to	even	a	tiny	piece	of	it	to	be	lost.	You	shall	send	the	inven-
tory	to	the	capital	and	wait	for	our	orders	what	to	do	next.	If	they	dare	to	resist,	you	act	according	to	
the	common	sense	as	there	will	be	no	time	to	get	an	answer	from	us.’	He	then	addresses	the	governor	
of	Ankara,	Vezir	Abdurrahman	Paşa:	‘And,	you	are	my	vizier!	Responsibility	is	on	you.	You	shall	help	
the	confiscator	in	this	task	of	revealing	the	property	of	the	deceased.’	C.ML	657/26892	(17	July	1814	
(29	Recep	1229)).		
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sometimes stemmed from a necessity created by either the bargaining 
position of the family or other political and economic conditions of the 
time. The quantitative part has already shown what directed these out-
comes. Nevertheless, a few words on the outcomes of ‘no confiscation’ 
and ‘inheritance tax’ are necessary. If we look more closely at the stated 
reasons behind ‘no confiscation,’ we see that there were essentially the 
five reasons displayed in table 4.1. The most frequent two reasons are 
self-evident. It would have been rational not to fully confiscate when 
the deceased had too much debt or the sum of his wealth was insignif-
icant.250 If we consider this data in combination with observations with 
negative net value (in which case one’s debts exceeded the value of his 
personal estates), then out of 51 cases with negative net value, 22 were 
reasoned as having too much debt or having an insignificant sum of 
wealth. 
It is perhaps more curious to observe that some were reasoned 
by mercy of the sultan.251 These generally stemmed from the requests 
by the family or mediators claiming that the deceased had left behind 
widow(s) and/or orphans who would have fallen into a very miserable 
state if the government confiscated the wealth of the deceased. Pre-
sumably as an effort not to damage his legitimacy by confiscating the 
wealth of people in dire need, the official sources referred to the ‘no 
confiscation’ decision taken in these situations as an indicator of the 
sultan’s benevolence over his subjects. It is also striking that the deci-
sion not to confiscate was explicitly linked with the mediators’ efforts 
                                         
250	An	example	to	the	case	of	an	insignificant	sum	is	as	follows.	When	it	was	decided	to	confiscate	the	
inheritance	of	the	notable	of	Köstence,	Bekir,	a	confiscator	was	sent	to	the	locality.	Although	the	con-
fiscator	worked	hard	not	to	leave	anything	unregistered,	the	total	sum	was	only	2,282	kuruş.	Since	
Bekir	was	indebted	with	some	2,588	kuruş,	the	bureau	of	confiscation	suggested	‘no	confiscation’	as	
it	would	not	have	been	worth	confiscating.	C.ML	391/15975	(30	November	1796	(29	Cemaziyülevvel	
1796)).	
251	A	request	letter	details	this:	When	the	notable	of	Edremid	district,	Alemizade	Hacı	Halil,	died,	the	
central	government	decided	to	send	a	confiscator	to	confiscate	his	wealth.	Yet	this	letter	requests	that	
despite	this	decision	taken	a	few	months	ago,	after	clearance	of	his	debts,	there	would	not	have	been	
much	to	go	to	the	treasury.	Additionally,	it	would	especially	have	been	mercilessness	to	his	orphans	
to	proceed	with	the	confiscation.	On	the	condition	of	silencing	the	debtors	by	paying	some	16,500	
kuruş	to	the	treasury	and	with	the	backing	of	a	certain	Hacı	Ali	of	Edremid,	the	wealth	was	left	to	the	
family	with	a	mention	of	his	orphans.	C.ML	58/2656	(21	August	1792	(3	Muharrem	1207)).		
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in six cases. Mediation, if performed by an influential person, could be 
effective.  
Table 4.1: Reasoning behind the Non-Confiscation Outcomes 
Reason/Outcome No Confiscation Inheritance Tax Total 
Having too Much 
Debt 
49 10 59 
Appearance of Heirs 3 0 3 
Insignificant Sum 40 1 41 
Requests by Media-
tors 
6 0 6 
Mercy of the Sultan 33 2 36 
Pardoning of the 
Punished 
3 3 6 
Total 134 16 150 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Notes: This table is based on 150 cases in which I could identify the state’s reason 
for no confiscation and inheritance tax. 
Another outcome was the ‘inheritance tax’ mentioned above. In-
heritance tax that was realised after the second stage was not much 
different than the one after the first stage in terms of including a pro-
cess of negotiation.252 It is useful here to provide some statistics inher-
ently absent from the first stage’s outcome of inheritance due to the 
                                         
252	Regarding	the	outcome	of	 inheritance	tax	realised	 in	the	second	stage:	“Since	 it	was	decided	to	
confiscate	the	wealth	of	my	brother	El-Hac	Mehmed	Ağa	and	uncle	İsmail	Ağa	and	his	brothers,	Mus-
tafa,	Haydar,	Abdurrahman,	Hasan	and	Koca	Ağa	who	fled	while	they	were	residents	of	the	district	of	
Aladağ,	Osman	Ağa	had	been	commissioned	to	manage	the	confiscation	process.	After	he	prepared	
the	inventory	and	presented	it	to	the	Sublime	Porte,	the	aforementioned	properties	have	been	left	to	
us	in	exchange	for	75,000	kuruş.	Of	this	amount,	we	are	supposed	to	pay	some	50,000	kuruş	by	cash	
to	the	confiscator	after	we	arrived	at	the	location	and	this	sealed	bill	of	exchange	undertakes	that	the	
rest	shall	be	paid	on	 the	ninth	of	November.	Your	servants:	Es-Seyyid	Süleyman,	 the	son	of	El-Hac	
Mehmed	Ayan-ı	Kaza	M.-El-Hac	Ahmed	Kethüda-yı	merkum	El-Hac	Mehmed’	This	makes	it	clear	that	
there	was	a	negotiation	between	the	centre	and	two	individuals,	one	of	whom	is	the	son	of	one	of	
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lack of an inventory at that stage. The share of inheritance tax to total 
value varies from case to case between a minimum of 0.015 and a max-
imum of 6. Logically, this value should not be higher than 1, but it 
seems that inheritance tax paid by the family was sometimes greater 
than the value of the inheritance. This might mean only that the cen-
tral government was not satisfied with the confiscator’s estimation and 
thought that the deceased was wealthier than as expressed in the in-
ventory. The average of this share was 60 per cent with a standard 
variation of 0.77, which shows that it was a very high inheritance tax.  
The next chapter will analyse short-term and long-term strate-
gies of families to protect their property from the sultan. It suffices to 
say here that the families were not totally voiceless. Apart from negoti-
ation as mentioned above as a peaceful way of resistance, they could 
also resist against the confiscator or, at the most extreme, even fight 
against government troops. The use of violent resistance was rare, 
however. Mostly, they simply consented to confiscation by doing noth-
ing. The decision to consent was arguably based on power asymmetry 
between the central government and these families as well as on the 
expectation that resistance would have highly reduced the probability 
of obtaining future grants, if not eliminating it. There were many fam-
ilies that managed to stay economically and politically powerful despite 
having been hit by confiscation several times.  
In case the outcome in the second stage was partial or full con-
fiscation, the next step was the method of transfer of the property to 
the treasury. The confiscator was usually informed about the proce-
dures to follow, mainly regarding which assets to sell on the spot and 
which ones to send directly to Istanbul. Relying on the location of the 
wealth, transportation could be either overland or sea. Occasionally,  
                                         
those	whose	wealth	was	seized	and	the	other	being	his	chamberlain.	This	document	is	a	debt	contract	
in	which	the	family	members	pledge	to	pay	the	inheritance	tax.	C.ML	11/480	(20	February	1821	(17	
Cemaziyülevvel	1236)).	
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Figure 4.1: The Narrative of the Process of Müsadere Visualised 
	 	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 							
 
some assets were loaded to passing ships to reduce costs of transpor-
tation. The confiscator was sometimes ordered to transport some as-
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case of auctions, there were additional remunerations dellalliye paid to 
criers (dellal). After the transportation, the case was permanently 
closed unless any complaints concerning the ownership status of con-
fiscated assets emerged or any concerns regarding cheating or hoard-
ing arose. 
Until this point, this section has provided a summary of how 
state confiscations were enforced in the Ottoman Empire in the long-
eighteenth century. The process was complex and taken with great 
care by the central authority. To add some historicity to this narrative, 
the following sub-section deals with a case study of the enforcement 
process.  
4.1.2 The	Case	of	Fethullah	Ağa,	the	Notable	of	Antakya,	and	his	Family	
Fethullah Ağa was one of the local magnates of Antakya (Anti-
och) in mid-southern Anatolia between 1763 and 1782. During this 
period, he served as the intermediary tax farmer of Antakya (mültezim), 
the deputy governor of Antakya (voyvoda) and took an active part in 
the management of religious foundations.253 His father, Kara İbrahim 
Ağa, was also the ayan of Antakya, and held his loyalty to the central 
state. In the first ten years of this period, he followed the footsteps of 
his father and won the central government’s trust by his loyal service 
especially in terms of the readiness of his military contributions.254 Be-
cause economic power was an important element of remaining in these 
offices for longer periods, like many local elites, Fethullah Ağa also at-
tempted to acquire wealth via oppression of subjects, corruption and 
infraction of rules. This is at least what is told by the sources produced 
                                         
253	While	the	main	task	of	a	voyvoda	was	to	collect	taxes	in	the	seventeenth	century,	it	turned	into	an	
office	of	district	administration	including	such	duties	as	provisioning	of	the	city	and	the	army,	security	
of	war	and	trade	roads	and	inspection	of	tax	collection.	Voyvodas	were	typically	chosen	from	the	no-
tables	of	provinces	and	districts	in	the	eighteenth	century.	Kemal	Kaya,	"Tanzimat’tan	Önce	Belediye	
Hizmetleri	 Ve	 Voyvovdalar,"	 Ankara	 Üniversitesi	 Osmanlı	 Tarihi	 Araştırma	 ve	 Uygulama	 Dergisi	
(OTAM)	26,	no.	41	(2007).	
254	Ülkü	Tecimen,	"Antakya	Ayanı	Hacı	Fethullah	Ağa	Ve	Ailesi"	(Süleyman	Demirel	University,	2013),	
64-88.	
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by the state. The events that led to his execution and confiscation of 
wealth were associated with local competition over state resources. Fe-
thullah Ağa was not happy with the appointment of a certain Hacı Şer-
afeddin Ağa as the voyvoda of Antakya. Apparently, Şerafeddin had 
killed his father too. Upon the death of his father, he increased his 
oppression over the subjects to make more wealth for himself, which 
was critical to protect his power in the region. In terms of his corrup-
tion, he is said to have embezzled some 80,000 kuruş sent to him to 
purchase cereals.255 Due to the complaints from the local community, 
he was first condemned with capital punishment and then pardoned 
in 1777. However, he later turned into a local bandit with his armed 
men and started a rebellion against the central state. He was finally 
executed in 1782.  
Table 4.2: Inventory of Fethullah Ağa’s Wealth Excluding Immova-
bles (Kuruş) 
Personal Estates 19,572 
Debts Owed To 3,423 
Debts Owned By 20,992 
Net 2,003 
Source: (Tecimen 2013) 
In early 1783, a certain Sipahi Ömer Ağa was tasked as the con-
fiscator of the wealth of Fethullah Ağa. The confiscator prepared an 
inventory and sent it to the capital. The summary of the inventory was 
as shown in table 4.2. His net value was calculated as 2,003 kuruş 
after deduction of debts owed by him to other people from the value of 
his personal estates and debts owed to him. This was a collective con-
fiscation, however, as he was joined in rebellion by his nephew Süley-
man Ağa and his accomplices. Their wealth, which was of less value, 
was also recorded for confiscation.  
                                         
255	Ibid.,	90-95.	
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Table 4.3: Confiscation of the Wealth of Fethullah Ağa of Antakya 
and his Family 
Targets of Confiscation Hacı Fethullah Ağa, Süleyman Ağa, 
some of Fethullah’s men and İsmail 
Ağa. 
Time 1783-1792 
Reason Oppression of subjects, embezzlement, 
rebellion. 
Sultan(s) Abdülhamid I (r. 1773-1789), Selim III 
(r. 1789-1808) 
Confiscator(s) Sipahi Ömer Ağa, Habeş Ali, and Ali. 
Resistance Yes, by İsmail Ağa, the nephew of Fe-
thullah Ağa. 
Net value Fethullah: 2,003+88,761 
Outcome First: Inheritance tax (15,000 out of 
25,000 paid) 
Second: Full confiscation 
Source: See cited documents. 
This inventory as depicted was not the end of the first stage of 
the process. One of the nephews of Hacı Fethullah, Hacı İsmail Ağa, 
played a key role during the enforcement process. He first resisted the 
confiscator Ömer Ağa and did not follow the orders of the government 
by refusing to return his uncle’s immovable property to the central gov-
ernment. Therefore, the above inventory excluded immovables. In due 
time, İsmail Ağa and the centre reached an agreement on the payment 
of a certain 25,000 kuruş to the treasury to buy his uncle’s inheritance. 
Seven thousand five hundred of this amount was to be paid in three 
months and the rest in two instalments.256 The intention of the centre 
                                         
256	AE.SABH.I	65/475-1	(30	September	1785	(26	Zilkade	1199))	
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was, using the language of the sources, to ‘silence the debtors,’ mean-
ing to pay the debts his uncle had owed.257 Despite this agreement, the 
confiscator managed to obtain only 15,000 kuruş paid in two instal-
ments. Many warnings to pay the remaining amount went unanswered 
while İsmail was turning into a rebel against the state.  
The process of confiscation of the wealth of Hacı Fethullah and 
his family was quite lengthy and probably costly too. It took some ten 
years to finalise the process. Some of this lengthy duration derived 
from the attempts to make the debtors pay, yet the actual process was 
active for at least five years. We see three different confiscators tasked 
with the confiscation. Ömer Ağa, who had prepared the first inventory, 
was dismissed for his inability to deal with this difficult mission. The 
second confiscator, Habeş Ali Ağa, exchanged many detailed letters 
with the central government, reporting what was happening. In some 
of them, he insisted that because he was engaged with this confiscation 
for some two and a half years during which he resided in Antakya and 
was not yet paid any commission, he was going bankrupt. He wrote, 
for example, that ‘despite all [his] efforts and exertions and homesick-
ness due to our stay here for two years,’ he was not paid anything and 
was in dire need of money.258 Habeş Ali was later ordered in September 
of 1785 by the sultan to send the remaining amount before June of the 
next year.259 He and the judge of Antakya were even warned in a man-
ner which accused them of ‘neglect’ and ‘toleration.’260 Based on the 
letter of the confiscator, when İsmail Ağa was just about to make the 
payment of 10,000 kuruş, he apparently killed Amanzade Mustafa Ağa. 
This homicide reflects the nature of competition over state resources 
because Amanzade was one of his rivals, a notable of Antakya who was 
                                         
257	AE.SABH.I	65/475-3	(6	September	1785	(2	Zilkade	1199))	
258	AE.SABH.I	66/4604-3.	
259	AE.SABH.I	65/475-7.	
260	AE.SABH.I	66/4604-2	(25	March	1785	(14	Cemaziyülevvel	1199)).	
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also the commander of Janissaries and a tax collector. After the hom-
icide, İsmail Ağa fled to Hedjaz.261  
Following his escape, Habeş Ali was ordered to prepare an in-
ventory of the wealth of İsmail as well. But, in the meantime, the centre 
appointed a new confiscator also called Ali, and this time from the cen-
tral administration.262 The newly appointed confiscator was requested 
to collect the debts owed to İsmail Ağa.263 After selling İsmail’s assets 
in an auction, Ali sent some 6,000 kuruş to the treasury and the rest 
was used to clear the debts. With the escape of İsmail, the immovables 
of Fethullah Ağa were also sold at the value of 88,761 kuruş.264 
What is also important in this story is that due to the rebellious 
and disloyal actions of İsmail, one of the documents includes a striking 
statement. The sultan wanted ‘either [İsmail] or one of his sons or men 
shall never again be the commander of Antakya and not even set foot 
on this city anymore.’ This clearly means that the family would be de-
void of any future grants and privileges and, even worse, would not be 
able to live in their hometown any longer.  
Before proceeding, it must be noted that this process did not 
apply to some confiscations that were outsourced to the elites in the 
region. At least a few of them became confiscation specialists. Allow me 
to analyse this outsourcing later in the chapter. In the present section, 
I provided an overview of the enforcement of confiscation. Figure 4.2 
gives a simplified version of it. As it is shown there, it is merely a bunch 
of actions. The next section enriches this analysis by explaining how 
these actions transpired within a game theoretical framework.  
                                         
261	AE.SABH.I	65/475-3	(6	September	1785	(2	Zilkade	1199)),	AE.SABH.I	65/475-6.	AE.SABH.I	66/4604-
3	(25	March	1785	(14	Cemaziyülevvel	1199).		
262	AE.SABH.I	65/475-6.	
263	AE.SABH.I	65/475-7.	
264	Tecimen,	"Fethullah",	169-170.	
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4.2 Müsadere	under	the	Revenue-maximisation	Assumption	
Why did the observed forms of behaviour transpire in the prac-
tice of müsadere? This question strays from the driving forces of con-
fiscation in that answering it requires a more interactive approach. In 
doing so, this section provides a context-specific model, employing ex-
tensive form games. The use of extensive form allows capturing the 
sequential nature of strategic interactions observed in the müsadere 
processes, meaning that players often moved after observing the move 
of the player who previously moved.265 Because my purpose is to high-
light the role of politics in the following chapters, it is kept constant 
here while an extended version of rationality is presented later in this 
chapter and in the next chapter. There is also no need to include or-
ganisations in the games presented here. The single organisation in-
volved in the process, which was the bureau of confiscation in Istanbul, 
was devoid of significant capacity to change how the game was played. 
One reserve to this, which will be detailed in the next chapter, is that 
the provincial families can be considered as a type of organisation. As 
the thesis evolves, I consider certain auxiliary transactions linking the 
central transaction between the sultan and the family.266 What is taken 
as endogenous, on the other hand, is incentives of players. Each player 
tries to maximise his monetary payoff. Next chapters will show how 
changes in certain variables of politics can alter the outcome of the 
confiscation game. 
The game presented in figure 4.2 is a game under the revenue-
maximisation assumption. It has two players, sultan 𝑆 and family	𝐹. 
These economic agents attempt to maximise their utility by not con-
sidering political costs and benefits of their actions. In other words, the 
players are short-sightedly concerned about monetary payoff alone. 
                                         
265	This	section	is	motivated	by	Greif’s	call	for	the	use	of	game	theory	for	a	better	understanding	of	
strategic	 interactions	 in	 economic	 history.	 Avner	 Greif,	 "Economic	 History	 and	 Game	 Theory,"	 in	
Handbook	of	Game	Theory,	ed.	Robert	J.	Aumann	and	Sergiu	Hart	(Amsterdam:	North	Holland,	2002).	
266	Greif,	Path	to	the	Modern	Economy,	360-361.	
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Two related assumptions are also made to reduce the game of 
müsadere to two players: (1) revenue-maximising local administrators 
immediately seal the property after the game starts, (2) the family 
knows this fact, the revenue-maximising confiscator accepts their 
bribe; that is, he is not honest.  
Figure 4.2: Müsadere Game Under Revenue-Maximisation Assump-
tion 
 
Notes: F: Family, S: Sultan, N: Nature 
This context-specific game is designed as a one-shot game, 
which means that no further games will be played between the same 
players. Although this was indeed the case for most families faced con-
fiscation for only once, it does not mean that they have not learnt an-
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ything from earlier games played between the sultan (and other sul-
tans) and other families. The players have perfect information, that is, 
each player knows the events that previously happened. Because both 
players know each other’s incentive structure, the game in figure 4.2 
is a dynamic game with complete and perfect information.  
The game in the figure starts with the family’s move since the 
previous move of the sultan whether to send a confiscator is a one-
player game, which makes it a decision without much strategic inter-
action. This move is about the sultan’s decision based on expected 
costs and benefits of confiscation. The only strategic interaction that 
could happen before the confiscator is sent is the case of negotiation, 
in which the sultan makes an offer to the family to pay inheritance tax 
that the family could either accept or reject. It is not necessary to detail 
this sub-game here as it is the same as the second-stage game of ne-
gotiation which I shall mention below.  
On those notes, we can begin to analyse the game. The second 
stage of the process of confiscation is where the actual game presented 
in figure 4.2 begins. It starts with the family’s move of responding to 
the action of the sultan to dispatch a confiscator. Now consider that 
the family consents to the confiscation of the wealth of the deceased 
denoted by	𝑊, in which case the game is kept short with full confisca-
tion. In this case, the sultan incurs agency costs of	𝑎 > 0, and transport 
costs	𝑡 > 0. The payoffs are allocated as such: 𝑊 − 𝑎 − 𝑡 > 0 for the sul-
tan, and −𝑊 for the family.  
Before examining the family’s move of bribing, consider the sit-
uation in which the family offers a deal to the sultan. The offer can 
either be accepted or rejected by the sultan. If he accepts the offer, the 
payoffs to the sultan are	𝑁 − 𝑎, where 𝑁 denotes negotiated value or 
inheritance tax paid by the family in lieu of confiscation. The family’s 
payoff in the case of acceptance is −𝑊. If the sultan rejects the offer 
and decides to confiscate, the family chooses whether to threaten with 
the use of violence or to consent. By consenting after rejection of its 
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offer, the family gets	−𝑊, while the sultan receives	𝑊 − 𝑎 − 𝑡. If the fam-
ily signals to threaten him by certain forms of violence, the sultan 
moves again by either fighting or retreating. If he fights, it is ‘nature’ 
moving this time.267 Nature determines here the probability of winning. 
Based on the archival evidence of such conflicts, which can also be 
seen in the above case study, I assign an approximate probability of 
winning of 90 per cent to the sultan and 10 per cent to the family. If 
the sultan ends up winning the fight, his payoff is realised at	𝑊 − 𝑎 −𝑡 − 𝑓, whereas the family’s is at	−𝑊 − 𝑓 − 𝑝. The symbol 𝑓 here denotes 
fighting costs for both players. If he fails to repress the family, the pay-
offs are distributed as follows: 𝑁 − 𝑎 and –𝑁 for the sultan and the 
family, respectively. If he decides not to engage in conflict for some 
reason, the sultan retreats in which case his payoffs are	𝑁 − 𝑎, whereas 
the family’s payoff is	– 𝑁 where 𝑁 denotes the negotiated value of inher-
itance. One word of caution here is that it is assumed, to simplify the 
model, that the process of negotiation included only one offer. In fact, 
there could be more than one round, in which 𝑁 would increase in 
every additional round to the point that the sultan was satisfied.  
It was also common knowledge that the family could offer a bribe 
to the confiscator. As stated above, the game assumes that the confis-
cator, as a revenue-maximising individual, will accept the bribe and 
this information is known by the family. However, the model should be 
sensitive to whether bribing was caught or not by the sultan. As it will 
be shown later, we need to assign a high likelihood to the case in which 
it was not caught. If it was caught, which I assign a chance of 10 per 
cent, the family is generally subjected to the cost of punishment de-
noted by	𝑝. In this case, the payoffs are 𝑊 − 𝑎 − 𝑡 for the sultan 
and	−𝑊 − 𝑝 for the family. If it goes uncaught, though, the game be-
comes more complicated. In the case of an uncaught bribe, the sultan 
has three potential moves, which are no confiscation, negotiation and 
confiscation. The case of no confiscation is simpler because the game 
                                         
267	Nature	is	a	hypothetical	player	in	game	theory	with	no	strategic	interests	in	the	game.		
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would end with payoffs of −𝑎 and −𝑏 where 𝑏 is the value of the bribe 
given to the confiscator. If the sultan offers a deal to the family, it can 
be either accepted or rejected. If it is accepted, the sultan gets		𝑁f − 𝑎, 
where 𝑁f < 𝑁 represents the negotiated value in the case of unnoticed 
bribing over a net value underreported by the confiscator. The family’s 
payoff from negotiation under uncaught bribing is equal to	−𝑁f − 𝑏, 
which is higher than	−𝑊. If the sultan decides to confiscate in the case 
of uncaught bribing, the family moves by either consenting or threat-
ening him with fighting. In the case of the family doing nothing, the 
sultan obtains the payoff of 𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡 and the family receives	𝑊f, where 𝑊f is equal to	𝑊 − 𝑏. Similarly, once threatened by the family, the sul-
tan decides whether to fight or retreat. If he chooses to retreat, the 
payoffs are −𝑎E for the sultan and 0 for the family. Military conflict pays 
off depending on their military strength. With the same logic used 
above, I assign probabilities of winning of 0.9 and 0.1 for the sultan 
and the family, respectively. If the sultan effectively represses, his pay-
off is	𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡 − 𝑓, while that of the family is	−𝑊f − 𝑓 − 𝑝. If repression 
proves to be ineffective, respective payoffs are −𝑎 − 𝑓 and −𝑓 respec-
tively for the sultan and the family.  
What would be the equilibrium of this game where neither player 
can be better off by changing their strategy? For this, it is necessary to 
solve sub-games first. The game ends if the family consents, and thus 
there is no sub-game. To solve if there is equilibrium in the bribe and 
negotiate moves, I refer to some findings from my archival research. I 
have calculated that the negotiated value, on average, is equal to 60 
per cent of the net value of wealth:	𝑁 = 𝑊 ∗ HM. Average agency costs were 
calculated to be around one tenth of the net value of wealth,		𝑎 = 𝑊 ∗CCA. Not much information is available regarding the value of 𝑡 in the 
sources and it is highly dependent on distance. Using backward induc-
tion, in the final possible node of the bribe move, nature is very likely 
to choose effective repression. Knowing this, the sultan plays fight to 
better odds. Aware of the fact that he will play fight and win, the family 
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plays consent in the previous sub-game to avoid the costs of punish-
ment. Before we proceed to the sultan’s move, we need to explain which 
action the family will play if the sultan decides to make an offer. The 
family will accept the offer as it is partial confiscation, which is, for the 
family, better than full confiscation which would occur in the case of 
rejection. Knowing that his offer will be accepted, the sultan decides 
among three alternatives: no confiscation, inheritance tax and confis-
cation, paying off	−𝑎, 𝑁f − 𝑎 and	𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡, respectively. Given these 
payoffs to the sultan, it is straightforward that ‘no confiscation’ is 
strictly dominated by the other two alternatives. But, as seen below, 
there is no domination among ‘inheritance tax’ and ‘confiscation.’  𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡 > 𝑁f − 𝑎 
𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡 > 3𝑊f5 − 𝑎 
𝑊f > 5𝑡2  
Is there a sub-game equilibrium in the sub-game of negotiation 
of the family? Using the same logic of backward induction, the sultan 
will play fight and win. Because this information is already available to 
the family, it will play consent in the previous game. Knowing this, the 
sultan rejects the offer, which forces the family to consent. The only 
equilibrium there is negotiate, reject and consent in which case the 
family obtains −𝑊, which is the same payoff as in the consent move. 
Therefore, it is also strictly dominated by the bribe option of the family 
in its first move. Thus, the family is indifferent between consent and 
negotiate moves. This means that the family will bribe the confiscator 
and the game will end in one of these nodes: (1) bribe-unnoticed-nego-
tiate-accept, (2) bribe-unnoticed-confiscate-consent. Thus, the game 
suggests that the family will bribe, which will go unnoticed. The sultan 
will then negotiate or confiscate. If he negotiates, the family accept the 
offer, while if he confiscates, the family will consent. Whether which 
one of negotiate or confiscate he will choose depends on the values of 
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𝑊f and	𝑡. One important note is necessary. As the information that the 
family bribed the confiscator is not available to the sultan, he acts as 
if 𝑊f = 𝑊. The same applies to the negotiated value under uncaught 
bribing. However, this lack of information does not change the outcome 
of the game. As the family will choose to bribe anyway, the action of 
the sultan is the main determinant of the outcome. His action is based 
on the profitability of confiscation by a cost-benefit analysis of the 
value of wealth (as perceived by the sultan) and transportation costs. 
Respective payoffs in two outcomes of the game are presented in table 
4.4. 
So, if 𝑊f > MjE , the sultan will play confiscation; otherwise, he 
plays inheritance tax. Both strategies are viable depending on the value 
of 𝑊f and	𝑡. However, and most importantly, both payoffs strictly dom-
inate the payoff from consent. To put it differently, it is not rational for 
the family to consent in its very first move under the constraints spec-
ified and that it will choose to bribe.  
Table 4.4: Payoffs in Two Potential Outcomes 
Condition/Player Sultan Family 
If 𝑊f > MjE  
(Bribe-unnoticed-
confiscate-consent) 
𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡 
 
−𝑊f 
If 𝑊f < MjE  
(Bribe-unnoticed-ne-
gotiate-accept) 
		𝑁f − 𝑎 		𝑁f 
 
This section has presented the confiscation game as a fiscally 
driven phenomenon under revenue-maximisation. It has concluded 
that under this constraint the family would necessarily bribe, and the 
game would end with either acceptance of an offer made by the sultan, 
that is inheritance tax, or the family’s consent to full confiscation. 
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Therefore, the issue of bribing requires further attention. The next sec-
tion gives this consideration and attempts to understand the nature of 
principle-agent relations in the müsadere game.  
4.3 Principal-Agent	Problems	
The principle-agent problem, which is the classic problem of po-
litical economy, applies here. We can reasonably think of the order 
given by the sultan to the confiscator, who was his main enforcement 
agent, as a type of contract. The order was to go to the locality and 
prepare the inventory by following the instructions without attempting 
to cheat. Indeed, there are a few reports in the archives of bribing. We 
should, however, be cautious about this because of the illegal nature 
of corruption; that is, there could exist some underreported cases. It is 
worth mentioning that the sultan has taken three measures to prevent 
such misbehaviour. First, it turns out that the confiscator was being 
selected with care based on his past conduct. Such a selection would 
never guarantee honesty on the confiscator’s side as it might well be 
that a confiscator was cheating without being caught. Thus, another 
mechanism of the process was associated with the fact that the en-
forcement of confiscation was mostly a joint effort accompanied by lo-
cal judges and governors.268 What this implies is that he must have 
convinced other agents to accept the bribe, which was a deterrent 
mechanism. Third, there was an unwritten sanctioning mechanism, 
which can be tracked through the available sources. If the confiscator 
was caught cheating, various forms of punishment could apply, from 
being devoid of future offices to capital punishment. Importantly, con-
fiscators knew these potential consequences of their actions.  
                                         
268	The	document	detailing	the	responsibilities	of	Mehmed	Emin	Bey	who	was	commissioned	to	con-
fiscate	the	wealth	of	Avcılarlı	Hasan	of	Edremid	 is	a	good	example.	After	 telling	him	what	to	do,	 it	
addresses	the	judge,	military	and	notables	of	Edremid,	asking	them	to	help	the	confiscator	in	the	mat-
ter	of	revealing	the	property	of	Hasan.	C.ML	548/22549	(2	July	1806	(15	Rebiülahir	1221)).			
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Figure 4.3: Confiscator’s Cheating Dilemma 
 
Notes: S: Sultan, C: Confiscator, N: Nature. 
From a rational-choice perspective, we can think of two addi-
tional factors that made bribery difficult. In the first place, if the family 
offers a bribe to the confiscator, there is an informational asymmetry 
between the family and the confiscator. That is, the family takes the 
risk of his being loyal to the sultan. If he turns out to be loyal, he can 
report it to the centre that can make the family face punishment 
harsher than property confiscation. Now suppose that the confiscator 
is not loyal, and he is the one who offers a deal including bribery to the 
family. In theory, the family is better off by accepting it. The question 
remains whether the confiscator would make such an offer. The key 
point is that by accepting a bribe, the confiscator takes the risk of se-
vere punishment mentioned above. Although the likelihood of being 
caught was low, it was never zero.  
Figure 4.3 displays this in a decision tree for the confiscator. 
This is not a game as it does not have strategic interaction. Since the 
value of	𝑤, representing wage offered to the confiscator by the sultan 
for his service, was usually consistent with the value of wealth, espe-
cially as it increased with the size of wealth, it is not necessary to con-
sider 𝑊 part of the confiscator’s payoff. His payoff from being honest is 
equal to	𝑤. If he ends up cheating, it is Nature that plays the next move 
to determine if he will be caught or not. Suppose that he will be caught 
with a probability of 10 per cent and not caught with a probability of 
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90 per cent. In the case that he gets caught, he pays for cheating per-
haps with his life. If so, his payoff from cheating should be a very high 
negative value.269 If he does not get caught, the value of bribed money 
should be added to his payoff, which would then be	𝑤 + 𝑏. If we intui-
tively solve this decision tree, we find that cheating is not rational if 
the probability of being caught is greater than zero. Since it is almost 
impossible to think of a case in which	𝑝 = 0, the confiscator as a ra-
tional individual would typically opt not to cheat, getting a payoff of	𝑤. 
To add some numbers, assume that the real value of wealth is 10,000 
kuruş. The value of 𝑤 would then be 1,000. He agrees with the family 
to receive a bribe of 2,000 kuruş, however, in exchange for underre-
porting the value, say, on 5,000 from which the family will earn 3,000 
while the sultan will lose 5,000. In this situation, the confiscator’s pay-
off from uncaught cheating would be 7,000*0.9=6,300, while it would 
be -100,000 (p)*0.1=-10,000 from caught cheating. If he stays loyal, he 
will get 1,000. Because he does not have any control over the move of 
Nature, loyalty will make him better off.  
It should be restated that although the surviving sources rarely 
point to the existence of bribery, some cases that seemingly ended with 
consent were possible cases of unnoticed bribing from which the sul-
tan’s payoff was	𝑊f − 𝑎 − 𝑡. In any case, the above logic lends support 
to the behavioural constraints of bribing.  
Next consider another scenario of principal-agent relations. That 
is, if we go to the very beginning of the confiscation process, the sultan 
was not informed about a potential case of confiscation by the local 
administrators. Note that unless a complaint reported this, we would 
never know whether something like this occurred. From a behavioural 
perspective, however, the local administrator could do so either be-
cause he was scared off by the family or because he made a deal with 
                                         
269	The	archival	 sources	are	very	clear	 in	 this.	Severity	of	punishment	 in	 the	case	of	what	 they	call	
‘action	against	the	consent	of	the	sultan’	which	refers	to	cheating,	is	always	emphasised	in	mission	
documents	given	to	the	confiscator.	Encouragements	and	sometimes	explicit	statements	to	shirking	
also	show	its	existence	among	the	confiscators.	C.ML	548/22549	(2	July	1806	(15	Rebiülahir	1221)).		
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the family as well. In this case, the local administrator takes a similar 
risk as the confiscator that he would be better off by loyally informing 
the sultan. Once he decides to inform, he is a loyal agent and will have 
no further move to play in the game. So, his subsequent action to seal 
the property to prevent hoarding reflects not his, but rather the sul-
tan’s, incentive structure. Sealing pays off higher than not sealing 
since the family would have a chance to hide unsealed property, which 
they would most likely do. This indeed occurred as depicted in the doc-
uments ordering the confiscator to make a more detailed search to re-
veal hoarded property. Sealing, however, must have made hoarding 
marginal. Now that we have examined two types of principal-agent 
problems, showing that there was little room for cheating because of 
the high costs associated with it, we can proceed to explain a specific 
form of enforcement. 
4.4 Outsourcing	of	the	Confiscation	Process	
Another observation from the sources of müsadere is that the 
sultans occasionally farmed out the enforcement process to a contrac-
tor, typically one of the rivals of the victim’s family. Outsourcing was a 
new practice that arguably emerged in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. This is quite striking for our purposes mainly because of the 
terms of such contracts. Note that these were not legal but rather un-
written contracts.270 Their terms differed but generally third parties of-
fered to pay cash value to buy the rights of confiscation. On occasion, 
they were also granted offices and privileges held by the deceased or 
the punished. They hired fiscal experts to manage the complex finan-
cial procedures that were involved in these confiscations.  
                                         
270	This	institution	of	delegating	confiscating	rights	to	third	parties	was	first	noticed	by	Ali	Yaycıoğlu	in	
his	recent	work	on	provincial	elites	in	the	long-eighteenth	century.	Yaycıoğlu,	Partners	of	the	Empire,	
108-109.	
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What were the respective costs and benefits of outsourcing to 
these actors? For the contractor, offering to buy the rights of confisca-
tion required possession of ready cash. The wealth portfolio of office-
holders and tax farmers shows that many of them did not have such 
high quantities of money (See: Chapter 6).271 Those who could pay 
these amounts were arguably the wealthiest ones with ready cash. For 
those capable of making a financial offer and of using violence against 
another powerful family, one of the main benefits of this contract, in 
addition to revenue gains, was the ability to consolidate their power 
especially if the individual whose wealth he wished to confiscate was 
operating in the same region because it would have meant elimination 
of one of his competitors. However, the risk he was taking was perhaps 
greater than the risk taken by the government. Like a centrally ap-
pointed confiscator, he could face resistance by the family of the de-
ceased and the amount of wealth might not have been as much as he 
expected. It is important to note that outsourcing typically occurred 
before the sultan sent a confiscator to the locality. Thus, in a way, both 
parties acted based on their respective estimated value of the richness 
of the deceased. 
For the sultan, delegation of confiscation rights to a third party 
could be lucrative depending on some time-specific and spatial factors. 
For a given time and location, he thought that he would be better off 
by outsourcing compared to handling it centrally. Since the infor-
mation on the total sum of the wealth is not available to the ruler at 
this stage of the game, he would act on a rough estimation of it and, 
as in the tax farming, accept a deal offered to him that was potentially 
lower than the estimated value. On the upside, he would avoid sunk 
costs of sending a confiscator and potential costs of transportation and 
fighting (in case the family decides to challenge). Perhaps most im-
portantly, this type of outsourcing contributed to the monopolisation 
of provincial elites whose area of influence becomes bigger when they 
                                         
271	Further	evidence	to	this	is	given	in	chapter	6.		
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eliminate their rivals. The central state would prefer many small dyn-
asties to a few big ones, since monopolisation of resources by big buy-
ers will, in the long run, decrease the share of the sultan in tax reve-
nues. This may explain why a large majority of confiscations was cen-
trally enforced rather than outsourced.  
4.5 Conclusion	
This chapter has discussed the internal dynamics of the practice 
of confiscation with a focus on its actors and processes of enforcement. 
Considering it in the form of several games, it has shown how its ac-
tors, namely the sultan, confiscators, local administrators, and fami-
lies were limited by each other’s respective incentive structure. The 
broad game of confiscation was a game with multiple equilibria as sup-
ported by historical evidence. When it is designed as a game assigning 
revenue-maximising behaviour to the players, there are two types of 
outcomes both beginning with the family’s bribing, though we see rare 
evidence of this bribery. Although this was partly because some bribing 
passed uncaught and thus was not reported to the centre, both offering 
and accepting a bribe was highly risky for the family and the agents. 
Constrained also by political institutions, the players involved in the 
confiscation game acted in a way that led to multiple equilibria. While, 
on one hand, this reflects a certain degree of flexibility from the ruler’s 
perspective, it was also a rational choice given the nature of his rela-
tionship with some targets of confiscation. In some cases, for which 
certain conditions needed to be present, the government outsourced 
the enforcement of confiscation to third parties who were usually com-
peting for the same resources as the targeted individuals. These un-
written contracts were a win-win situation for their parties, namely the 
sultan and the contractor.  
Using game theoretical reasoning, this section focused on the 
process of enforcement that started once the sultan was informed by 
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the local administrator regarding a potential case of confiscation. The 
use of game theory helped to make sense of certain types of behaviour 
that transpired in the game of confiscation. It also helped to explain 
why the confiscation game designed under the revenue-maximisation 
assumption does not lend support to what has happened. I have also 
referred to the impact of principal-agent relations to understand why 
they could not behave in a manner that a short-sighted revenue-max-
imising individual would act. This chapter did not, however, detail one 
important element of the game, which is the role of past conduct and 
bargaining position of the families; that is, how decisions made in the 
pre-confiscation stage influenced the outcome of the confiscation pro-
cess. This stage can be called stage zero. The next chapter delves into 
the relevant sources used to shed light on patrimonial strategies of a 
powerful family based in central Anatolia. In addition to this link with 
the next chapter, the present chapter is also linked with chapter 6 con-
cerning the limits of collective action among the targets of confiscation, 
by arguing that the ability of the families to resist confiscation even at 
the individual level was limited.  
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5 PATRIMONIAL	MANAGEMENT	AS	A	STRATEGY	OF	
CIRCUMVENTING	MÜSADERE:	A	MICROHISTORY	
‘There is a Çapanoğlu behind this’ is an idiom in modern Turk-
ish, referring to suspicious situations with unobservable factors. Few 
people, however, would know its origins, dating back to eighteenth-
century Anatolia. Rumour has it that an inspector tasked with a fraud 
case was warned by a colleague of his as follows: “You are in trouble if 
there is a Çapanoğlu behind this! You better leave it well enough!” It is 
said that the case was immediately closed. There is an intriguing story 
behind the narration, referring to the power enjoyed by a family called 
Çapanoğlus of central Anatolia in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. This chapter is in part a history of the institutional background 
of this warning.  
To place it into the context of the thesis, the chapter examines 
patrimonial management of provincial elites, who were potential tar-
gets of müsadere, as a way of circumventing confiscation. By patrimo-
nial management, I mean certain strategies devised to accumulate cap-
ital out of state-related resources and transmit it through generations 
until their end results were reached. Although it was not always suc-
cessful, greater success in management of provincial dynasties meant 
more monopolisation and a longer life for the dynasties. It can be said 
that these power holders were structured around family organisations 
that were tied not only by kinship but also by profit. This chapter il-
lustrates how the practice of müsadere was also used to redistribute 
wealth from the disloyal elites who failed to play by the rules to the 
loyal elites who faithfully cooperated with the sultan. In doing so, it 
presents just another mechanism explaining why property protection 
was a public rather than private good. Analysing the role of long-term 
strategies in gaining relative immunity from müsadere, this chapter 
looks at the history of a single family that was among the winners in 
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relative terms. Therefore, it contributes to the overall theme of the the-
sis in two main ways. First, it shows how a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship was established and served to the purpose of protection of 
property from the perspective of the targets of müsadere. Second, it is 
complimentary to the last two chapters in terms of explaining previ-
ously abstracted details of agency. 
The present chapter follows a micro-historical approach in terms 
of searching for answers to ‘great historical questions’ through smaller 
objects such as a single event, individual, family or location.272 In doing 
so, it is important to choose a relevant microscopic unit of analysis and 
not to abstract it from its broader institutional and historical con-
text.273 Micro-historians typically work on outliers, once defined by Ed-
uardo Grendi as ‘normal exception’ or ‘exceptional-typical,’ referring to 
the idea that few truly exceptional sources can actually be more useful 
than thousands of stereotype sources in revealing how things worked 
in past.274 To follow such an approach, this chapter uses certain qual-
itative sources such as the correspondence, letters of complaint, impe-
rial edicts, probate records and a travel book. While others have also 
been used in other chapters, a unique travel book written by Scottish 
traveller John M. Kinneir (1782-1830) is worth mentioning.275 His ac-
count is quite telling in terms of social life in the family house and 
includes some insights, although they occasionally seem exaggerated, 
about the family’s capabilities.   
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.1, I present a 
brief history of the family that also explains why it was chosen as the 
                                         
272	Sigurður	G.	Magnússon	and	István	Szíjártó,	What	Is	Microhistory?:	Theory	and	Practice	 (London:	
Routledge,	2013).	
273	In	that	respect,	Emma	Rothschild’s	study	of	the	Johnstone	family	of	eighteenth	century	Scotland	
has	inspired	this	chapter.	The	Inner	Life	of	Empires	is	“a	new	microhistory”	in	its	effort	to	link	a	family’s	
experience	of	making	money	and	using	newly	emerging	economic	opportunities	by	the	use	of	infor-
mation	to	broader	debates	of	mercantilism,	laissez	faire	economics	and	slavery.		
274	 Francesca	 Trivellato,	 "Is	 There	 a	 Future	 for	 Italian	Microhistory	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Global	 History?,"	
California	Italian	Studies	2,	no.	1	(2011).	
275	John	MacDonald	Kinneir,	Journey	through	Asia	Minor,	Armenia	and	Koordistan,	in	the	Years	1813	
and	1814	(London:	John	Murray,	1818).	
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subject of this micro-historical analysis. Section 5.2 looks at the at-
tempts to confiscate the wealth of this family and how the remaining 
members of the family dealt with these confiscations. Section 5.3 ex-
amines the imperial dimension of their sources of bargaining power, 
i.e. their interactions with the central government. Section 5.4 pro-
ceeds to the regional dimension, looking at how they managed the re-
gional politics, namely their interactions with other magnates who were 
their rivals. Section 5.5 reformulates the theory of müsadere consider-
ing the findings of this chapter. Section 5.6 concludes with an attempt 
at evaluating the implications of this micro-history.  
5.1 Why	the	Çapanoğlu	Family:	A	Concise	Historical	Background	
The Çapanoğlu family was the product of a unique historical and 
institutional context. It was one of the most powerful local dynasties or 
‘regional governance regimes’ that rose to political and economic power 
in the eighteenth century.276 Like other provincial families, the 
Çapanoğlu family emerged due to the privatisation of fiscal and politi-
cal resources in the eighteenth century by starting to acquire lesser 
offices in secondary tax farming markets.  
The reasons I have chosen the Çapanoğlu family as the unit of 
analysis are as follows. First, unlike some families that were engaged 
in trade and commercial agriculture, this family directed their eco-
nomic activities extensively on fiscal intermediation. This is not sur-
prising because big farms called çiftliks used for commercial agricul-
ture tended to be situated in such regions as western Anatolia, the 
Balkans and the Black sea coasts that were all proximate to major 
                                         
276	Historical	 sociologist	Karen	Barkey	uses	 the	term	 ‘regional	governance	regimes’	 to	refer	 to	“the	
networks	of	large	patriarchal	families	that	established	themselves	around	one	or	two	leaders;	devel-
oped	their	resources	and	influence	through	multiple	state	and	non-state	activities	and	positions;	ex-
tended	their	networks	to	incorporate	clients,	whether	lesser	notables	or	peasants;	and	both	in	their	
local	rule	and	in	their	understanding	of	their	legitimacy	mimicked	the	ruling	household	of	the	sultan.”	
Barkey,	Empire	of	Difference,	242.			
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trade routes.277 Coasts were also more favourable for international 
trade because of their easy access to markets, while the zone of influ-
ence of the family under study was landlocked during much of its his-
tory. Central Anatolia was not only distant from ports but unfavourable 
to the cultivation of high-value industrial products, such as olives, to-
bacco, and cotton, at the time.278 Although the family extended its zone 
down to Tarsus in the eastern Mediterranean, the family members did 
not seem interested in potential commercial fruits of that region be-
cause of their existing sources of income.279 As evidence will show in 
the next chapter, the business of governance was the most lucrative 
activity even for those who resided in coastal regions and despite the 
high risk of confiscation for those involved. Nonetheless, the reliance 
of the family solely on primary and secondary tax farming makes its 
history particularly promising in terms of property security since the 
fortunes of tax intermediaries were most likely to be confiscated by the 
central government, and this family seems to have circumvented this 
threat relatively successfully.280 Second, as I have stressed in the 
quantitative analysis, the proximity to Istanbul was another determi-
nant of the power and willingness to confiscate for the central govern-
ment. In that aspect as well, the family’s main zone of influence was 
not particularly advantageous.  
Third, the family’s success was significant because it came from 
a modest background. Historical accounts on the early period of the 
family are quite scarce. We only have the epitaph of Ömer Ağa, the first 
known member of the family, who died in 1704. Historians often 
pointed out that he was the chief of a certain Mamalu tribe which was 
                                         
277	Zens,	"Provincial	Powers:	The	Rise	of	Ottoman	Local	Notables	(Ayan)."	
278	F.	Saris,	D.	Hannah,	and	J.W.	Eastwood,	"Spatial	Variability	of	Precipitation	Regimes	over	Turkey,"	
Hydrological	Sciences	Journal	55,	no.	2	(2010).	
279	Barkey,	Empire	of	Difference.	
280	Halil	İnalcık	asserts	that	it	was	only	the	long-distance	merchants	in	Middle	Eastern	societies	that	
‘enjoyed	 [property	 rights]	 conditions,	 allowing	 them	 to	 become	 capitalists.”	 İnalcık,	 "Capital	
Formation."	
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settled by the central state into central Anatolia in 1696 to counterbal-
ance the power of bandits operating in the region.281 Clearly, starting 
from the level of tribal chiefdom was not a special advantage to the 
family. Thus, the family must have built its reputation and accumu-
lated wealth nearly from scratch. Despite these disadvantages, the 
family was one of the long-lasting families, while some lasted a far 
shorter duration. This longevity and humble beginnings is what makes 
the family an exceptional-normal case, which would help us to explain 
the unwritten rules of protection from state confiscation of property.   
Figure 5.1: Genealogy of the Çapanoğlu Family 
 
Source: Reproduced from Mert (1980) 
Since the beginning, the base of the family was in Yozgat. Yozgat 
was a small village when the family settled there, yet it turned into a 
town of considerable size mostly due to the efforts of the Çapanoğlu 
                                         
281	İsmail	Hakkı	Uzunçarşılı,	"Çapanoğulları,"	Belleten	XXXVIII,	no.	150	(1974).	
180 
family.282 Ahmed Paşa (d. 1765) was the son of Ömer Ağa and seems 
to be the one who managed to secure a zone of influence in central 
Anatolia which they were freed from banditry and extortion. In his re-
lations with the government, he built a reputation of trustworthiness 
and loyalty from his service of elimination of bandits and providing the 
government with military assistance and food provisioning. To reward 
such loyal service, he was granted eight official positions between 1728 
and 1765.283 Ahmed’s son Mustafa (d. 1783) maintained family power 
after a three-year interregnum period starting with the death of his 
father.284 If a golden age of the family is determined, it was the times 
of Süleyman (d. 1813) who was the youngest son of Ahmed. Under his 
leadership, the family’s zone of influence reached its greatest extent 
from central Anatolia to some parts of northern and southern Anato-
lia.285 In addition to his own revenue farms in these regions, he man-
aged to establish a large network throughout Anatolia because people 
who worked with him were also granted tax farms. 
The political power of the family was largely curbed after the 
death of Süleyman in 1813. This was part of the greater centralisation 
project of Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839).286 The sultan pursued a decisive, 
but not necessarily violent, policy against the local elites. For the 
Çapanoğlu family, it was quite peaceful as they did not resist the cen-
tralisation. It was arguably a deliberate choice of the sultan to wait 
until the death of Süleyman, who was the most influential member of 
the family. As a result, in 1813, all revenue farms controlled by the 
family were reclaimed by the centre that appointed salaried state offi-
cials to the fiscal and political administration to the family’s zones of 
                                         
282	British	geographer	and	traveller	John	Kinneir,	who	visited	Yozgat	in	1813	and	was	received	by	the	
most	 influential	 family	member,	Süleyman,	wrote	 that	 the	population	of	Yozgat	was	16,000	at	 the	
time.	
283	Barkey,	Empire	of	Difference.	
284	Özcan	Mert,	18.	Ve	19.	Yüzyıllarda	Çapanoğulları	(Ankara:	Kültür	Bakanlığı,	1980).	
285	AE.I.Abdülhamit	1337.	
286	Pamuk,	"Fiscal	Institutions."	
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influence. Perhaps also as a strategic move, the sultan kept the strong-
est member of the family, Mehmed Celaleddin Paşa, away from Yozgat 
by constantly appointing him as governor to cities distant from his 
hometown.287 In a way, he was incorporated into the centralised ad-
ministration. In 1828, he was deposed of the military title of Paşa be-
cause of ‘his incapability and shirking’ and exiled to Tekirdağ in the 
west of Istanbul where he lived until his death in 1848.288 After the 
death of Süleyman, the members of the family other than Celaleddin 
were brought to Istanbul where they were kept under watch by the 
sultan, while some were honoured with lesser titles.289 
Although references are occasionally made to other members of 
the family, the rest of this narrative revolves mainly around the most 
influential three individuals, namely Ahmed, Mustafa and Süleyman 
(See: Figure 5.1). The following section concerns the attempts at con-
fiscating the wealth of the family and how the attempts were largely 
circumvented by the family.   
5.2 Wealth	and	Confiscation	
Did the family face any confiscation, and if so, how did they han-
dle it? The Çapanoğlu family lived at a time of opportunity as well as 
insecurity. Their skilful use of their opportunities to circumvent inse-
curity explains why and how the family managed to keep its power and 
wealth intact for nearly a century. Despite various attempts at confis-
cating the wealth of the family members, the heirs enabled relatively 
successful intergenerational transfer of wealth by conducting negotia-
tions with the central government. These negotiations resulted in ei-
ther no confiscation or in the payment of a certain amount of compen-
sation. As evidence to what they achieved by not facing confiscations, 
John Kinneir, who stayed in Süleyman’s house for four days in 1813, 
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reports that “His wealth in jewels was generally believed to be im-
mense.” He also noticed that “In countries where private property is 
insecure people are naturally inclined to invest their fortunes in dia-
monds and other precious stones, which, on any reverse of fortune, 
may be easily concealed or carried away.”290 
Table 5.1: Items of Ahmed Paşa’s Inheritance Confiscated 
Introductory protocol: 
In accordance with the imperial order to confiscate cash, it is the 
inventory of jewellery, housewares, cereals, and animals of the mur-
dered deputy governor of Bozok (voyvoda), Çaparzade Ahmed Paşa: 
(1) Those properties in his house in Yozgat, and those hidden in var-
ious places sealed with the signatures of Feyzullah Paşa, the gover-
nor of Sivas, and the surrogate judge of Yozgat. 
(2) Those cash and wares that the deceased has taken together with 
him when he escaped, and were returned after his death by his son 
Mustafa Bey and Mustafa’s chamberlain Osman.  
(3) Those cash and wares found in a chest escaped by his wife Ayşe 
Hatun to a village called Perçem and returned after a certain Emin 
reported her. 
(4) Those jewellery and wares belonging to his wife Ayşe, his daughter 
Ayşe and his son Süleyman. 
(5) Those cereals and animals of the deceased found in 118 ware-
houses in Yozgat and various villages.  
Confiscated Assets 
 
 
Big emerald ring 1 
Shield 1 
                                         
290	Kinneir,	Journey.	
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Items to be sent to Is-
tanbul 
Guns and daggers 6 
Silver belt 2 
Two-headed silver 
belt 
4 
Silver stick 6 
Silver flag tail 3 
Silver flag ensign 1 
Silver axe 6 
Tail with silver ball 3 
Turcoman flag with 
silver ball 
1 
Golden dagger with 
one emerald six de-
mantoid stones at its 
top   
2 
Items to be auctioned Horse 27 
 Horse under joint 
ownership 
16 
 Wheat 16,242 
 Barley 1,839 
 Corn 150 
 Chick pea 125 
Source: (Polat 2015) 
The first attempt of confiscation involved the inheritance of Ah-
med after his execution in 1765. Execution for political reasons had 
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often been accompanied by confiscation.291 The cause of his execution 
was a rumour that he was collecting illegitimate taxes, a rumour prob-
ably circulated by his rival Abaza Mehmed Ağa. Abaza Mehmed was 
later tasked with the confiscation of the wealth of Ahmed together with 
another rival of Ahmed, Zaralızade Feyzi Paşa, who was a member of 
the Zaralızade family of the neighbouring city of Sivas.292 Upon Ah-
med’s execution, two main revenue farms held by Ahmed, namely the 
farm of the sub-province of Bozok and of the Mamalu tribe, were taken 
back from the hands of the family. In the meantime, his eldest son 
Mustafa fled to Crimea by taking 45,000 kuruş from the inheritance of 
his father, while his other sons Selim and Süleyman went to Istanbul 
to negotiate their demand that tax farms entitled to their father stay 
with the family.293 The central government, however, sent them back 
to Yozgat on the grounds that their absence from Yozgat was inspiring 
a lack of authority there and even ordered Abaza Mehmed Ağa not to 
let them leave the town again.294 Their demand to get the farms back 
was fulfilled only after a three-year interregnum period. It is under-
stood that the family members tried to conceal some property from the 
confiscators. The governors of the neighbouring cities where Ahmed 
Paşa possessed property and animals were ordered to be further 
searched. However, these orders have remained inconclusive.295 Alt-
hough the initial order was to fully confiscate his wealth, most of his 
property was eventually left to the family members, including his real 
estates. Most importantly, the centre did not touch the tax farms that 
were in possession of Ahmed Paşa’s sons.  
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The items of Ahmed’s wealth registered for confiscation were as 
depicted in table 5.1. This shows that those items ordered to be trans-
ported in kind to Istanbul were munitions. This was typical for many 
other confiscations. Animals and cereals of Ahmed Paşa were asked to 
be sold in an auction to be held in Yozgat. The rest of the inheritance 
mostly remained with the family. Therefore, this confiscation included 
only a small fraction of his assets. In addition, the table does not give 
any sense that Ahmed Paşa was engaged with trade. He does not even 
seem to be interested in moneylending like other local elites. The only 
economic activity other than tax farming with which he was engaged 
was small partnerships in animal husbandry. However, these animals 
were raised most likely for family use only.  
The inheritance of Selim, one of the sons of Ahmed, was also 
initially confiscated in return for his debts to the state. The central 
state, however, preferred to leave it to the heirs of Selim on the condi-
tion that they pay 10,000 kuruş to the treasury.296 Another turning 
point in the family’s history was after the assassination of Mustafa by 
his slaves. At the time of Mustafa’s death, his brother Süleyman was 
in Istanbul. In the meantime, one of the retinues of Mustafa, Gürünlü 
Mustafa Ağa, sent a letter to the capital, requesting that the sub-prov-
ince of Bozok be granted to Mustafa’s fourteen-year-old son, Ali Rıza. 
In his letter, he mentions Çapanoğlu Mustafa as someone who was not 
interested in animal husbandry but possessed big farms. After men-
tioning that his master Mustafa was known for his giving cereals to the 
needy and constructing mosques and bazaars, he stated that if Ali Rıza 
was granted the office, he would serve the imperial centre with as much 
effort and loyalty as his father.297 Despite this request, Süleyman pro-
ceeded by offering a deal to the central government for him to pay 
1,980,000 kuruş in exchange for Mustafa’s inheritance and the deputy 
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tax collectorship of Bozok. Sultan Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-1789) wrote 
of the incident as follows:  
My vizier, we are not in a position to say that there was no prop-
erty of the deceased and agree with his sons and brother on a 
certain amount of compensation. It is said that he owned only 
20,000-30,000 purses [10 million-15 million kuruş]. The reality 
is that this one is not like others who died before. He was a brutal 
oppressor. His subordinates will of course hide the property un-
less they were ordered to unearth.298  
Table 5.2: Confiscation Attempts for the Çapanoğlu Family 
Name Year Justification Outcome 
Çapanoğlu Ah-
med Paşa 
1765 Crime Partial Confisca-
tion 
Çapanoğlu 
Selim Bey 
1771 Indebtedness Inheritance Tax 
Çapanoğlu Mus-
tafa Bey 
1781 Enrichment by 
Royal Grant 
Inheritance Tax 
Abdullah 1801 Affluence (Need of 
Revenue in Treas-
ury) 
Full Confiscation 
İlbaşı Ahmed 1813 - Inheritance Tax 
Çapanoğlu 
Süleyman Bey 
1813 Enrichment by 
Royal Grant 
Inheritance Tax 
Çapanoğlu Ha-
fize Hanım 
1825 - Full Confiscation 
Source: See bibliography for data sources. 
Nevertheless, Süleyman’s offer was accepted after some delay due to 
the fiscal distress at the time. From this time to his death in 1813, 
                                         
298	AE.I.Abdülhamid	1337.	
187 
Süleyman never again lost his control over the resources of the region. 
The same confiscation process also applied to his wealth in 1813. This 
time, Süleyman’s son Celaleddin Paşa pledged to pay 500,000 kuruş 
to the treasury in three instalments. This offer was accepted, while all 
the personal estates, except 80 real estates in Amasya on the north of 
Bozok, stayed in the hands of the family.299 As mentioned above, the 
demands of the sons of Süleyman regarding the tax farms of their fa-
ther became inconclusive due to the ongoing centralisation efforts.  
The evidence presented in table 5.2 suggests that the family 
faced a total of seven confiscation attempts at the zenith of its power. 
Only two of these attempts ended with full confiscation and these two 
cases concerned people in the close network of the family, which means 
that the wealth of major figures was not fully confiscated. This leads to 
the argument that the Çapanoğlu family seemed to be relatively suc-
cessful in circumventing the attempts of the centre to confiscate their 
wealth. The question arising from this narrative is what exactly put the 
Çapanoğlu family in such a position that the government did not seem 
willing or able to fully confiscate their wealth. The next three sections 
seek to answer this question.  
5.3 Managing	‘the	Imperial’:	Relations	with	the	Centre	
The sources of bargaining power of the Çapanoğlu family rested 
on a mutual dependence they established with the central government, 
the local know-how of the family and its successful management of 
intra-elite competition. This section starts by clarifying how they man-
aged their relations with the centre. A document dated to 1786 is quite 
telling in this respect. Upon the allegations that Süleyman was op-
pressing the people under him, the sultan asked the opinion of the 
Grand Vizier how to proceed. While for many others, this could result 
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in execution and confiscation, the first part of the response of the Vizier 
was as follows:  
It cannot be said that what is being rumoured about the 
Çapanoğlu is wrong. But at this time if there is a need of 5,000 
and 10,000 soldiers, we have only Çapanoğlus from the dynas-
ties that can send. They were the ones who sent 1,000 soldiers 
to Egypt and this time 2,000 to the army of Ismail. If they are 
needed again, they would do the same.300 
The words of the vizier refer to a type of reciprocity based on the mili-
tary support in exchange for non-confiscation. The second part of the 
vizier’s answer emphasises the irreplaceability of the family’s know-
how by a centrally appointed official: ‘If a Paşa is appointed to replace 
him, his influence will not be like that of the Çapanoğlu because of 
inexperience. That is because he knows the temperament of people. 
For now, we shall try to warn him by sending a letter.’ The sultan re-
sponded as follows: “My vizier, it is understood that his execution is 
not timely. There should be a more appropriate time for it.”301  
As the document clearly stated, one source of bargaining power 
for the family was its ability to man the army. When asked, their local 
know-how and networks with townsmen made them capable of recruit-
ing thousands of armed men to join the army. Kinneir writes this as 
such: ‘…and it is said that he could master, in the course of a month 
or six weeks, an army of forty thousand men.’302 Depending on the 
nature of the external threat, they were ordered to either lead their 
troops in person or appoint a commander from their men to lead. The 
family often passed these missions to the notables of towns in their 
region of influence and their close retinues. These lesser elites were 
part of the network of the family in their role as beneficiaries of part of 
the pie of the family’s revenue. When the family pleased the centre with 
                                         
300	Uzunçarşılı,	"Çapanoğulları."	
301	HAT	25642.	
302	Kinneir,	Journey.	
189 
timely dispatch of soldiers, its members were granted further titles and 
sources of revenue.303 
It is important to note, however, that at least in several occa-
sions, the family did not abstain from overlooking the demands of the 
sultan. For example, in 1777, Mustafa did not obey the imperial order 
to go to Baghdad with the requested number of men (2,000) to join a 
campaign against Iran; instead, he eventually sent only 1,000 men led 
by a commander as opposed to leading the men personally as or-
dered.304 This was a reaction to the government’s appointment of his 
rival, Canikli Ali Paşa, as the governor of Sivas –a city neighbouring 
Yozgat from the east. Because the Caniklizade family had already been 
in control of the northern borders of the zone of the Çapanoğlus, this 
appointment would have meant that the Çapanoğlus were contained 
by their rival family from both north and east. Although the central 
government was not happy with Mustafa’s act, he was still granted the 
tax collectorship of Kırşehir (muhassıl).305 Such disloyalties seem to 
have been tolerated if they were exceptional as in the history of the 
Çapanoğlus.  
Moreover, the family members provisioned the army as well as 
the capital or functioned as requisition agents.306 From the mid-eight-
eenth century to the 1820s, the family was frequently asked to dis-
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patch such products as grain, pack animals, sheep, meat and potas-
sium nitrate.307 Some demands were to purchase these goods from 
their territories and transport the goods to Istanbul. Purchasing could 
be difficult, as the price paid to the producers by the government was 
lower than the market price.308 For instance, in 1803, Konya’s potas-
sium nitrate producers, who had been demanding a price increase, 
sold Süleyman low-quality products as a way of protest.309 In another 
instance, Çapanoğlu Osman sent a letter to the centre, explaining the 
problems he was having in requisition of potassium nitrate. He stated 
that since the centre was not sending a significant amount of money 
at once and doing so only in small pieces, the producers of central 
Anatolia were either producing low-quality potassium nitrate or not 
producing at all as they did not have enough to buy raw materials and 
pay their employers.310 As the centre expected of them, however, the 
family responded affirmatively to a majority of these demands. There-
fore, in 1806, Selim III (r. 1789-1808) wrote to Çapanoğlu Süleyman 
with regards to grain and meat provisioning in the middle of a war with 
Russia as follows: 
…You are my astute and loyal servant. So, you shall consider my 
sorrow and send immediately as much provisions and cereal as 
you can to Istanbul. It is because enemies surround us all at this 
time. May God crush the enemies of religion and state! You are 
my only consolation in Anatolia…311 
In fact, that Süleyman was his only consolation in Anatolia was a word 
of encouragement because other families such as the Karaosmanoğlus 
of western and the Caniklizades of northern Anatolia were asked to do 
the same. 
The family’s coercive power was also used in elimination of ban-
dits. Banditry was one of the challenges facing the state authority at 
                                         
307	Potassium	nitrate	is	one	of	the	raw	materials	of	gunpowder.		
308	Seven	Ağır,	"The	Evolution	of	Grain	Policy	Beyond	Europe:	Ottoman	Grain	Administration	 in	the	
Late	Eighteenth	Century,"	Journal	of	Interdisciplinary	History	43,	no.	4	(2013).	
309	HAT	4513.		
310	C.AS	238/10047	(8	July	1802	(7	Rebiülevvel	1217)).	
311	Uzunçarşılı,	"Çapanoğulları."	
191 
the time. Comprised of nomads and unemployed mercenaries, bandits 
were plundering property of rural populations and passing merchants, 
thereby damaging the tax base. Therefore, preventing the bandits from 
plunder was a win-win game for the family and the government as both 
were beneficiaries of state resources. The family skilfully suppressed 
many banditry activities in the region, which always pleased the centre 
that was busy to deal with generally small-scale domestic hassles. The 
motivation of the family to take such initiatives is explained well by an 
incident from 1766. As mentioned above, upon the assassination of 
Ahmed, Mustafa had fled to Crimea. However, he was later captured 
and jailed by Abaza Mehmed Ağa who had played the major role in the 
assassination and confiscation of the wealth of his father. Somehow 
breaking out of prison, Mustafa lived with the Mamalu and Köçeklü 
nomads for a while. While among the nomads, he noticed an oppor-
tunity of wiping out a bandit group which was damaging the popula-
tion through plunder and murder. With the troops that he gathered 
from the nomads, Mustafa attacked the bandits in 1766, killing almost 
800 of them. He then sent some of the severed heads to the capital as 
proof of his achievement.312 As a reward for his service of distinction, 
the government awarded him the tax farm of Mamalu nomads to be 
shared with his brother Süleyman, while also awarding him the hon-
orary title of Kapıcıbaşı.313 The central government particularly trusted 
Süleyman with such initiatives. In 1796, when a man named Müftü 
Abdülhalim was oppressing the populace in the Ayaş district of Ankara 
with the claim of ayanhood, Mustafa was ordered to go negotiate with 
him; and if the rebel attempted to fight or escape, to do whatever was 
necessary.314 
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The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was a period of 
reforms. The decisive defeats by the Russians in the wars of 1768-1774 
and 1787-1792 had particularly revealed the necessity of military re-
forms. Selim III introduced a series of reforms known as Nizam-ı Cedid 
(New Order). The reforms included the establishment of a new army 
abiding by Western standards and a treasury to finance the costs of 
the army. The establishment of the new system in the provinces re-
quired the help of the local elites. Some elites were among the groups 
of opposition because they thought that the reforms would put their 
rights and concessions at stake.315 However, interestingly, some in-
cluding the Çapanoğlu family backed the reforms from the beginning, 
not feeling the same fear as other families.316 Pro-reform families vol-
unteered to supply men and money to the new army in Istanbul and 
invited military experts to train their own men to bring the new regime 
into their own zones of influence. This factional setting culminated in 
anti-reform factions which instigated a coup that toppled Selim III from 
his throne in 1808. The new sultan was enthroned with a contra-coup 
by one of the local notables, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, who agreed to or-
ganise an assembly to which he invited representatives from major pro-
vincial dynasties. Here, the Deed of Agreement was signed to guarantee 
property rights protection on the sultan’s side and the continuation of 
support for reforms on the side of elites. Süleyman was one of the sign-
ees of the deed. He went to Istanbul with his troops just in case of a 
retaliatory event.317  
Even more important was that Süleyman improved his reputa-
tion in the eyes of the central government by supporting reforms. Kadı 
Abdurrahman Paşa, one of the architects of the New Order, was as-
signed the governorship of Konya where he was going to be responsible 
for establishing the new regime. His entry to the city, however, was 
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prevented by anti-reform factions in Konya in 1804. The governor had 
to wait for four months outside the city. The centre then asked Süley-
man for his help to allow the governor settle in the city. Taking on this 
task, he sent a representative to Konya to negotiate with the anti-re-
formists. His arbitration proved successful after the deed of the gover-
nor to the people of Konya, stating that they would not be harmed by 
his reform works. The government thanked Süleyman for protecting 
‘the honour of both Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa and the sultanate,’ while 
rewarding him the rights of tax collection of Amasya on the condition 
of instituting the New Order there.318 In addition, shortly after 1805, 
Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa, the son of Süleyman, was appointed as the 
governor of Sivas.  
Managing the relations with the imperial centre was an im-
portant part of the patrimonial management of the family. The family 
mostly preferred loyalty in its relations with the sultan, but loyalty was 
given in exchange for obtaining state resources and relative protection 
from confiscation by the sultan. The imperial dimension was not the 
only aspect of patrimonial management, however. The next section 
deals with the management of the ‘local’ dimension of their patrimony.    
5.4 Managing	‘the	Local’:	Networks	and	Intra-Familial	Competition	
In economic terms, we can think of these regional governance 
regimes as organisations that linked the interests of family members 
and subordinates. They were organisations that enabled their mem-
bers to extract monopoly rents. With subordinates and lesser elites, 
they established a patron-client relationship tied by profit. The rela-
tionships with other families, however, were inherently dissonant. 
Other families were their competitors in monopoly rents. This section 
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discusses the role of networks and competition in patrimonial manage-
ment of the elites. 
It is necessary to clarify that the concept of family refers to an 
entity broader than people tied by kinship. The size of the family by 
affinity would not have been enough to manage the interests of these 
organisations effectively. The sources mention many individuals who 
were economically tied to the family. Among these were the retinues of 
the family, who generally used the family title, as well as lesser elites 
in the region.319 For example, tax farming contracts make it clear that 
people in the family network were also bidding in auctions. An esham 
contract from 1808 is stimulating in this respect.320 In that year, the 
tax farm of İzmir and its surrounding areas was decided to be divided 
into 32 shares, each of which was valued to yield 2,000 kuruş per year. 
Half of a share was sold in an auction to Şerife Nimetullah Hanım, who 
was the wife of the assistant of the representative of the Çapanoğlu 
family in Istanbul, for 6,000 kuruş.321 Thus, even someone who was 
linked with the family so indirectly could afford to pay a reasonable 
amount of money for a share of a tax farm in western Anatolia. It also 
demonstrates that major families such as the Çapanoğlu family had a 
representative in Istanbul to negotiate the rights of the family with the 
centre. Similarly, one of Süleyman’s men purchased a share from the 
customs tax farm of Istanbul.322 Although the core zone of influence of 
the family was central Anatolia, their network extended far beyond that 
region. 
The functionaries of the family were also granted offices in the 
fiscal system. When a certain Alaeddin Paşa was granted the tax farm 
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of Kırşehir, a city neighbouring Yozgat, İsmail Ağa from the personnel 
of Süleyman was appointed as the deputy tax collector.323 A striking 
example of the monopoly power also relates to the network of the fam-
ily. When the tax collector of Kayseri, a city also neighbouring Yozgat 
from the southeast, was unable to pay his instalments on time, he was 
dismissed from the office. The newly appointed tax collector was one of 
the men of Süleyman, Ömer Ağa.324 This demonstrates that once the 
families reached a certain level of economic power, their power to ex-
tend their zones of influence could increase exponentially. Once their 
rivals died or were dismissed for any reason, the family members and 
retinues were ready to replace them.325 
For successful patrimonial management, the local elites had to 
survive through the competition with their rivals over the rents.326 Co-
operation between them, or generally fiscal entrepreneurs, would have 
put them in a better position against confiscation by the sultan. How-
ever, because of the reasons discussed in the next chapter, the out-
come was intra-elite competition rather than cooperation. As comple-
mentary to the argument of Balla and Johnson regarding the inability 
of tax farmers to act collectively, I show here the nature of intra-elite 
relations that could be quite dissonant when their material interests 
clashed.327 Although the local dynasties had their own zones of influ-
ence, the resources lying at the intersection of these core zones were 
disputed and constantly shifting between the families. The central gov-
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ernment occasionally intervened in these conflicts either directly or in-
directly by using the threat of confiscation which in a way, fostered 
loyalty and explicitly showed the government’s stance. 
One of the most well-known inter-family clashes occurred be-
tween the Çapanoğlu and Caniklizade families. The zone of the Cani-
klizades was the Black Sea region in northern Anatolia. To reward his 
distinctive service in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, Canikli Ali 
Paşa, the prime figure of the Caniklizades, was assigned the rights of 
tax collection of Amasya in 1772. After the governorship of Sivas, which 
was also one of the disputed areas between the two families, was given 
to Canikli Ali Paşa as well, Mustafa protested these grants by refusing 
to dispatch the requested number of soldiers to Baghdad for the war 
against Iran. Canikli Ali Paşa was then appointed as the commander 
of a campaign to Crimea that had been lost to Russia during the war.328 
This appointment came with many offices awarded to his family to fi-
nance his expenditures during the campaign.329 Upon these develop-
ments, Mustafa started overlooking the imperial orders such as provi-
sioning of camels to be used for transportation of grains from Sivas to 
Crimea with various pretexts. He even went beyond this by preventing 
the dispatch of soldiers and military aids from his own region.330 
Although this was a risky action, the public opinion created by 
the fiasco of Ali Paşa in the campaign served the purpose of Mustafa. 
This was possibly Mustafa’s expectation from the beginning. As part of 
this atmosphere, the people of Amasya sent a public petition to the 
imperial centre, complaining about the outright confiscation of their 
property by Mikdat Ahmed Paşa, the son of Ali Paşa. The centre then 
sent a letter to Ali Paşa to preclude his son from such acts. When Ali 
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18	years	old),	the	tax	farm	of	the	sub-province	of	Çorum	(Mehmed	Bey	–the	nephew	of	Ali	Paşa).	In	
the	meantime,	Ali	Paşa’s	elder	son	Battal	Hüseyin	was	awarded	with	the	honorary	title	of	Kapıcıbaşı	
(Chief	Gatemen	of	Imperial	Abode).	Mert,	18.	Ve	19.	Yüzyıllarda	Çapanoğulları.	
330	Ibid.	
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Paşa remained silent, Mustafa intervened by sending a word to Ali Paşa 
warning him to obey the order. Getting angry for having been warned 
by a lower-rank person (Canikli Ali held the title of Paşa), Ali Paşa at-
tacked the territories under the Çapanoğlu control. Mustafa’s counter-
attack, however, proved successful, defeating the troops of the Cani-
klizades in 1779. Ali Paşa then wrote a letter to Istanbul, asking for the 
punishment of Mustafa with the mention of his flaws and even his be-
trayal in the provisioning of grain and camels during Ali Paşa’s own 
Crimean campaign. When his endeavour remained inconclusive, he 
burnt his bridges by saying first: ‘Either you execute him, or I will re-
move him,’ and then, ‘…hereafter I have no business with the state. I 
do whatever I want and ruin many lands.’331 This statement was an 
explicit rebellion against the state. Therefore, Canikli Ali Paşa was de-
clared an outlaw and dismissed of the title of vizier. In political termi-
nology of the Ottoman Empire, the consequence of rebellion against 
the state was capital punishment and confiscation of wealth. The gov-
ernment delegated the process of punishment to Mustafa, while send-
ing numerous orders to local notables and administrators in the region 
to help him. After losing two battles against Mustafa, Caniklizade Ali 
fled to Crimea. In the meantime, the wealth of the Caniklizade family 
was confiscated, which shook the family.332 Although Ali Paşa was later 
pardoned, the disloyal attitude of the Caniklizades put them in a worse 
position in comparison to their rivals. In contrast, the Çapanoğlus were 
never at odds with the centre to such an extent.  
The role played by the Çapanoğlu family in the confiscation of 
Canikli Ali Paşa was not uncommon. As confiscations were lengthy and 
costly, they were asked for help many times. This was an opportunity 
for the family, which turned Süleyman into a confiscation specialist.333 
                                         
331	MD	178/37-1,	MD	178/37-2.	
332	Karagöz,	Canikli	Ali	Paşa.	
333	An	episode,	which	does	not	fit	into	the	main	text,	is	striking.	In	1795,	Süleyman	was	asked	to	help	
the	confiscator	commissioned	with	the	confiscation	of	a	certain	Mühürdar	İsmail	of	Bozok	‘who	was	
198 
He was ordered at least ten times to confiscate, or to help someone else 
to confiscate, the fortunes of his rivals or potential rivals. For instance, 
Hacı İbrahim Paşa, who was the possessor of tax farms of Niğde and 
Kayseri, lying on the south of the base of the Çapanoğlu family, was 
sentenced to death in 1793 for illegitimate tax collection. The centre 
delegated the task of execution and confiscation of Hacı İbrahim Paşa 
to Süleyman. This was a difficult task but a great opportunity for 
Süleyman, who apparently had plans to extend his power to the south 
since the powerful Caniklizades had already blocked his potential move 
towards the north. He eventually chased and managed to catch his 
target in a village in upper Sivas (hundreds of kilometres away from 
the family base). He then prepared an inventory for İbrahim Paşa’s in-
heritance and gave İbrahim’s properties to the commissioned confisca-
tor, who then auctioned them. He also imprisoned three of İbrahim 
Paşa’s men. The wealth of Ömer Ağa, İbrahim Paşa’s steward, was later 
confiscated also for making his wealth out of illegal transactions. He 
promptly benefited from the success of this mission in the form of tax 
farms of Niğde and Kayseri, and perhaps even more, and which opened 
for him the southern corridor to the eastern Mediterranean cities of 
Adana and Tarsus.334 
The second round of the conflict started when Süleyman was 
appointed as the governor of Sivas because of his support for the sul-
tan’s reforms. Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, the son of Canikli Ali Paşa, who 
was the governor of Trabzon in northeast Anatolia in 1804, came to 
Canik, the base of the Caniklizade family, and started recruiting men 
with the aim of attacking the Çapanoğlus.335 The central government, 
not wanting a new hassle back in Anatolia while spending its energy in 
                                         
famous	with	his	richness.’	This	was,	of	course,	no	surprise.	But	the	beginning	sentences	of	the	docu-
ment	show	that	the	person	was	actually	murdered	by	Süleyman	‘due	to	his	greed	for	Ismail’s	wealth.’	
The	document	does	also	warn	Süleyman	for	paying	extra	attention	to	the	issues	of	searching	and	pre-
vention	of	hiding.	Yet	it	does	not	say	anything	about	some	punishment	that	could	apply	to	Süleyman	
himself.	C.ADL	25/1528	(2	November	1785	(29	Zilhicce	1199)).		
334	C.ADL	8/521,	C.ML	14191.	
335	HAT	7535.	
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the Balkans addressed a Serbian uprising and Dağlı rebellion, took the 
province of Amasya back from Süleyman to appease Tayyar Mahmud 
Paşa and put a centrally appointed official in charge.336 Still not satis-
fied, Tayyar Mahmud Paşa occupied the cities of Tokat and Zile which 
had been under the control of the Çapanoğlus, declaring that he would 
abolish İrad-ı Cedid, the financial source of the New Order. As with 
Tayyar Mahmud Paşa’s father, the government declared him the out-
law, which dictated capital punishment and confiscation. This task 
was given to the governor of Erzurum, Yusuf Ziya Paşa, and Süleyman 
was ordered to help him. Soon after Tayyar Mahmud Paşa failed in his 
attempt to be pardoned, his troops were defeated by the government 
troops. Upon successfully banishing the ‘outlaw,’ Yusuf Ziya Paşa was 
awarded the governorship of Trabzon, which had been formerly filled 
by Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, as well as the tax farms of the sub-provinces 
of Canik and Şarkıkarahisar. Süleyman’s reward was taking Amasya 
back.337 
Süleyman did not want to wait too long to find an opportunity to 
achieve his ultimate aim to capture the lands of the Caniklizade family. 
The rebellion by anti-reform factions in the Balkans in 1806 spread 
soon after into northern Anatolia. Taking advantage of this, Süleyman 
sent a letter to Istanbul, stating that the people of cities under the ad-
ministration of Yusuf Ziya Paşa, his former collaborator, were not 
happy with him. This time, Süleyman proposed that if these places 
were given to the administration of a centrally appointed tax collector, 
he would happily establish the New Order there.338 This proposal was 
not accepted by the government. Nevertheless, it is quite telling about 
the intertwining of the ‘regional’ and the ‘imperial’ in the lives of the 
Çapanoğlus. As usual, the rejection of his proposal did not change 
Süleyman’s loyalty to the sultanate. He had already obtained one of 
the lion’s shares from the opportunities created by the reforms. In 1209 
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of the hegira calendar (1794-1795), he appeared as one of the seven 
major tax farmers, and held more than 3,000 tax farms out of 6,341 
by the İrad-ı Cedid treasury, making him the largest tax farmer of the 
time.339 
This section has shown that the ‘imperial’ dimension of patrimo-
nial management of the Çapanoğlu family helped the family to increase 
its monopolisation of the local resources. Given the institutional set-
ting of resource allocation, intra-elite conflict was an inevitable out-
come while confiscation was an important part of it. The Çapanoğlu 
family was one of those families that managed these processes rela-
tively successfully. Losers, on the other hand, were confiscated and 
severed from state resources at least temporarily.  
5.5 Incorporating	Politics	into	the	Model	
How does this narrative change the game played by revenue-
maximising players presented in the previous chapter? In the first 
place, it makes clear that politics and rent-seeking explain why the 
families were largely willing to accept confiscation of their wealth and 
why it was a rational strategy to negotiate for both the sultan and the 
families. The degree of success in patrimonial management strategies 
was an important determinant of the confiscation policy of the sultan.  
The underlying logic behind the politics of müsadere was that 
the targets of confiscation were beneficiaries of state resources, which 
were allocated mostly based on favouritism.340 It is true that confisca-
tion was sometimes a form of punishment, say, after military failure of 
                                         
339	Cezar,	Osmanlı	Maliyesinde	Bunalım.	
340	A	 letter	of	 thanks	and	 request	 sent	by	 the	head	of	 the	notable	of	Thessaloniki,	 Yusuf,	provides	
additional	support	to	this	claim.	In	this	letter,	he	thanks	the	sultan	for	leaving	his	father’s	inheritance	
to	the	members	of	the	family	for	some	200,000	kuruş	and	bestowing	his	 father’s	offices	to	him	by	
ordering	the	newly	appointed	governor	of	Thessaloniki	not	to	intervene	with	his	tax	farms.	He	requests	
some	payment	for	a	certain	mission	given	to	him	and	oaths	that	his	wealth	if	summed	‘from	needle	to	
threat’	would	not	be	enough	to	cover	their	expenses.	Yusuf	then	apologises	for	his	apparently	disloyal	
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high-rank officials. An exception could be the case of rebellion against 
the political authority of the Ottoman dynasty. Although, as it will be 
discussed later in the study, there was a macro-historical obstacle to 
their power to resist, I want to emphasise the expectation that remain-
ing loyal would have paid off more than what was lost in the confisca-
tion. Put formally, by consenting the families sacrificed 𝑊 revenue at a 
time 𝑡 for a certain 𝑋 > 𝑊 revenue at time	𝑡 + 1.341 While this increased 
the price of resistance, as shown in the quantitative analysis, the fam-
ilies with high relative bargaining power managed to negotiate with the 
sultan on payment of inheritance tax.  
Bargaining power also partly explains the sultan’s decision to 
offer a deal to the family in the first stage. The other part of the rea-
soning is that of external factors such as war and distance. The kind 
of power we refer to here is the distribution of bargaining power be-
tween the sultan and the targeted family; that is, the ability to exert 
influence on each other’s decisions. Ceteris paribus, it could be rational 
for the sultan to keep the family in the game by not fully confiscating 
their wealth for the following reasons. First, the family could be the 
only family with sufficient economic power to buy fiscal contracts in 
their region of influence. The Çapanoğlu family is a good example of 
such monopoly power. Importantly, as this power increased over time 
with the addition of new areas, it was becoming even more difficult to 
                                         
actions	during	his	youth	and	promises	not	to	stray	again	from	the	path	of	loyalty.	This	letter	was	taken	
by	one	of	his	men	to	the	capital	and	 included	some	1,000	kuruş,	which	was	the	first	 instalment	of	
inheritance	tax.	C.ML	300/12183	(15	August	1813	(17	Şaban	1228).	
341	One	of	the	typical	examples	of	this	is	as	follows.	In	the	document	through	which	I	present	a	trans-
literation	here,	the	son	of	Seyyid	Ömer	Paşa,	the	former	governor	of	Maraş	offers	to	pay	some	100,000	
kuruş	in	exchange	for	his	father’s	inheritance	and	offices.	‘From	the	first	of	the	month	of	Muharrem	
of	1211	to	one	year	later,	the	inheritance	of	my	father,	the	former	governor	of	Maraş,	was	registered	
for	confiscation.	In	exchange	for	payment	of	100,000	kuruş	to	the	treasury	in	three	instalments,	my	
father’s	inheritance,	the	governorship	of	Maraş	with	the	honorary	title	of	mirmiran,	was	given	to	me.	
I	hereby	declare	that	33,333	kuruş	will	be	paid	when	the	order	reaches	me,	with	the	rest	to	be	paid	in	
two	instalments	in	two	and	six	months.’	There	is	another	interesting	letter	affixed	with	the	same	set	
of	documents.	In	that	one,	the	person	who	wrote	it,	probably	an	influential	person,	states	that	Ahmed	
Duran	Bey,	the	son	of	Seyyid	Ömer	Paşa,	is	loyal	to	the	sultan’s	persona	and	if	the	province	was	be-
stowed	upon	him,	he	will	have	no	difficulty	paying	the	amount	he	promised	to	pay.	C.ML	505/20531	
(5	July	1796	(20	Zilhicce	1210)).	
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eliminate them. Second, the family could have an integral power net-
work, again as in the case of the Çapanoğlu family. Third, the family 
could have a local know-how that was absent from their competitors 
as mentioned by the sultan regarding the family under study. Finally, 
the family could be so loyally serving the purposes of the central gov-
ernment that a one-time gain from confiscation could not replace the 
family’s service. Under these conditions, it would be too costly for the 
sultan to cut this relationship or weaken their power as long as they 
continued to serve these functions and their functions were needed by 
the central government.  
In contrast, the sultan might view the family negatively for vari-
ous reasons such as potential disloyalty or a poor reputation in the 
eyes of the state, and thus their elimination would make him better off. 
In that case, he would be extra-motivated to confiscate their wealth. 
This is what exactly happened in the case of the Caniklizade family 
whose wealth was confiscated and whose benefits from the system 
were temporarily cut. This leads to the argument that we should add 
to the game of confiscation a political payoff of the sultan and the fam-
ily. On the side of the sultan, bargaining power of the family mattered 
in the decision to confiscate, while on the family’s side resistance was 
not necessarily a good strategy against the sultan. In the next chapter, 
I will give more details on the lack of their capacity to resist but this 
time from the perspective of the lack of collective action.  
This broader and reformulated theory of the müsadere can be 
best understood within the conceptual framework of Violence and So-
cial Orders.342 North, Wallis and Weingast formulated this framework 
to understand political and economic development of societies. They 
identified two types of states: natural states and open-access states. 
                                         
342	 Douglass	 C.	 North,	 John	 Joseph	 Wallis,	 and	 Barry	 R.	 Weingast,	 Violence	 and	 Social	 Orders:	 A	
Conceptual	Framework	for	 Interpreting	Recorded	Human	History	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
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Natural states are those in which a dominant coalition of elites monop-
olise rents by limiting access. In natural states, economics is politics, 
meaning that “wielding power within the coalition is the critical ele-
ment in economic success, while the distribution of economic privileges 
is the key to creating incentives for stable relations within the coali-
tion.” They continue by arguing that “resources can be gained by mili-
tary success, and within the coalition, resources can be gained by po-
litical success.” Their framework captures most of the elements of the 
political economy behind the müsadere practice.  
5.6 Conclusion	
This chapter has shown how successful patrimonial manage-
ment could make provincial dynasties in the eighteenth-century Otto-
man Empire better off in the face of the practice of confiscation. 
Müsadere was a unique and useful tool in the hands of the sultan to 
keep fiscal intermediaries under control and to redistribute resources 
by exacerbating intra-elite competition. These functions of it, however, 
were also subject to the capacity of the state to tax, administer and 
monitor. Patrimonial management was the combination of strategies of 
the elites that increased their chance to accumulate wealth out of state 
resources under the threat of müsadere. Their strategies, as in the case 
of the Çapanoğlu family, could put them in a better position vis-à-vis 
the sultan in terms of not only a higher level of protection of property 
and their lives, but also entitlement of offices and grants. ‘The political’ 
and ‘the economic’ were greatly intertwined in the lives of the 
Çapanoğlus that helped them to make and largely protect their wealth, 
originating from their two-dimensional choices and strategies, namely 
the ‘imperial’ and the ‘regional’ dimensions of patrimonial manage-
ment.   
To conclude, there existed the opportunities of establishing a 
symbiotic relationship with the central government. Lacking sufficient 
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military and fiscal capacity, the government’s exacerbation of intra-
elite competition was arguably a way of political survival and mainte-
nance of social and political order during a period of transition. The 
willingness of the local elites to win the sultan’s favour by fighting the 
bandits, for example, made not only themselves but also the local pop-
ulation and the government better off. In addition, rather than clashing 
with any local trouble-makers, the central government used the tool of 
müsadere to let the favoured eliminate the others, thereby increasing 
the life of the favoured and perhaps succeeding during a period of crisis 
in this way.   
In a broader framework, this story contributes to the global his-
tory of economic and political management of aristocracies and elites 
as well as rent-seeking.343 Unlike in Europe where aristocracy was re-
garded as a parasitic class or with little interest in growth-enhancing 
investments, there was no aristocracy of that manner in the Ottoman 
Empire. One of the reasons persistently raised in the existing literature 
was the existence of constant confiscations of property of any groups 
who were likely to appear as aristocracy. This chapter examined the 
group that came closest to the concept of aristocracy during the whole 
of Ottoman history. Provincial elites have not enjoyed strong hereditary 
rights on their property. Fragility of their wealth structured their rela-
tions with the state in a different way. Like European aristocracies, 
however, they focused their attention on extracting monopoly rents 
through offices in the form of a ‘partnership’ as it was called by Ali 
Yaycıoğlu.344 The creation of monopoly positions was not entirely un-
der their control, yet when they reached a certain level of local monop-
olisation they could more easily protect their position by benefiting 
from their monopoly power.  
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The micro-historical approach adopted in this chapter was use-
ful to understand the abovementioned issues. The case of the 
Çapanoğlu family sheds some light on how things historically pro-
ceeded, although it makes no pretension to be fully representative as 
is the case for studies done through microhistory. It is true that there 
were apparently families that were less successful in patrimonial man-
agement, such as the Caniklizade family. However, the path followed 
by the family under study was one leading to relative success, if not 
the singular path to allow for this. It is now necessary to leave the 
microscope to the side and to take a glance in the next chapter at the 
macro-historical factors that led to the survival and abolition of the 
müsadere practice.  
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Appendix 5.1 Excerpts from Kinneir’s ‘Journey through Asia Minor, 
Armenia and Koordistan in the Years 1813 and 1814’ 
… His revenue, which was almost entirely derived from a tax on the 
grain produced in his estates, amounted, on an average, to ninety thou-
sand purses a year, twenty thousands of which it is said were set aside 
to bribe the ministers of the Sultan. His wealth in jewels was generally 
believed to be immense; and it is said that he could muster, in the course 
of a month or six weeks, an army of forty thousand men. He lived in 
great splendour; his haram was filled with the most beautiful Georgian 
slaves, and food for three hundred people was daily prepared in his 
kitchen. I was received by him with politeness and dignity, in a magnif-
icent apartment surrounded with sofas made of crimson velvet, fringed 
with gold, and opening into a garden of orange trees ornamented with a 
marble basin and jet d’eau. His countenance was benevolent, and his 
beard as white as snow; he made me sit close to him, and asked a num-
ber of questions respecting Buonaparte, of whom he appeared to be a 
great admirer. He afterwards demanded where I was going, and what I 
wanted in that part of the country. I told him I was travelling to amuse 
myself and I intended to visit Casarea and Tarsus. He replied that, as 
the road was in many places infested by brigands, he would give me a 
guard and letters to the governors of the different districts through which 
I should pass, and on taking leave of him he enjoined the doctor to see 
that all my wants were supplied during my stay at Ooscat.345  	
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6 INSTITUTIONAL	PERSISTENCE	OF	MÜSADERE	IN	THE	
LONG-EIGHTEENTH	CENTURY	
Previous chapters have focused on how and under what con-
straints confiscations were conducted. This chapter shifts to the ques-
tion why confiscations were persistent throughout the long-eighteenth 
century. The chapter also looks at the related question of why it was 
officially abolished in 1839. Concerning the question of abolition, it 
must be noted at the outset that although confiscation remained a po-
litical tool until the end of the nineteenth century, it was never at the 
same intensity as during the period under analysis.  
The chapter puts the relationship between the ruler and his 
agents into the centre of analysis. In doing so, it argues that given the 
high costs of investment in state capacity caused by the size and het-
erogeneity of the empire, confiscation remained the best available pol-
icy to survive through the crisis and enabled what I call controlled de-
centralisation. Potential targets of müsadere, on the other hand, were 
unable to credibly punish the sovereign because of the high costs of 
collective action. Regarding the question of abolition, it is argued that 
the abolition declared in 1839 was more credible than earlier declara-
tions partly due to the diminishing significance of functions of the 
practice, such as keeping the agents under control, as a result of some 
advances in curbing their vested interests. The analysis employed here 
does not deny the role of the nineteenth century modernisation that 
had generated hostility against such practices of the classical regime. 
It presents a complementary argument to the role of modernisation.  
The method used here is called ‘Analytic narratives.’ Introduced 
by Bates (et. al), the analytic narratives method seeks to explain his-
torical phenomena with the use of formal lines of reasoning from ra-
tional choice theory.346 Specifically, it requires an iterative combination 
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of theory and historical evidence. This chapter deals with two puzzles, 
namely the survival and abolition of the müsadere practice, namely 
why the practice of confiscation persisted and became more frequent 
despite the weakening of the ruler’s power and why it was abolished at 
the time of centralisation. The method is useful mainly because it cap-
tures the impact of the institutional environment in addition to that of 
human agency. Other than building on the findings of earlier chapters, 
this chapter uses additional evidence on investment preferences of the 
targets of müsadere and the profiles of bidders in confiscation auc-
tions.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 looks at the 
functions of the müsadere practice from a broader perspective. Section 
6.2 offers a narrative highlighting a puzzle of survival. Section 6.3 ex-
amines the forces of survival embedded in the institutional design of 
müsadere. Section 6.4 shifts the focus to general forces feeding the 
lack of collective action. Section 6.5 tackles the question of abolition 
while reformulating the theory of institutional survival. Section 6.6 
concludes.  
6.1 A	Functional	Approach	to	the	Practice	of	Müsadere	in	a	Period	
of	Crisis,	the	Long-Eighteenth	Century	
This section analyses various functions of the müsadere practice 
to understand why the confiscation policy was the best available tool 
to deal with the crisis of the eighteenth century. A functional approach 
is useful because its functions are the elements that enabled the cen-
tral authority’s continued interest in it. I argue that many functions of 
müsadere, which served the aims of the central government, be they 
fiscal, administrative or redistributive, were associated with the low 
capacity of the Ottoman state. These functions cannot be fully distin-
guished from each other and were eventually related to the main prob-
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lem facing the sovereign, namely how to minimise costs of decentral-
ised tax collection. In this section, I show how these functions interre-
latedly kept the sultans’ interest intact in exercising confiscations. The 
focus here is rather on administrative and redistributive functions of 
müsadere, which were indirectly fiscal given the institutional struc-
ture, and not on its most obvious but less important revenue-generat-
ing function. 
In 1695, the Ottoman Empire introduced the life-term tax farm-
ing in which tax farms were sold to private contractors under compet-
itive allocation. However, this new system soon ceased to be efficient 
as it gave way to monopolisation of revenue sources in fewer hands. In 
other words, the central government was no longer benefiting from the 
information revelation features of the system. As a result, the state 
became more dependent on the local elites not only in tax collection 
but in performing certain military and administrative tasks. After hav-
ing faced this problem, the centre extended the centuries-old practice 
of confiscation to these new actors though on a selective basis. To un-
derstand why, now consider a low capacity monarchy which is unable 
to tax, fight and administer without the cooperation of the local elites 
outside the primary realm of the central state.347 Thus, if local elites 
and administrators are too weak, this state lacking that kind of coop-
eration will collapse under the attacks of its external enemies. If they 
are too strong, however, they will either dethrone the current ruler or 
establish their own states, leading to the central state’s disintegration. 
A solution of political survival can be granting a degree of political par-
ticipation to these elites, but this is, by definition, absent from monar-
chies. Another solution could be to invest in state capacity towards 
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more centralised institutions as it precociously happened in eight-
eenth-century England.348 However, the costs of such investment, 
which would have encountered with vested interests of the elites, were 
much higher in the Ottoman Empire due to the greater size of its ter-
ritory and heterogeneity of its population. The only viable solution was 
thus to find an equilibrium level of decentralisation in which the elites 
are neither too weak nor too strong. The practice of müsadere played 
a key role in maintaining this balance by constantly curbing the elite 
power to the extent that they could still be useful and allowing the ruler 
to play them against each other. 
In addition, there is a close relationship between the administra-
tive capacity of a state and the use of confiscation as a tool of punish-
ment. The sultans lacked sufficient capacity to implement their policies 
because of poor monitoring technology.349 This is closely related to ad-
ministrative power, which is defined as ‘the extent to which the ruler’s 
choices and outcomes are influenced by potential defiance by those 
with administrative capacity.’350 The Ottoman sultans had their own 
methods of monitoring the behaviour of their administrators and solv-
ing agency problems but these were never effective enough.351 Seen 
through the lens of the above definition, administrative power further 
weakened in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire because of its 
increased reliance on tax entrepreneurs, who also held administrative 
offices, as a result of intensified warfare. This occasionally led to inev-
itable conflicts between the centre and its administrative agents. 
                                         
348	Johnson	and	Koyama	argue	that	because	of	their	need	for	inside	credit	England	and	France	shifted	
away	from	decentralised	to	cabal	tax	farming,	which	made	it	necessary	to	invest	in	standardisation.	
Noel	D.	 Johnson	and	Mark	Koyama,	"Tax	Farming	and	the	Origins	of	State	Capacity	 in	England	and	
France,"	Explorations	in	Economic	History	51	(2014).	
349	This	was	not	specific	to	the	Ottoman	Empire.	For	an	analysis	on	early	modern	China,	see:	Ma	and	
Rubin,	"Paradox	of	Power."	
350	Greif,	"Administrative	Power."	
351	Metin	M.	Coşgel	et	al.,	"Crime	and	Punishment	in	Ottoman	Times:	Corruption	and	Fines,"	Journal	
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In the Ottoman Empire, the practice of müsadere was related to 
administrative capacity through one of its functions that is to keep ad-
ministrators under control.352 The very existence of müsadere (and the 
accompanying institution of ‘political execution’) was a deterrent factor 
for unintended behaviour of administrators such as embezzlement and 
corruption in the absence of effective methods of monitoring agent be-
haviour. One mechanism was their fear of getting caught. As was seen 
in chapter 2, nearly half of the confiscations were justified by a crime. 
The other was that their incentive to gain wealth by cheating the prin-
cipal was lower in the existence of confiscation as that wealth was likely 
to be subject to confiscation even if they were not caught.  
The redistributive function of müsadere was that it enabled the 
state to constantly curb the power and wealth of its agents, which in 
turn prevented them from building long-lasting patrimonial structures 
at the expense of the central authority. As was explained in chapter 5, 
some were relatively more successful in circumventing confiscations, 
which made them survive longer. However, there were many short-
lived families as well and the relatively successful ones ultimately faced 
the same end in the 1810s and 1820s. This second administrative 
function of müsadere provided a fair amount of redistribution of power 
and wealth.353 It is important to recall the emphasis placed in chapter 
4 that this was done despite high costs associated with müsadere, and 
these high costs were ironically related to the low capacity to adminis-
ter as well since the enforcers of müsadere were also the administrative 
officials.  
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Figure 6.1: Ottoman State Revenues in European Perspective (in per 
capita tons of silver) 
 
Source: Reproduced from (Pamuk and Karaman 2010). 
Notes: The annual revenues per capita for other European states with which the 
Ottomans were in military competition are presented as the average among them. 
The states included in the data shown in the graph are England, the Dutch Repub-
lic, France, Spain, Austria, Russia and Poland-Lithuania.  
However, the sultans faced a trade-off regarding the redistribu-
tive function of müsadere. Specifically, once local elites managed to 
hold a certain degree of power, they could survive even longer by some-
how bypassing full confiscation through the institution of inheritance 
tax. Inheritance tax was useful for the sultan for it enabled constant 
support to be received from the provincial dynasties. Even so, it also 
harmed the ruler’s welfare function in the long run as it led to the mo-
nopolisation of resources. Once monopolised, they could send a lesser 
amount of tax revenue to the centre. The fact that powerful families 
were given the chance to circumvent full confiscation through inher-
itance tax, but could not get complete immunity from it, relates to an 
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equilibrium in which the sultan inevitably gives a certain level of im-
munity to the powerful, which leads to power monopolies. Immunity is 
given inevitably because of the low capacity of the state to fight, to tax 
and to administer. Figure 6.1 shows that the fiscal capacity of the Ot-
toman Empire was persistently lower than the average among major 
states in Europe at the time. Since the Ottoman Empire was in military 
competition with the states shown in this graph, the graph illustrates 
the relatively low military capacity of the Empire and thus the increas-
ing number of military failures during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  
Taken together, a high capacity state would not need to confis-
cate the wealth of its people, or to be administrators, tax farmers or 
others, even considering the lack of formal constraints to their power. 
The most used definition of state capacity is the capacity to collect 
taxes and enforce rules, which are two basic functions of a state. This 
definition indeed covers all functions of müsadere as follows. A state 
strong enough to extract enough revenue from its population would 
not need extra-ordinary revenues such as those from outright confis-
cations. Likewise, a state capable of monitoring the behaviour of its 
administrators with a reasonable efficiency, which was crucial for the 
enforcement of rules as well as to collect taxes in the Ottoman context, 
would not attempt to confiscate their wealth upon the administrators’ 
deaths or as arbitrary punishment. Its use as a redistributive mecha-
nism is indirectly related to state capacity. The need for redistribution 
of power and wealth stemmed from the decentralised structure of the 
Empire. Contrary to the generally accepted view in Ottoman historiog-
raphy, the Ottoman state was never centralised in a modern sense. 
Centralisation-decentralisation dichotomy, however, is more useful 
when considered in relative terms. Decentralisation was the outcome 
of the lack of the sufficient organisational and technological capacity 
to administer a state of massive size. Therefore, the practice of 
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müsadere was and became increasingly the only viable alternative of 
survival.  
All in all, the ongoing benefits of the Ottoman rulers derived from 
the practice of müsadere were closely associated with low state capac-
ity. Once it became part of Ottoman politics and was mastered over the 
centuries, it was of good use in managing the conflictual period of the 
long-eighteenth century. When the central government ceased to ben-
efit from the competitive tax farming, the practice of confiscation made 
a controlled type of decentralisation possible, which was an important 
intermediary system on the way to centralised fiscal system.354 Given 
the high costs associated with state capacity investment, this was a 
viable solution to the fiscal and political problems facing the central 
government in the long-eighteenth century. Confiscations made a con-
trolled decentralisation possible in a period of transition. This political 
economy explanation helps us to understand the existence of the prac-
tice. That is, it did not exist only for the sake of seizing people’s prop-
erty or simply for financing wars. However, the fact that it existed or 
that the sultans were continuously interested in it does not completely 
explain its survival. For that, it is also necessary to examine the other 
side of the coin, which is the perspective of the targets of müsadere.  
6.2 The	Question	of	Survival	
6.2.1 Puzzle	
This sub-section is a brief narrative of the puzzle of survival of 
the müsadere practice during the long-eighteenth century. As men-
tioned in the introduction, state confiscation of a similar nature was a 
common practice in most pre-modern Muslim states. It arguably be-
came part of the Ottoman system sometime in the fifteenth century 
                                         
354 Nineteenth-century centralisation is used in relative terms. Despite some gains 
towards centralisation, the central administration continued to rely on tax farmers 
to a lesser extent until the end of the empire. 
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and was institutionalised in the sixteenth century. In 1453, Mehmed 
II conquered the city of Constantinople after which he executed his 
grand vizier, whom he accused of treason, and confiscated the vizier’s 
wealth. The vizier was also a member of a provincial aristocracy of Tur-
coman origin, which had played important roles during the process of 
state building. Execution of the vizier and confiscation of his estates 
were arguably part of this power politics in the sultan’s grand strategy 
of curbing the power of these families to bring all power under direct 
control of the Ottoman dynasty. While the following decades saw more 
confiscations of the wealth of office-holders, Mehmed II undertook a 
campaign of confiscation directed at the assets of pious foundations 
starting in 1475, also as part of his centralising reforms.355 
Although the balance of power followed fluctuating trends during 
the four centuries that followed, müsadere had already entered the po-
litical and economic order and remained intact until 1839. It is im-
portant to recall a distinction made in the introduction. Confiscations 
both before and during the eighteenth century had different character-
istics in terms of their targeted population, methods of implementation 
and frequency. They became more numerous and sophisticated, and 
applied to a new group, namely provincial elites, in the eighteenth cen-
tury. The previously widespread justification of enrichment by royal 
grant was used much less frequently. This trend is puzzling since the 
central government had now delegated more of its power to the periph-
ery, yet the prime targets of confiscation were those new holders of 
power. Although political institutions allocated all de jure power to the 
monarch in the Ottoman Empire, the elites possessed de facto power 
that derived from their military, economic and political resources.356 
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The question is why this power did not translate into collective retalia-
tion against the confiscation of their wealth.  
Institutionalists call the point of departure creating a path de-
pendent on stability as a ‘critical juncture.’357 In this respect, the year 
1453 was a critical juncture in the history of müsadere. The reason 
Mehmed II, and not the preceding sultans, was able to practice confis-
cations, at least on such a scale, was arguably linked with his trium-
phant reputation, which made his authority unquestionable during his 
reign.358 To use the terminology of new institutional economics, the 
following 150 years, as with many institutions of the classical Ottoman 
regime, generated self-reinforcing processes that made a reversal from 
the existing path difficult even after changes in the institutional envi-
ronment.359 Moreover, this was a process of ‘learning-by-doing’ in 
terms of enforcement of confiscation.  
It is useful to add that the period of consolidation of central 
power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries created a persistent 
path. But how could have this path been reversed? One view concern-
ing institutional change is that exogenous shocks based on parameter 
shifts lead to a change in institutions. Military revolution that occurred 
in parts of early modern Europe was an exogenous shock for traditional 
institutions of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, many of the institu-
tions were transformed even before modernity. Because of these mili-
tary advances in Europe, the central government increasingly privat-
ised fiscal resources with the aim of collecting more taxes. Privatisa-
tion, however, availed peripheral forces to which much power was del-
egated. Private fiscal contractors became increasingly stronger and 
                                         
357	On	the	concept	of	critical	junctures,	see:	Giovanni	Capoccia	and	R.	Daniel	Kelemen,	"The	Study	of	
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some of them started to act semi-independently from the centre from 
the second half of the century onwards. Curiously enough, the sultans 
could confiscate even more and, more importantly, do so by targeting 
these peripheral figures. Another approach to institutional change fo-
cuses on the role of political actors. It argues that political actors could 
block changes due to their ongoing benefits from status quo.360 I ex-
plain below that there is some credibility to this view in the case of 
müsadere since there were indeed some winners of the system. Yet, 
winning or losing was barely a function of de jure power that they 
lacked. Simply, anybody, including once-winners except the sultan, 
was subject to müsadere and so a potential loser. Even confiscation 
entrepreneurs mentioned in chapter 4 occasionally had their wealth 
confiscated. Thus, the first puzzle remains unsolved. Why were they 
unable to push for a change in their favour? It is this puzzle I address 
below.  
6.2.2 Forces	of	Survival:	Institutional	Environment	
The analysis adopted here proposes that the inability of the tar-
gets of müsadere to solve the problems of collective action was one 
reason why it continued to be exercised through the long-eighteenth 
century. By collective action, I refer to the ability to retaliate collectively 
or impose economic and political costs on the ruler, either violently 
using coercion or non-violently using bargaining for property security. 
So, it differs from what Tine de Moor names ‘institutionalised collective 
action’ by its structure as a group of non-state organisations, a long-
run effective form that was absent from the Ottoman order.361 The type 
of collective action I refer to is a simpler and short-run effective form, 
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which could potentially lead to a change in institutions. In the termi-
nology of Albrecht Hirschman, this is the ‘voice.’ Per his theory, when 
the benefits of the members of an organisation are harmed, they will 
respond in two ways: (1) exit (quit the relationship) or (2) use their voice 
(try to restore the relationship). Let our organisation here be a state 
and its members be the subjects of the sovereign. The level of ‘loyalty’ 
to the organisation, which is related to the legitimacy of rule in a state, 
determines the probability of each strategy to be chosen.362  
Retaliation of any form (voice) is only effective when collective. 
Collective action still has its own obstacles. As Mancur Olson theorises, 
an individual is not willing to take part in retaliation unless the benefits 
accrued from participation exceed costs. His theory has two fundamen-
tal insights: (1) small groups are better in coming together and (2) se-
lective incentives are conducive to formation of collective action.363 As 
for exiting the relationship, economic actors who face confiscation can 
move their enterprise to another state. To do so requires a certain level 
of mobility and independence regarding their sources of income from 
those distributed by the state. Merchants, for example, have more mo-
bile capital and are more independent from the state. This is important 
given that one of the justifications of müsadere was indeed enrichment 
by royal grant or to have financial accounts with the treasury.  
First, I shall focus on the forces which prevented collective ac-
tion, and which are outside the realm of the müsadere institution. 
These forces constitute the institutional background behind confisca-
tions. The question of the property security of tax farmers was an-
swered by Balla and Johnson (2009) in a comparative study of France 
and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.364 They argue that 
property rights of tax farmers were more secure from state predation 
in France. They focus on the definition of security as it relates to the 
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security of tax farming contracts against the unilateral dissolution of 
the sovereign. These contracts were indeed not well-respected by the 
sultan such that they could be terminated once a higher bid was made. 
My analysis here also considers the practice of müsadere of which tax 
farmers were among the main targets. One may argue that the practice 
of müsadere did not violate property rights since it was implemented 
after death, but even then, it violated the right to bequeath which was 
well-recognised by Islamic law. Additionally, post-mortem confiscation 
was not a rule. Many wealth-holders lost their wealth as an arbitrary 
punishment. This use of müsadere was closely linked to falling out of 
favour of the central government.  
Regarding the reasons why property rights of tax farmers were 
less secure in the Ottoman Empire than in France, Balla and Johnson 
rightfully draw attention to the role of collective action organisations. 
That is, while a tax farmer organisation called General Farms protected 
property rights of its members against the French Crown, such an or-
ganisation was never formed among the Ottoman tax farmers. The lack 
of collective action, in their view, was due to high costs of collusion 
that stemmed from the size of the empire, heterogeneity of tax farmers 
and the lack of corporate form as well as legal personhood. The Empire 
indeed ruled a large territory (larger than France), which was relatively 
unfavourable for the establishment of stable tax farmer networks. 
Those who were involved in the tax farming system were of various 
origins, which also increased the costs of collusion. On the issue of the 
lack of corporate form, Balla and Johnson mainly cite Timur Kuran, 
who attributes it to the small size of Islamic partnerships caused by 
egalitarian Islamic inheritance law that traditionally divided inher-
itance into many pieces, as opposed to the case in Europe.365  
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It is true that there was no effective collective action organisation 
as the ‘silent revolution,’ as dubbed by Tine de Moor, experienced in 
the history of Europe.366 The only potential exception would be craft 
guilds, but Ottoman guilds were not independent from the state’s 
sphere of control. However, other forms of collective action could have 
been possible. Although its effects were shorter lasting, violent collec-
tive action took place in the form of peasant revolts and Janissary in-
surrections. These were reactions to other forms of confiscation, which 
were excessive and unlawful taxation for the peasants and monetary 
debasements for the Janissaries. It is at first surprising that confisca-
tion was faced by tax farmers and office-holders, the latter which were 
the most powerful and the wealthiest group of society; but confiscation 
of office-holders did not lead to a similar outcome as the peasants 
though it was a more direct confiscation. A second look at the nature 
of the relationship they maintained with the central government, how-
ever, removes that surprise by showing that family-state relations were 
based on rent-seeking in which loyalty paid off greatly. That is, even if 
one could benefit from the common good of property security by joining 
collective retaliation against the sultan, the least risky strategy was to 
remain loyal by freeriding due to the uncertainty whether all others, or 
at least a reasonable number of them, would have joined too. The costs 
of collective action even with a small number of people were high. Here 
the existence of a corporation, of course, could be a game changer in 
favour of wealth-holders by motivating attendance and thereby reduc-
ing these costs through positive and/or negative sanctions.   
Other disincentives of collective action relate to group size and 
distance. Most scholars agree with the general idea behind Olson’s the-
ory that small groups are better in organising collective action. The 
data analysed in chapters 2 and 3 included some 1,017 cases. Yet the 
number of those under the threat of müsadere can be comfortably es-
timated to be much higher. The exact number of office-holders and tax 
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farmers, as the prime targets of müsadere, is difficult to estimate. Nev-
ertheless, Ariel Salzmann’s estimates give us a rough sense: “Over the 
course of the eighteenth century some 1,000 and 2,000 Istanbul-based 
individuals, along with some 5,000 and 10,000 individuals based in 
the provinces, as well as innumerable subcontractors, agents, bank-
ers, accountants, and managers, controlled an important share of state 
assets.” The group size should be seen in relative terms, and Salz-
mann’s approximate numbers are reasonably higher than those con-
cerning France. As an additional disincentive, the distance between the 
targets of confiscation, which could be up to 5,000 kilometres from 
Bosnia to the Arab peninsula, would have mattered too.367 However, 
the spatial distribution presented in chapter 2, reflecting a negative 
correlation between frequency of confiscation and proximity to the cap-
ital, causes us to stray from distance being one of the main forces of 
survival since those who suffered the most were actually clustered.   
Now I shift to the ability to use the ‘exit’ strategy. To what extent 
were the sources of income of the targets of müsadere dependent on 
the resources distributed by the central government? Ali Yaycıoğlu de-
fines the economic activity of provincial elites as ‘the business of gov-
ernance,’ stressing its rent-seeking nature.368 Yet other studies and 
Yaycıoğlu himself recognise that the business of governance was not 
their only enterprise. For example, they are known to have invested in 
commercial agriculture.369 So, in answering the above question, it 
would be useful to look at where they derived their revenue. It can be 
argued that the more they invested in such assets as farms, real estate, 
and luxury, the less likely they could avoid confiscation.  
Figure 6.2 illustrates the confiscated wealth of a select group of 
twenty individuals including their debt relations (See also: Appendix). 
This sample has been selected based on the likelihood of bypassing 
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confiscation using two criteria. The first is the proximity of their loca-
tion of residence to the coast since those living in coastal areas were, 
ceteris paribus, more likely to be engaged with other economic activities 
than the business of governance. The second is status as provincial 
elites, as this group was expectedly more independent from the central 
government relative to other office-holders. Except for two people, all 
included in this sample were living in either coastal locations or very 
close to the coast. With one exception, all were provincial elites.  
Figure 6.2: Asset Composition of Confiscated Wealth of a Selected 
Sample of Provincial Elites Living in Coastal Areas 
 
Source: CML 339/13926, DBŞM MHF.d 12922, DBŞM MHF.d 13048, DBŞM MHF.d 
13077, DBŞM MHF.d 13722, DBŞM MHF.d 13177, DBŞM MHF.d 13194, DBŞM 
MHF.d 13202, DBŞM MHF.d 13208, DBŞM MHF.d 13210, DBŞM MHF.d 13224, 
DBŞM MHF.d 13350, CML 227/9489370 
The figure stresses debt-credit relations as the most striking el-
ement of their investment portfolio. Debts they owed and those owed 
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to them form more than 70 per cent of their wealth. In the most ex-
treme case, for example, a notable of Zihne (modern day Nea Zichni in 
Northern Greece), Abdülfettah Bey, owed some 429,584 kuruş to the 
treasury that amounted to three times the value of his personal as-
sets.371 Being indebted to the public treasury generally signified unpaid 
annuities of tax farming contracts, which indicates a high degree of 
dependence on the state. It also shows the central government’s ina-
bility to control the fiscal realm. While this notable of Zihne was only 
indebted to the public treasury, others in the sample owed to money-
lenders, who were predominantly Greek and Armenian, as well. Debts 
owed to them generally came from their retinues, relatives or people in 
their network. Thus, it is justified to say that credit relations consti-
tuted the most important part of their economic activities.372 
The marginal proportion of fields, vineyards and orchards among 
their possessions reveals that they did not invest much in large-scale 
agricultural production. This property group reflects their private prop-
erty in the form of land, while the lands they were supposed to collect 
taxes from were under state ownership.373 The figure suggests that an-
imal husbandry was a relatively more essential agricultural enterprise, 
but the number of animals stated in these documents gives a sense 
that they were raised rather for family use than for markets. Other 
than the unimportance of agricultural production, there is no sign of 
industrial activity in their inheritance either. One example that could 
potentially contradict this is the case of a certain Seyyid Abdülaziz Ağa 
of Milas in southwest Anatolia.374 His inheritance included some reve-
nues from a mine he was operating, but it turned out that this mine 
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was just his tax farm owned by the state. Thus, the label ‘mining rev-
enues’ (nühas gelirleri) found in his inheritance reflected his revenues 
from a state-owned tax farm. 
This discussion is linked to a historiographical debate on the rise 
of commercialisation in the Ottoman Empire, which was once concep-
tualised by Marxist historians as the transition from feudalism to cap-
italism, or from state to private ownership. Although local elites had 
been presented as the main actors of this development, more recent 
literature argues that they were mainly engaged with the business of 
governance, that the role of their big farms called çiftliks was overesti-
mated and that they were, in fact, not of considerable size.375 Also rel-
evant to this discussion is the fact that those whose wealth was con-
fiscated tended to orient their activities away from trade and towards 
the realm of politics and rent-seeking. Fiscal business was more lucra-
tive and a quicker way of making wealth. This was the case, however, 
at the risk of müsadere. Indeed, engagement with the business of gov-
ernance must have arguably made it easy to justify the confiscation 
with the official defence of obtaining enrichment by royal grant. These 
points emphasise that the benefits of rent-seeking exceeded its risks 
such that they could be pursued despite the threat of müsadere.    
6.2.3 Forces	of	Survival:	Institutional	Design	of	Müsadere	
What mechanisms of survival did the practice of müsadere con-
tain in its institutional design? To answer this question, it is first es-
sential to explain its severity and flexibility. To clarify, by the survival 
of müsadere I do not mean that it survived through this process en-
tirely unchanged. Institutional flexibility, associated to institutions of 
the Ottoman Empire by Şevket Pamuk, can be applied to the practice 
of müsadere as well. As evolutionary game theory suggests, behaviours 
with higher payoffs are more likely to be replicated over time. This was 
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arguably why a new form of müsadere, specifically inheritance tax, ap-
peared in the eighteenth century to occasionally replace full confisca-
tion. Similarly, without the rise of centrifugal forces in this century, 
the outsourcing of müsadere would not have emerged. Therefore, in 
this century, the müsadere game included outcomes other than con-
fiscation, reflecting a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability to the 
new conditions. These new practices within the müsadere system ei-
ther created conflictual interests or allowed for the possibility of by-
passing confiscation. However, the new practices do not explain the 
whole story behind the lack of collective action since they were not 
universally applied. For reasons discussed in chapter 3, some gained 
while some lost from this flexibility and adaptation. 
Collective action in this context is all about the accumulation of 
discontent. Two other features of institutional design of the müsadere 
practice, i.e. exclusiveness and non-collectiveness, also contributed to 
the absence of collective action. By non-collectiveness, I mean that it 
rarely targeted multiple individuals at once. It usually applied to one 
person at a time partly due to its post-mortem nature. This made those 
who were under the risk of müsadere reluctant to join collective action 
until it was their turn to be confiscated. When it was their turn, then 
others were not interested in joining collective action for the same rea-
son. Exceptions to this non-collectiveness did exist. For example, I 
have observed that confiscation was collectively conducted in the case 
of rebellion. However, these cases are outcomes of rebellion and qualify 
as just another type of collective action. Furthermore, confiscation of 
the wealth of rebels was more easily justifiable in the eyes of the public. 
As for exclusiveness, it means that müsadere mostly excluded the 
property of relatives except for the case of a crime committed by more 
than one member of the same family. We understand this from the 
documents which show that if the assets of a relative were confiscated, 
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any objections were normally considered carefully often before the wit-
nesses. Confiscation as an additional form of punishment was subject 
to the principle of individuality.376  
Another disincentive of collective action was the presence of in-
tra-elite competition. This competition can be examined in two dimen-
sions, namely inside and outside the müsadere system. Within the sys-
tem of müsadere, outsourcing of müsadere reflected intra-elite compe-
tition from the perspective of both those who offered (the sultan) and 
those who accepted (the contractor) the challenge. While delegation of 
müsadere was important, most confiscations were conducted centrally 
by the agents of the sultan. Therefore, a more important dimension of 
intra-elite competition was the general competition among the elites 
over fiscal and political resources. As shown in the previous chapter, 
two prominent families were in conflict based on the question of who 
would have benefited more from state resources. Outsourcing of 
müsadere was just a result of this rent-seeking competition that oc-
curred outside the müsadere system. In other words, confiscation of 
the wealth of a family signified an opportunity for the contractor family 
operating in the same or neighbouring region. As in the case of these 
families, the conflict over the resources of intersecting points of their 
areas of influence could even result in armed conflict between them. 
The stance taken by the central government varied but it was not nec-
essarily reconciliation. Instead, as in this case, the central government 
could openly support one party (the Çapanoğlus) due to their higher 
expected loyalty derived from past conduct while declaring the other 
party (the Caniklizades) as rebels and confiscating their wealth. It is 
crucial to note that the latter family was later pardoned and brought 
back into the game. In conclusion, the confiscation game was only part 
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of a broader game of rent-seeking. Their conflicting interests, particu-
larly at the regional level, made any collusion difficult.  
Table 6.1: Bookkeeping of the Inheritance of Mufti Halil Efendi 
 Value (kuruş) 
Auctioned in the central treasury 197,633.5 
Auction in his house 25,000 
Auction in his waterfront residence 20,000 
Total 242,633.5 
Taxes 10,950 
Remaining 232,727.5 
Transportation costs 669.5 
Remaining 231,058 
*** 600 
Final total 230,458 
Source: D.BŞM.MHF 13327 
Moreover, outsourcing was not the only internal element of the 
müsadere that discouraged collective action. One must ask who gained 
from confiscations. Although a complete analysis of redistributive as-
pects of the practice of müsadere requires a separate monograph, one 
way of answering this question may be found by looking at the auctions 
held for sale of confiscated assets. It is true that some properties were 
transported directly to the palace or warzones,377 but many others were 
sold in auctions. One example is the confiscation of the wealth of Mufti 
Halil Efendi who died in Istanbul in 1821. His personal assets were 
auctioned in three different locations, namely the palace treasury, his 
house and his waterfront residence.378 The auction document starts 
with the bookkeeping entry given in table 6.1. 
                                         
377	I	found	in	chapter	3	that	this	was	most	common	for	liquid	assets	as	well	as	such	goods	as	firearms,	
gunpowder,	tents,	and	cereals,	which	could	be	used	directly	in	wars.		
378	 On	 auctions,	 see:	 A.	 Nükhet	 Adıyeke	 and	 Nuri	 Adıyeke,	 "Yunan	 Ayaklanması	 Sırasında	 Girit	
Resmo'da	Müsadere	Ve	Müzayedelere	Dair	Bir	İnceleme,"	Kebikeç,	no.	32	(2011).	
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Table 6.2: Occupational and Title Distribution of Bidders of Confisca-
tion Auctions in a Chosen Sample 
Occupation/Title Ağa Efendi Bey Paşa No Title Total 
Military 28,049 1,980 0 0 835 30,864 
Administrative 120,046 61,232 2,555 0 60,729 244,562 
Legal Community 0 8,190 0 0 3,079 11,269 
Artisans 7,971 17,956 0 0 8,601 34,528 
Merchants 12,688 3,831 0 0 15,610 32,129 
Moneylenders 0 0 0 0 705 705 
Palace Officials 5,000 0 0 8,605 0 13,605 
Minters 0 20,000 0 0 0 20,000 
No Occupation 61,692 90,934 0 0 18,912 171,807 
Total 235,715 204,123 2,555 8,605 108,471 559,468 
Source: D.BŞM.MHF.d 13289, D.BŞM.MHF.d 13327, D.BŞM.MHF.d 13454, 
D.BŞM.MHF.d 13341, D.BŞM.MHF.d 13465. 
Notes: Those cases included in the data presented are Mustafa Mazhar Efendi (Head 
of Finance Department, 1818), Halil Efendi (Mufti, 1821), İsmail Paşa (Governor of 
Niğde, 1822), Ali Esad Paşa (Governor of Alanya, 1828), Salih Paşa (Governor of Da-
mascus, 1828) 
Based on a sample of five auctions, figure 6.2 shows that many 
bidders present at auctions were again office-holders. It displays how 
much each occupation and title group paid to buy the auctioned as-
sets. Ultimately the administrative officials paid some 44 per cent of 
the total payment. The categories of ‘no occupation’ and ‘no title’ reflect 
those not specifying title or occupation. But the fact that most of the 
bidders included in the category of ‘no occupation’ are titled as either 
efendi or ağa means that they likely fall into the occupation categories 
of government officials too. It is striking to see that two purchasers of 
the assets of Ali Esad Paşa and one of those of Salih Paşa were the 
officials of the Bureau of Confiscation themselves. The former two pur-
chased some textiles.379 Taken together, these lists of purchasers 
demonstrate that when auctioned, confiscated properties were mostly 
bought by office-holders. This reflects their satisfaction in paying for 
confiscated assets without much care for the fact that their families 
                                         
379	D.BŞM.MHF	13454,	D.BŞM.MHF	13465.	
230 
were also on the possible path of being denied the inheritance of their 
wealth when the time came.  
Figure 6.3: Forces of Survival of the Practice of Müsadere through 
the Long-Eighteenth Century 
 
That the central state conducted confiscations with some degree 
of flexibility and followed certain unwritten rules respecting the rights 
of others arguably contributed to the lack of motivation to attend a 
potential collective action. This section has also shown that the confis-
cated assets were redistributed among the other potential targets of 
confiscation. Before proceeding to the abolition, I provide a diagram in 
figure 6.3, summarising the main argument of this section.  
6.3 The	Question	of	Abolition	
6.3.1 Puzzle	
This sub-section addresses the second puzzle of this chapter, 
which is why the practice of müsadere was abolished in 1839 despite 
the consolidation of central power. The notion of abolition here refers 
to the most credible attempt to abolish the practice although it is 
known that confiscations continued at a lesser intensity after 1839. 
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This question, which is equally important to identifying the forces of 
survival, also requires understanding why several attempts before the 
one in 1839 failed. To date, historians of the Ottoman Empire have not 
examined this question presumably because they have assumed that 
the abolition was an outcome of the nineteenth century modernisation. 
The period of modernisation started with military reforms in the eight-
eenth century but peaked with the promulgation of Gülhane Edict that 
instigated the era of Tanzimat reforms in 1839. The edict, which in-
cluded a statement about the abolition, was the outcome of an ideo-
logical change in its core. Under the influence of wars lost to the Euro-
peans for at least a century and due to a greater exchange of ideas after 
the French Revolution, the government classes were now convinced 
that European institutions were superior to theirs and that European-
style reforms were necessary.  
Objections occasionally arose against the use of müsadere from 
the Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen, but these objections were 
rather weak. Many chroniclers of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies mentioned müsadere as a political convention with no attempt 
at criticising it. Those who criticised it preferred to make a distinction 
between lawful and unlawful confiscation. The latter was considered a 
practice that the sultans should avoid. One of the most detailed re-
marks was made by Sarı Mehmed Paşa, who was the minister of fi-
nance in the early eighteenth century. In his well-known counsel book, 
he suggested that the use of müsadere should be restricted to the sit-
uations when an individual was legally punished with execution, while 
he criticised its use as a means of extracting revenue. More specifically, 
he mentioned the unlawful confiscation as ‘abominable wealth col-
lected through confiscation in the treasury.’380 The great historian of 
the nineteenth century, Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, distinguished between the 
lawful and unlawful confiscation such that it would be lawful if the 
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individual had made wealth through his public service. Though he 
wrote his chronicle after the abolition of müsadere, he nevertheless 
supported that this kind of confiscation would have been legitimate 
even during his own time.381 In works such as that of Sadık Rıfat Paşa, 
one of the architects of the nineteenth century reforms and the minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, the müsadere practice is also mentioned pejora-
tively. After his return from a diplomatic mission in Vienna, he wrote a 
booklet entitled ‘On the State of Europe’ (Avrupa Ahvaline Dair).382 In 
this booklet, he spoke highly of the lack of such an institution as state 
confiscation of the wealth of officials in Austria so that the office-hold-
ers could feel more attached to their state. Thus, in his view, the main 
detriment of müsadere was to decrease loyalty and attachment of offi-
cials, which in turn adversely affected administrative efficiency. From 
a theoretical perspective, however, the Ottoman ethicist Kınalızade (d. 
1572) touched upon its impact on taxation as follows: ‘When a cruel 
ruler confiscates the oxen of the peasants, how shall he collect the tithe 
in the time of harvest? How can he confiscate the property of mer-
chants and get all of them only once without sacrificing continuous 
customs revenues?’383 
The question arises regarding the existence of any response to 
these criticisms from the sultans or if they thought of abolition before 
1839. It is documented that Selim III felt obliged to respond to a criti-
cism that came from one of the district governors. He wrote that his 
intention was not to harm the rights of orphans but to confiscate the 
wealth of someone who made wealth by imperial grant, which was a 
tradition of his ancestors.384 Thus, the sultan himself makes the above 
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distinction between lawful and unlawful confiscation too. However, the 
data presented in Part I reveals that this distinction was barely re-
spected; nor did the government care much in the eighteenth century 
whether confiscation was gained through offices.  
In 1812, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, who became the grand vizier of 
Mahmud II in the same year, organised an assembly in Istanbul to 
which a select group of major provincial elites was invited. At the end 
of the assembly, the Pact of Alliance (Sened-i Ittifak) was signed. Alt-
hough Sultan Mahmud II did not attend the assembly, he had allowed 
his signature to be put on the pact. One of the clauses of the pact was 
the sultan’s respect of property rights of provincial elites. Thus, he had 
made a commitment given in exchange for the continuation of the 
elites’ support for his reforms. The assembly was the event that best 
approximated a form of collective action, though not all families sent a 
representative to it. Yet we know that this pact was never put into prac-
tice. This is also confirmed by the data presented in chapter 2, which 
does not show any gap in the confiscation activity during those years. 
In 1826, Mahmud II issued an edict abolishing the practice of 
müsadere.385 Both commitments, however, failed to be credible since 
müsadere remained in effect until 1839, when it was finally abolished 
in the Gülhane Edict with the following remarks:386 
If there is an absence of security of property, everyone remains 
indifferent to his state and his community: no one interests him-
self in the prosperity of the country, absorbed as he is in his own 
troubles and worries. If, on the contrary, the individual feels 
complete security about his possessions then he will become 
preoccupied with his own affairs, which he will seek to expand, 
and his devotion and love for his state and his community will 
steadily grow and will undoubtedly spur him into becoming a 
useful member of society.  
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As these remarks show, the reason of the abolition was to in-
crease the quality of public service and thus prosperity by referring to 
the insecurity that confiscations created. The main purpose of the edict 
was also declared along similar lines, namely removing corruption, 
abolishing tax farming and granting equality to all subjects before law 
regardless of ethnicity and religion. In focusing on the effects of 
müsadere on administrative efficiency, this clause shows similarities 
with the views of Sadık Rıfat Paşa, which is not surprising given his 
role in these modernisation attempts. Although the edict was a project 
of Mahmud II and was finalised by his son Abdülmecid I (1839-1876) 
after his death, its actual architect was the grand vizier Mustafa Reşit 
Paşa, who was a former ambassador to Vienna as well. The role of re-
form-minded statesmen cannot be denied. When seen from a broader 
perspective, one would also see that the Tanzimat reforms were a dip-
lomatic move. By launching these Western-style liberal reforms, the 
Ottomans wanted to receive the support of Britain in the Egyptian sit-
uation created by the rebellion of the Ottoman governor, Mehmed Ali 
Paşa, against Egypt.387 The same motive had played the main role in 
the signing of the Treaty of Balta Liman of 1838, which gave Britain 
full access to Ottoman markets.  
These attempts of modernisation only partially explain the abo-
lition. Essentially, it does not explain why the sultan’s commitment in 
1812 and 1826 was not credible. To find this explanation, it is neces-
sary to discover whether there was a change in the equilibrium that 
made it survive, namely those forces feeding the lack of collective ac-
tion and the functions of müsadere for the central government. What 
constitutes a puzzle here is that the abolition did not come because of 
resistance by the victims of müsadere but from the enforcers and when 
the sovereign was more powerful than before. To put it differently, the 
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consolidation of the power of the ruler curiously contributed to the im-
provement of property rights. The next sub-section explains how.  
6.3.2 Explaining	Abolition	
The fact that the sultan could not credibly commit to end the 
practice of müsadere deserves further attention. In this section, I argue 
that the loss of essential functions of müsadere changed the equilib-
rium of survival.388 Specifically, from the 1810s to the 1830s, Mahmud 
II managed to curb the power of major provincial elites, abolish the 
main corps, the Janissaries, and replace it by a new army loyal to the 
sultan’s persona. Although the institution of tax farming was officially 
abolished by Gülhane Edict, many provincial power-holders holding 
tax farms and offices were gradually replaced by centrally appointed 
administrators. Though fiscal and political centralisation must be con-
sidered distinct concepts from a theoretical perspective, they were 
closely related in the case of the Ottoman Empire since the agents of 
the eighteenth-century decentralisation were both fiscal and political 
actors. Therefore, curbing the power of local elites also meant injecting 
more revenues into the centre. It is true that the central state remained 
partly dependent on tax farmers until the collapse of the empire, but 
there were considerable gains in terms of fiscal centralisation by the 
1830s. Going back to the discussion at the beginning of the chapter, 
investment on state capacity were now less costly due to the elimina-
tion of the vested interests of the local elites. 
The ultimate elimination of centrifugal actors came in the early 
nineteenth century as a combination of various methods. The treaty of 
Bucharest in 1813 and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia gave Mahmud 
some time to direct his attention to eliminating provincial elites. The 
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methods he used were a combination of peaceful and violent methods. 
In the case of the Çapanoğlu family, he acted immediately after the 
death of Çapanoğlu Süleyman in 1813. The elimination of this family 
was relatively smooth. Some members of the family were invited to re-
side in the capital to prevent them from rising to power again. One of 
the sons of Çapanoğlu Süleyman, Mehmed Celaleddin Paşa, was con-
tinuously granted governorships in provinces outside the base of the 
family, Bozok. Importantly, he was not a so-called independently act-
ing power-holder anymore; instead he was now part of the administra-
tive hierarchy. Although more blood was shed in the case of the 
Karaosmanoğlu family for the control of central-western Anatolia after 
the death of Karaosmanoğlu Hüseyin Ağa, it was not the most difficult 
case. Concerning the distant Arab lands, the sultan was less success-
ful in restoring the direct rule. Despite several achievements, for exam-
ple, it was greatly challenged by the elites of Baghdad. The central au-
thority was also restored in the Balkans during the period 1814-1820, 
though the methods for achieving this remain uncertain.389 This deci-
sive centralisation of Mahmud II led to the shift of power in favour of 
the central government in a high majority of provinces.  
Certain gains in fiscal capacity relaxed the fiscal function, which 
was arguably less important than the other functions. Mahmud II fi-
nally managed to inject more revenues into the centre partly due to the 
elimination of local elites and partly due to tax reforms. Although rev-
enue data is largely missing between the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, it is possible to see the impact of fiscal centrali-
sation on the revenues of the state based on significant increases 
achieved from the second half of the nineteenth century an onwards in 
comparison with the latest years from the eighteenth century for which 
data exists.390 This marks a decline in the importance of müsadere as 
a source of revenue.  
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With these advances in centralisation in both fiscal and political 
terms realised in the early nineteenth century, the main function of the 
practice of müsadere, which was to control the fisco-political realm in 
the provinces, started to lose its importance. Thus, the costs of abol-
ishing müsadere declined. When the problem is defined this way, it 
becomes useful to put it in the comparative context of the other two 
Muslim empires of Eurasia. The Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Em-
pires all experienced a period of crisis in the long-eighteenth century, 
yet the Ottoman Empire was the only one that managed to survive 
through this crisis. One of the causes of the fall of Mughal Empire of 
India was localisation of power and, by extension, the inability of en-
forcement of the central authority because of eighteenth-century mili-
tary pressures.391 The Mughal rulers also confiscated the wealth of of-
fice-holders through the escheat system after their death. Yet the ex-
istence of the escheat seemingly did not help to prevent the emergence 
of local potentates, which caused the breakdown of the empire though 
the regional dynasties continued to use legitimating power of the centre 
until the British rule. The same cause applies to the Safavids who lost 
their authority to a regional dynasty called the Qajars in 1789.392 
Despite passing through a similar process and having its power 
delegated to local actors, the Ottoman Empire survived until the end 
of World War I without much resistance to its re-centralisation. This is 
just one aspect of a broader question that Şevket Pamuk answered by 
emphasising the role of pragmatism and flexibility of Ottoman policies. 
The sub-question regarding why the Ottoman Empire was more suc-
cessful in dealing with the agents of decentralisation can be better an-
swered with a mention of müsadere. As detailed in chapter 4, 
müsadere was a highly institutionalised and sophisticated form of con-
fiscation in the eighteenth century. It helped the centre to keep the 
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power of centrifugal forces under constant control by creating a rela-
tively efficient redistribution of wealth. When other conditions of cen-
tralisation, such as a relatively peaceful period in the international 
arena, were apparent, they were not too powerful to resist. In compar-
ison to the Mughals, the Ottomans had lost a smaller proportion of 
their political power to the provinces because they were more success-
ful in keeping them dependent on the central state through processes 
of reciprocity discussed in chapter 5. Therefore, the forces of survival 
of müsadere indirectly contributed to the survival and recovery of the 
Empire. 
Returning to the question of abolition, when the recentralisation 
was partly achieved at the expense of provincial elites, müsadere was 
not as necessary. The Ottoman transition from non-hereditary owner-
ship of office-holders to private ownership was not due to the inability 
of enforcement as it was with the Mughals, but rather a deliberate 
choice because of the functional loss. This happened as such under 
influences of modernisation. Before proceeding any further, it is useful 
to note that the loss of territories in the early nineteenth century, es-
pecially with the independence of Greece in 1830, arguably increased 
the administrative capacity of the Ottoman Empire. With its size 
shrinking, it was less costly to monitor the agents. It is useful to restate 
that the abolition of müsadere occurred from within, that is, without 
much resistance from those who suffered from it. In this regard, it can-
not be regarded as a limitation to absolute power undesired by the 
sovereign. On the contrary, it happened at a time when the sovereign 
was more powerful. Therefore, the lesson to be drawn from this narra-
tive is not how absolute power was constrained but how and why prop-
erty rights were improved with the consolidation of central authority. 
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6.4 Conclusion	
This chapter argued that the practice of müsadere survived 
through the long-eighteenth century due to the continuity of its func-
tions and the lack of collective action. The lack of collective action was 
caused by the distinct institutional characteristic of müsadere, the 
lack of group identity among the targets of müsadere and the general 
institutional environment. Müsadere was abolished as a deliberate and 
resolute action in 1839 because of some loss in its functionality and 
because of an ideological change happening at the time. The chapter 
has shown that the issue of survival stands out when examined within 
the broader context of institutional research and Eurasian state for-
mation. In the Ottoman Empire, the practice of müsadere played a cru-
cial role in controlling the political and economic power of the provin-
cial figures at a time of decentralisation when investing on state capac-
ity was costly. The continual use of the müsadere practice in the eight-
eenth century contributed to the political survival through the modern 
era through enabling a transitional type of decentralisation, i.e. con-
trolled decentralisation.  
To link this argument with those of the previous chapters, it 
should be highlighted that even though müsadere infringed on the 
property rights of a specific group of people, this was not necessarily 
detrimental for economic growth and political stability. The economy 
suffered arguably more from problems of coordination and decentrali-
sation than insecurity of property. After all, the data shown in this 
chapter reveals that the targets of müsadere barely invested capital in 
resources outside the realm of the state. This does not make them a 
parasitic class as European aristocracy has long been labelled. How-
ever, we can argue with more confidence that they were a select group 
of people, though without a distinct group identity, who sought for 
privileges and grants from the ruler. At its best and with some con-
straints, the tool of confiscation enhanced the redistribution of wealth 
and power.   
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APPENDIX 6.1: Components of Inheritance of a Selected Sample of 
Provincial Elites Living in Coastal Areas (in proportion to total wealth) 
Name Year Occupa-
tion 
Location Jewel-
lery/Cash 
Fields/Vine
yards/Or-
chards 
Cere-
als 
Real Es-
tate 
Live-
stock 
House
wares 
Slaves Min-
ing 
Debts 
to 
Debt by 
Seyyid 
Abdülazi
z Ağa 
1788 Local No-
table 
Milas 0 5.78 0.73 0 9.41 0 0 64.06 20.00 0 
Ahmed 
Ağa 
1788 Governor Sığla 2.82 0 12.36 69.10 6.69 0 0 0 9.01 75.47 
Cani-
klizade 
1792 Local No-
table 
Canik 21.63 2.45 15.04 1.42 0 43.47 0.82 0 15.14 0 
Hacı Ali 
Ağa 
1798 Deputy 
Tax 
Farmer 
Boyabad 52.12 4.28 1.79 8.90 2.98 0.63 6.14 0 23.12 0 
Genç 
Mustafa 
1799 Superin-
tendent 
Canik 37.41 1.15 7.62 3.56 3.65 16.62 2.24 0 27.70 0 
İbrahim 
Ağa 
1805 Deputy 
Tax 
Farmer 
Akşehir 0.38 0 0 0 9.61 75.57 14.42 0 0 0 
Kör İs-
mailoğlu 
Hüseyin 
1808 Local No-
table 
Havza 0 0.19 3.66 14.20 9.30 4.29 0 0 68.33 63.46 
Ömer 
Ağa 
1809 Superin-
tendent 
Kırmasti 7.72 9.09 2.89 26.80 18.30 8.30 0.87 0 25.99 0 
Ci-
hanzade 
Abdulazi 
Bey 
1812 Local No-
table 
Aydın 7.45 0 60.94 18.47 0.68 6.13 6.30 0 0 164.06 
Süley-
man 
1813 Local No-
table 
Söğüt 0 2.80 58.18 22.21 16.79 0 0 0 0 0 
Tu-
lumoğlu 
Halil 
1813 Local No-
table 
Kozluca 0 2.46 16.32 0 71.57 9.63 0 0 0 0 
Seyyid 
Ömer 
Ağa 
1813 Deputy 
Tax 
Farmer 
Menteşe 2.33 11.80 5.32 20.96 48.30 0.70 1.80 0 8.77 0.61 
Evran-
lıoğlu 
Osman 
1813 Local No-
table 
İslimiye 1.42 0 0 16.39 0 5.69 0 0 76.48 24.90 
Sarıcaoğ
lu Os-
man 
1813 Local No-
table 
Yenişehir 0 4.11 34.85 0 27.31 8.073 0 0 25.64 0 
Osman 
Ağa 
1814 Local No-
table 
Babadağı 3.03 0 2.60 0 0 0 0 0 94.35 0 
Abdülfet
tah Bey 
1823 Local No-
table 
Zihne 0.24 0 86.09 10.01 3.65 0 0 0 0 374.58 
Ahmed 
Paşa 
1824 Governor Şam (Da-
mascus) 
13.94 0 0 0 4.84 7.13 3.14 0 70.92 26.25 
Yusuf 
Agah 
Efendi 
1824 Account-
ant of 
Palace 
Kitchen 
İstanbul 11.68 0 5.93 0 0 3.08 0 0 79.29 68.99 
Hacı 
Çelebioğ
lu Es-
Seyyid 
Osman 
Ağa 
1825 Superin-
tendent 
Değirmen
dere 
3.59 0 2.74 2.67 0.38 0 0.74 0 89.85 0 
Hasan 
Bey 
1829 Local No-
table 
Ermenek 77.39 0 0 0 22.60 0 0 0 0 3.54 
Source: See: Figure 6.2
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7 CONCLUSION	
This thesis has explored the driving forces, informal constraints, 
functions, survival and abolition of the practice of müsadere by the 
sultans of the Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the period from 
the 1700s to 1839, through the lens of new institutional economics. 
The main research question of the thesis asked what enabled, guided 
and motivated ‘predation’ by the Ottoman state, and how and to what 
extent. This research can be regarded as a case study. It was not solely 
the Ottoman sultans who confiscated the wealth of their subjects dur-
ing the pre-modern period. It was indeed a phenomenon of pre-moder-
nity that the sovereign seized wealth in different forms and with vari-
ous motives, methods, degrees of resistance and constraints. Yet the 
case of müsadere, despite its many complexities, stands as a fruitful 
working ground to study these elements of state predation under an 
allegedly absolutist monarch with no formal constraints to his power. 
Thus, the implications of this research also contributed to various 
strands of the current literature such as on the interaction between 
state capacity and confiscation, state policies under decentralisation, 
patrimonial management of elites under the threat of state confisca-
tion, and stability and change of property insecurity. In other words, 
the case of müsadere was used as a lens to analyse these themes in 
economic history.  
In doing so, this thesis has drawn on both quantitative and qual-
itative sources to identify and analyse the institutions surrounding the 
müsadere practice. First, a new dataset of confiscations was con-
structed from muhallefat records and supporting materials. In terms 
of methods, this thesis has followed independent yet complementary 
methods for respective chapters. I was motivated to do so because of 
the context-specific qualities of the practice of müsadere, which made 
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it necessary to look at its various aspects from different angles. In this 
respect, both econometric and qualitative methods were relevant and 
necessary. Descriptive statistics in chapter 2 allowed for the presenta-
tion of general characteristics of the practice, while econometric tech-
niques were used in chapter 3 to reveal the exact motives of the sultan. 
Game theory in chapter 4 helped to make sense of certain types of 
behaviour observed in the practice of müsadere, while a micro-histor-
ical examination in chapter 5 made it possible to understand the strat-
egies of the powerful under the threat of property insecurity. The ‘ana-
lytic narratives’ method employed in chapter 6 was useful to solve the 
puzzles of survival and abolition. These methods supported each other 
in terms of benefiting from one another’s findings. Even so, the ques-
tions they addressed could not be answered by the methods beside the 
primary one chosen for each respective question.    
Before proceeding to the contributions of the thesis, we should 
restate how the case of confiscation in the Ottoman Empire can be 
compared to other cases. First, the groups under the threat of confis-
cation were different from many other cases. Unlike sovereign lenders 
and merchants, office-holders and tax farmers did not have sufficient 
capacity to punish the sovereign because of the lack of collective ac-
tion. Second, the practice of müsadere was mostly post-mortem seizure 
of property, which at first seems like a political convention. Third, it 
was singular and rarely collective, except for cases in which rebellion 
was involved. These differences make it somewhat tricky to locate the 
case under scrutiny in a broader context of abuses of sovereign power 
in history. Yet, at the core, they were likely to be driven by similar mo-
tives. Additionally, they were similar in that they were exercised by the 
sovereign arbitrarily and selectively. In this respect, it was just a dif-
ferent form of taking, which is why the findings of this thesis are useful 
in understanding the scope and limits of state predation in early mod-
ern history. Practices, which were similar to the müsadere practice, 
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existed in other Islamic polities and later in China where the wealth of 
office-holders was at constant risk of confiscation too. Property rights 
and hereditary property rights in the modern sense emerged much 
later in Asia and the Middle East compared to the West.393  
On these notes, this section proceeds to evaluate how this thesis 
has contributed to the literature on the nature of policies of early mod-
ern states, state predation and patrimonial strategies of elites, state 
capacity and formation during the early modern period. In the rest of 
this chapter, I will first take a step back and re-evaluate the implica-
tions of the study for Ottoman economic history and general economic 
history. The focus will be on what this research has achieved and what 
its contribution to the above lines of literature has been. Then, I will 
touch on the limitations of this study by considering some potential 
areas of future research. 
Were sultans confiscatory and what determined their power and 
willingness to confiscate? The nature of absolutism has always been 
an important question of economic and political history, perhaps more 
so since the rise of the NIE in the 1970s. The main argument of a recent 
book by Acemoğlu and Robinson is that extractive institutions were the 
main culprit of interstate divergence that we observe today. Absolutism 
was obviously depicted as the most favourable ground for the emer-
gence of extractive institutions. In this book, they even directly refer to 
the Ottoman Empire as one of their examples as follows: ‘The reason 
that the economic changes that took place in England did not happen 
in the Ottoman Empire is the natural connection between extractive, 
absolutist political institutions and extractive economic institutions. 
Absolutism is rule unconstrained by law or the wishes of others, 
though in reality absolutists rule with the support of some small group 
                                         
393	 Huri	 İslamoğlu-İnan	 and	 Peter	 C.	 Perdue,	 Shared	 Histories	 of	 Modernity:	 China,	 India	 and	 the	
Ottoman	Empire,	Critical	Asian	Studies	(New	Delhi,	New	York:	Routledge,	2009).	
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or elite.’394 The main findings of the study do not mean that the sultan 
formally shared his de jure power with others. Yet those others were, 
at least indirectly, shaping his policies primarily in areas of warfare, 
taxation and confiscation. 
This study has repetitively drawn attention to the selectivity of 
the müsadere practice. The sultans did confiscate but only selectively 
so because their power and willingness to confiscate was not the same 
each time, location and for every family. The usual claim made by tra-
ditional historians of the Ottoman Empire that those who made wealth 
through state resources were automatically subject to confiscation fails 
to explain this selectivity. By relying on the current literature in eco-
nomics and political science exploring constraints on the sovereign, the 
present study argued that confiscations were driven by not only fiscal 
but also political and redistributive forces. The sultan’s aim, in this 
case, was not to maximise his revenues but to maximise his rule.395 
Moreover, to better understand the interactive nature of the müsadere, 
this thesis has given voice to the victims. Fiscal history has already 
shown that absolutist states did have less capacity to tax. Confisca-
tions were no different. Just like their inability to collect taxes at the 
level of fast-growing European states, confiscations occurred but lim-
itedly so. Admittedly, müsadere was just one aspect through which we 
can study the constraints on the sovereign.  
What were the self-constraints of the sultan’s power to confis-
cate? The thesis argued that the sultans were constrained by their con-
sideration of costs and benefits as well as by the bargaining power of 
the elites under the threat of müsadere. The former was linked with 
transaction costs of confiscation determined by the location and con-
fiscability of assets. Bargaining power of the elites varied over time, 
space and based on their resources. These variations shaped the power 
                                         
394	Acemoglu	and	Robinson,	Why	Nations	Fail.	
395	Irigoin	and	Grafe,	"Bounded	Leviathan."	
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and willingness of the sultan. In contrast to the literature, wars were 
found in the context of müsadere to have been negatively associated 
with confiscations. This was the case primarily because of the increase 
in relative bargaining power of the elites due to the increased need for 
their cooperation during wartime. In a way, the central state lacked the 
ability to fight wars abroad without the cooperation of the elites, which 
made it prefer military support to one-time revenue gains from confis-
cation.396 The role bargaining power played in the practice of müsadere 
urges us to pay more attention to the perspective of the victims when 
analysing this kind of institution in history. Constraints not neces-
sarily came from constitutions or representative institutions but from 
the nature of relations between the ruler and constituents as shaped 
by the institutions of societies. These non-formal constraints have been 
examined by social scientists in various contexts. But the Ottoman 
case seems to be largely missing from this literature.  
Why did rulers confiscate? They could indeed be driven by many 
motives. The need for more revenue was among them. I do not deny 
the fact that the sultans obtained much revenue through confisca-
tions. Although it was probably not significant in terms of its contribu-
tion to total state revenues, it served the purpose of being an extraor-
dinary source of revenue. However, the negative correlation between 
the power and willingness to confiscate with wars suggests that the 
revenue was extracted more outside the course of preparation and ac-
tual fighting of wars. The problem was rather with the size of the em-
pire and its low capacity, which made it difficult to monitor the behav-
iour of administrators and control the power of fiscal entrepreneurs. 
This political-economic function of the müsadere enabled redistribu-
tion of resources and exacerbation of competition over rents. While 
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provincial elites were attempting to monopolise rents, the central gov-
ernment wanted them to be redistributed among different actors as 
much as possible and preferably towards those who played by the in-
formally set rules. The risk of confiscation was known to these people, 
yet the business of governance was nevertheless the most profitable 
economic activity. This leads us to consider the relationship between 
the müsadere practice and economic performance.  
Did müsadere impede economic development and lead to the de-
cline of the Ottoman Empire? In earlier twentieth century historiog-
raphy, incompetency of later sultans was presented as the main reason 
for the economic and political decline of the empire. In contrast, eco-
nomic historians of the Empire recently adopted a different approach 
to the notion of its decline. Military decline, Şevket Pamuk argued, was 
an outcome of persistently low fiscal capacity.397 Other works blamed 
political, cultural and religious institutions regarded as ill-suited for 
economic growth. Among all these debates, however, an institution 
that seems to have survived from the classical regime into the era of 
modernity has been relatively understudied. Historians who studied 
the müsadere practice have generally taken a descriptive approach and 
few were, in fact, economic historians with an interest to link it to 
broader debates of economic history. Additionally, none of them have 
conducted a systematic analysis of the anatomy of this institution.  
The question here is whether the findings of the study lend any 
support to the view that confiscations were to be blamed for economic 
underdevelopment or the decline of the Ottoman Empire. They do not. 
First reason of this is that there were ways to evade it. Although this 
study did not touch on the issue of religious endowments, it is well-
known that these institutions of Islamic polities were used as a shelter 
from müsadere by the sultans. There was indeed a significant increase 
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both in the establishment of religious endowments in the eighteenth-
century Ottoman Empire and the proportion of family waqfs to total 
number of waqfs.398 Family waqfs were particularly designed for the 
above purpose. This function of waqfs has been emphasised, for exam-
ple, by Timur Kuran.399 Yet what is overlooked in these analyses is that 
most religious endowments were established by administrators and tax 
farmers, and these groups had little incentive to invest in growth-en-
hancing economic activities.  
Importantly, and as a second reason to why there is not much 
to blame confiscations for economic underdevelopment, the main tar-
gets of müsadere sought to obtain monopoly rents as opposed to any-
thing else. They were fiscal intermediaries and administrators with lit-
tle interest in investing in areas favourable to development. What they 
did was overwhelmingly dominated by rent-seeking using their monop-
oly power. The more powerful ones were more capable of protecting 
their wealth from the government. This capability is one of the main 
insights of North and Weingast’s renowned work regarding the impact 
of constraints to the power of the sovereign in England on industrial 
revolution.400 Yet, in the Ottoman case, neither sovereign lending ex-
isted nor productive classes such as merchants and artisans worried 
much about confiscation of their wealth. Those who felt the most inse-
cure were in the business of revenue extraction, and apparently many 
of them tried to maximise their revenue by not sending enough revenue 
to the centre. By confiscating their wealth, the government attempted 
to protect its share in the fiscal revenue pie. However, as mentioned 
above, it lacked the full capacity to do so.   
Although the indifference of the targets of müsadere to valuable 
activities has been emphasised in the current study, it should also be 
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stressed that they operated in an economic system without much in-
centive regardless of the existence of the müsadere practice. In this 
system, tax farming was the most lucrative activity despite the higher 
risk of confiscation. If other incentives for people to engage with trade 
had been in place, the same people, who have fallen victim to 
müsadere, would probably not have been operating in the fiscal sys-
tem. In that case, we would not even attempt to question whether it 
affected economic performance.  
While the müsadere practice in the eighteenth century is defined 
as an institution that enabled the central state to keep its control over 
the resources, it is necessary to ask whether it was conducive to the 
emergence of the modern state. Although the literature on the nature 
of political economy in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire had 
traditionally been centred on the dichotomy between centralisation 
and decentralisation, the revisionist literature has mainly referred to 
the uselessness of these concepts since the Ottoman Empire was never 
completely centralised. I continued to use these terms nonetheless, 
though carefully and in relative terms. One of the central themes of 
this line of literature has been the nature of relations between the cen-
tre and provincial elites, who were tax entrepreneurs and office-hold-
ers. Since the publication of the study by Ali Yaycıoğlu, we now know 
more about these relations.401 With the caveat that he is currently 
working on a new project on confiscations and their influence on peo-
ple’s lives, his recent book on provincial elites does not establish the 
link between müsadere and centre-periphery relations. In this respect, 
this study has referred to the fragility of what he calls ‘partnership.’ 
Provincial elites, as people who were dependent on state resources, 
used their sources of bargaining power to circumvent confiscations; yet 
this often-non-violent resistance was not sufficient to create any insti-
tutional change in their favour. Partnership, in other words, was under 
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the sultan’s control. The threat of confiscation enabled him to be the 
stronger player of the state-elite relations.  
In the economic historiography of the rise of the modern state, 
both political and fiscal centralisation was often emphasised as a nec-
essary condition.402 The müsadere practice contributed to both kinds 
of centralisation. In the eighteenth century when some power was del-
egated to the periphery, confiscations served the purpose of preventing 
higher degrees of decentralisation; while in the early nineteenth cen-
tury it played an important role in curbing the power of the local elites 
and enabled political centralisation. Fiscal centralisation was related 
to political centralisation since the local elites were fiscal entrepre-
neurs who retained tax revenues before the revenues reached the 
treasury. As shown in the thesis, these roles were limited to the extent 
that the elites were needed by the state during the period of transition 
to modern state, yet they had to be controlled both politically and eco-
nomically. Although there have been individual studies examining the 
confiscation of the wealth of provincial elites, this thesis is the first 
study that emphasised the importance of these abuses in understand-
ing the centre-periphery relations; and from there addressing such 
themes as centralisation, decentralisation and, more broadly, state for-
mation. In relation to this, the sultans were constrained in their ability 
to implement policies. Even though the elites were unable to organise 
collective action, they could bargain. Some capacity of the elites to ne-
gotiate with the centre stemmed, in the first place, from low capacity 
of the state, which had previously left the devolution of power to 
them.403 Under these conditions, confiscation was the best available 
policy to deal with the crisis of the eighteenth century while alternative 
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policies such as investment in state capacity were not feasible due to 
high costs associated with it caused by the difficulty of the vested in-
terest of the elites. Especially from the second half of the century until 
the 1820s, the practice of confiscation enabled the central administra-
tion to maintain a controlled decentralisation, that is, the political and 
economic power of the agents of decentralisation were kept under con-
stant control. 
Overall, this thesis thus contributed to the literature on the rise 
of modern states by stressing the role of confiscations in the Ottoman 
path to the modern state that started to emerge in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Müsadere contributed to the success of a low capacity state to 
reach modernity. This thesis showed how a low capacity state behaved 
in a period of crisis and transition, which could easily be fatal to its 
very existence. This capability to independently deal with this crisis, 
by itself, was a strength rather than weakness. It should be embedded 
in the fact that there were centuries of experience for the Empire when 
it came to confiscations. 
However, the complexities of the case of müsadere studied in this 
thesis are captured best by the framework drawn by North, Wallis and 
Weingast.404 That is, the role of the müsadere practice becomes clear 
when seen through the lens of their framework. They view the natural 
states as the dominant coalition of elites, while they constantly prevent 
non-elites from using factors of production by limiting access to them. 
They also capture the fragility of the position of elites by arguing that 
changes in “relative prices, demographics, economic growth, technol-
ogy and a host of other variables” could change their position.405 Most 
victims of confiscation in the Ottoman Empire were the members of the 
dominant coalition. They enjoyed many privileges and monopoly rents 
by limiting access to them. But their economic and political position 
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was extremely fragile. In this sense, the thesis contributed to the au-
thors’ framework by presenting an extreme form of fragile dominant 
coalition.  
Finally, the discussion in the previous chapter contributed to the 
literature on stability and change in institutions. Property rights of 
elites were secured greatly in 1839 partly because the sultans were not 
as interested in exercising confiscations as before. The literature on 
institutional persistence and change has focused on the role of exoge-
nous shocks leading to changes such as technological; yet the change 
took place in the absence of any exogenous shocks and collective ac-
tion by those whose rights were abused. It came in the form of changes 
in incentives of one of the parties.   
It is also necessary to highlight the limitations of this research, 
the first being source limitations. One can question, for example, the 
representativeness of the quantitative data used in chapters 2 and 3. 
The sources of the müsadere practice are quite dispersed even in the 
BOA, let alone those in other archives. There were, for example, some 
muhallefat records that would not specify details other than a list of 
assets. For the outcome of the müsadere process, I have resorted to 
the correspondence between the central government and müsadere 
agents. Yet even these sources were not always enough to finalise the 
details of the observation. My reading of qualitative sources, however, 
gives a picture that does not contradict the findings of the quantitative 
analysis. For the potentially questionable impact of wars on the power 
to confiscate, for example, I presented a document in chapter 5 show-
ing the same motive when they decided not to confiscate the wealth of 
the family. A second limitation is that there were obviously elements of 
the müsadere that were unmeasurable in the quantitative analysis. 
This, however, was the precise purpose of the multi-method approach 
adopted in the study. With the help of other sources, I have tried to 
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shed light on how patrimonial management strategies or relative bar-
gaining power of the families played an important role. A future work 
can be comparing confiscated inheritances with non-confiscated ones 
by employing tereke records. Due to the time limitation, I have decided 
to make use of the outcome of the process of confiscation, but such a 
comparison may yield further results. 
What this research has not directly attempted to examine is the 
impact of confiscations on economic growth. I could not test this im-
portant issue due to the questions about the representativeness of the 
data, the time limitation of the doctoral programme, and the fact that 
the period under question did not show much fluctuation in terms of 
economic indicators. Indirectly, however, I have analysed the actions 
and investments of potential victims of confiscation, finding that they 
were not productive classes. A complete analysis of this issue can be 
done in future, however. For that, one would possibly need to collect 
data for a longer period. This can be done perhaps by comparing the 
period before and after the abolition of the müsadere practice, control-
ling for all potential variables that could have influenced economic per-
formance.  
As I have found in this study, the existence and survival of 
müsadere was more related to low state capacity than to property 
rights. It must have had some detrimental effects in terms of economic 
incentives. The main point of any future research, however, should re-
volve around the themes of state capacity, state formation and political 
economy. An important caveat, however, is the role of religious endow-
ments which were arguably used as a shelter from confiscation. This 
role of waqfs should be one of the directions of future research as well. 
It was not one of the objectives of the present study and I do not believe 
this significantly affected its quality; but archival sources regarding the 
functioning and founders of religious endowments are quite rich. It 
would be an important contribution not only to the field of Ottoman 
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economic history but also to the field of Islamic economic history to 
analyse to what extent the founders of family waqfs established these 
institutions with the motive of protecting their wealth. For this, an ex-
amination should be made regarding the extent to which the founders 
were the members of the same family who were paid constant salaries 
by the waqfs, and how likely it was for these people to invest their cap-
ital in productive activities if they were not under the threat of confis-
cation.  
Another potential area of future research is comparisons be-
tween property rights abuses. From my preliminary attempt in chapter 
6, it appears that Islamic and Asian states exercised similar practices 
in the pre-modern period. One would probably not find sources of con-
fiscation for the Safavids of Iran for which there is very scarce data 
except for chronicles. However, the archives of the Mughal Empire, es-
pecially those sources in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives, seem to 
be very promising in making this comparison between the müsadere 
practice of the Ottoman Empire and the one called zabt by the Mughals 
exercised for the wealth of zamindars.406 Although a high majority of 
sources in the Mughal archives are not yet catalogued, there should be 
a way of handling this issue for those who can read the Shikasta script 
of Persian. One additional source for comparison is early modern 
China during the Qing dynasty (r. 1644-1912). From the recent work 
of Rubin and Ma (2017), similarities between the two cases can easily 
be found.407 A collaborative work between economic historians of 
China and the Ottoman Empire has the potential to reveal important 
findings regarding early modern political economies in Eurasia that did 
not even share a religion, as in the case of the Mughal-Ottoman com-
parison. 
                                         
406	Islam,	"The	Mughal	System	of	Escheat:	An	Analytical	Study".	
407	Ma	and	Rubin,	"Paradox	of	Power."	
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